When Is HIV a Crime? Sexuality, Gender and Consent by Shayo Buchanan, Kim
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
2015
When Is HIV a Crime? Sexuality, Gender and
Consent
Kim Shayo Buchanan
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Shayo Buchanan, Kim, "When Is HIV a Crime? Sexuality, Gender and Consent" (2015). Minnesota Law Review. 256.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/256
BUCHANAN_4fmt 4/7/2015 4:27 PM 
 
1231 
Article 
When Is HIV a Crime? Sexuality, Gender 
and Consent 
Kim Shayo Buchanan† 
I.  Rationales for HIV Criminalization: Public Health and 
Moral Retribution ......................................................... 1239 
A.  The Public Health Critique ................................... 1241 
B.  Low-Status Victims: IV Drug Users, Sex 
Workers, and Men Who Have Sex with Men ........ 1248 
C.  Moral Retribution .................................................. 1253 
II.  Sexual Autonomy and HIV disclosure ............................. 1262 
A   Partners’ Interest in HIV Disclosure ................... 1263 
B.  Nondisclosure As Sexual Assault .......................... 1264 
1.  Canada .............................................................. 1265 
2.  The United States ............................................ 1267 
C.  Three Versions of “Informed Consent” .................. 1272 
i.  Rape by Deception ............................................ 1273 
2.  Undisclosed Health Risks ................................ 1278 
a.  HIV and other dangerous infections.......... 1278 
b.  Contraceptive fraud ................................... 1285 
iii. Informed Consent: The Medical Model ........... 1287 
D.  Sexual Autonomy and Gender Equality ............... 1289 
III.  Innocent Victims and AIDS Monsters: The Race and 
Gender of HIV Crime .................................................... 1294 
 
 † Associate Professor, University of Southern California Gould School of 
Law. This Article has benefited greatly from discussions with many more peo-
ple than can be thanked here, especially Aziza Ahmed, Erez Aloni, Susan 
Frelich Appleton, Katharine Bartlett, Sam Bray, David Cruz, Anne Dailey, 
Adrienne Davis, Paul Gowder, Camille Gear Rich, Ariela Gross, Aya Gruber, 
Isabel Grant, Jill Hasday, Trevor Hoppe, Joy Jones, Margo Kaplan, Alex Lee, 
Jack Lerner, Martha Shaffer, Giovanna Shay, Nomi Stolzenberg, and the par-
ticipants in workshops at AALS (Criminal Law and Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Law sections), Boston University, the Canadian HIV and AIDS Legal 
Network, Pepperdine, Southwestern Law School, USC, UC Hastings, and Law 
and Society. I am grateful to Quincy Chuck, Josh Macleod, Henna Pithia, and 
Nick Shapiro, and especially to librarian Paul Moorman, for invaluable re-
search assistance. Copyright © 2015 by Kim Shayo Buchanan. 
BUCHANAN_4fmt 4/7/2015  4:27 PM 
1232 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:1231 
 
IV.  The Gender of HIV Prosecution ...................................... 1306 
A.  Demographics of Nondisclosure Prosecutions ...... 1308 
B.  Gendered prosecution disparities: Why? .............. 1313 
C.  What About Heterosexual Men? ........................... 1319 
D.  Sexual Orientation and Perceived HIV Risk ........ 1322 
E.  Gender, Intimacy and Sexual Deception .............. 1328 
V.  Policy Implications: Ratchet Up or Down? ....................... 1338 
Conclusion ............................................................................... 1342 
 
Almost everyone—including most people with HIV—would 
agree that HIV-positive people (that is, people living with hu-
man immunodeficiency virus) should tell their partners of their 
serostatus before having sex.1 But should failure to do so be a 
crime?  
Throughout the United States and Canada, courts and leg-
islatures tend to assume that it should be. In nearly every 
state, people with HIV have been prosecuted for failing to dis-
close their serostatus before having sex.2 Between 1987 and 
 
 1. See, e.g., Scott Burris et al., Do Criminal Laws Influence HIV Risk Be-
havior? An Empirical Trial, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 467, 503 (2007) (finding that 
large majorities of HIV-positive and HIV-negative respondents agreed that 
people with HIV should disclose their serostatus before sex); P.M. Gorbach et 
al., Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Patterns of HIV Disclosure Among HIV Positive Men 
Who Have Sex with Men with Recent STI Practising High Risk Behaviour in 
Los Angeles and Seattle, 80 SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED INFECTIONS 512, 516 
(2004) (finding that most HIV-positive men recognized an “ethical responsibil-
ity” to disclose); Keith J. Horvath et al., Should It Be Illegal for HIV-Positive 
Persons To Have Unprotected Sex Without Disclosure? An Examination of Atti-
tudes Among US Men Who Have Sex with Men and the Impact of State Law, 
22 AIDS CARE 1221, 1224 (2010) (“Sixty-five percent of respondents believed 
that it should be illegal for an HIV-positive person . . . to have unprotected sex 
without telling the other person of their HIV status . . . .” (emphasis added) 
(The study did not ask whether it should be a crime to have protected sex.)); 
Scott Burris & Matthew Weait, Criminalisation and the Moral Responsibility 
for Sexual Transmission of HIV, 23 (Global Comm’n on HIV & the Law, 
Working Paper, 2011) (acknowledging the principle that people living with 
HIV owe a moral duty to disclose or practice safer sex). Canadian surveys of 
HIV-positive respondents found that more than seventy percent supported 
criminalization of nondisclosure before unprotected sex “in some circumstanc-
es.” BARRY D. ADAM ET AL., HOW CRIMINALIZATION IS AFFECTING PEOPLE 
LIVING WITH HIV IN ONTARIO 23 (2012), available at http://www.ohtn.on.ca/ 
Documents/Research/B-Adam-OHTN-Criminalization-2012.pdf.  
 2. See generally RENÉ BENNETT-CARLSON ET AL., POSITIVE JUSTICE 
PROJECT, CTR. FOR HIV LAW & POL’Y, ENDING AND DEFENDING AGAINST HIV 
CRIMINALIZATION: STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS AND PROSECUTIONS (2014) 
[hereinafter CHLP, ENDING AND DEFENDING], available at http:// 
hivlawandpolicy.org/resources/ending-and-defending-against-hiv 
-criminalization-state-and-federal-laws-and-prosecutions, (surveying HIV-
specific laws and criminal prosecutions, including nondisclosure and other 
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2005, twenty-four states passed statutes that criminalize sexu-
al nondisclosure of HIV.3 In many other states, nondisclosure is 
prosecuted using general criminal statutes, such as reckless 
endangerment, aggravated assault, and, occasionally, attempt-
ed murder.4 Criminal laws typically require that a person who 
knows he or she has HIV must disclose his or her serostatus be-
fore engaging in sexual or nonsexual activities that are deemed 
to expose a partner to HIV.5 In most states, condom use is no 
defense.6 No law distinguishes lies about HIV status from situ-
ations in which the complainant simply assumed that the ac-
cused was HIV-negative.7 Generally, if the HIV-positive person 
does not disclose, he or she is guilty of a crime even if the sexu-
al activity posed very low risk of transmission, or posed no 
transmission risk at all.8 In general, nondisclosure complain-
ants have not been infected, and allegations of transmission 
appear to be rare.9 
 
HIV-specific crimes and sentence enhancements across all U.S. states and ter-
ritories); CTR. FOR HIV LAW & POL’Y, PROSECUTIONS AND ARRESTS FOR HIV 
EXPOSURE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2008-2014 (2015), available at 
http://www.hivlawandpolicy.org/resources/chlp-publications (follow “Chart: 
Prosecutions for HIV Exposure in the United States 2008-2014” hyperlink) 
[hereinafter CHLP, PROSECUTIONS]; Zita Lazzarini et al., Evaluating the Im-
pact of Criminal Laws on HIV Risk Behavior, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 239, 248 
fig.2 (2002) (presenting the distribution of HIV-related prosecutions by state). 
 3. Margo Kaplan, Rethinking HIV-Exposure Crimes, 87 IND. L.J. 1517, 
1518 (2012). 
 4. CHLP, ENDING AND DEFENDING, supra note 2, at 12. Many states 
also have statutes that criminalize exposure to sexually transmissible infec-
tions (STI) more generally. According to the CHLP, “The penalties under these 
statutes tend to be limited to misdemeanors and there is no record of a case of 
HIV exposure ever being prosecuted under such statutes.” Id. at 2; CHLP, 
PROSECUTIONS, supra note 2 (documenting the prosecution of HIV nondisclo-
sure, biting and spitting as, inter alia, aggravated assault, reckless endanger-
ment, and attempted murder). 
 5. See CHLP, ENDING AND DEFENDING, supra note 2 (detailing the laws 
of each state). 
 6. Id. at 300. California requires HIV disclosure only before “unprotect-
ed” sex, defined as vaginal or anal intercourse without a condom. CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120291 (West 2012); see also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/12-5.01 (West 2014); MINN. STAT. § 609.2241(1)(e) (2014). 
 7. See CHLP, ENDING AND DEFENDING, supra note 2. 
 8. See infra Part I.A. 
 9. Trevor Hoppe surveyed every HIV-nondisclosure prosecution in Mich-
igan between 1992 and 2010, finding that only four of fifty-eight convictions 
(6.9%) involved any allegation of transmission. Trevor Hoppe, From Sickness 
to Badness: The Criminalization of HIV in Michigan, 101 SOC. SCI. & MED. 
139, 143 (2014). Carol Galletly and Zita Lazzarini surveyed every prosecution 
in Nashville between 2000 and 2010, finding that only three of sixteen sexual 
nondisclosure prosecutions (18.75%) involved any allegation of transmission. 
BUCHANAN_4fmt 4/7/2015  4:27 PM 
1234 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:1231 
 
Although nondisclosure laws have consistently been upheld 
against constitutional challenges,10 a well-established public 
health critique points out that HIV criminalization bears little 
relationship to transmission risk and fails to account for ad-
vances in medical treatment; it may undermine effective public 
health interventions; and it does not increase disclosure, deter 
high-risk behaviors, or reduce transmission.11 These scholars 
also critique the retributive rationale for HIV criminalization, 
pointing out that criminal laws exacerbate the discrimination 
and stigma that make disclosure so difficult. They question 
whether nondisclosure is morally culpable in light of partners’ 
ability to protect themselves by using condoms or engaging in 
safer sexual behaviors.12 Legal commentators have also criti-
cized the inconsistency of HIV laws with general principles of 
criminal liability, pointing out that the elements of HIV-
disclosure mandates make ill-fitting proxies for risky acts, cul-
pable mental states, and victim consent to transmission risks.13  
Legislators, police, and prosecutors, however, seem to have 
been largely impervious to this critique. Although the federal 
government has recently questioned the utility of HIV criminal-
ization,14 no state has repealed its HIV criminal law.15 Nor do 
 
Carol L. Galletly & Zita Lazzarini, Charges for Criminal Exposure to HIV and 
Aggravated Prostitution Filed in the Nashville, Tennessee Prosecutorial Region 
20002010, 7 AIDS BEHAV. 2624, 2627, 2628 tbl.3 (2013); see also CHLP, 
PROSECUTIONS, supra note 2; EDWIN J. BERNARD, KAFKAESQUE: A CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS OF US HIV NON-DISCLOSURE, EXPOSURE AND TRANSMISSION CASES, 
20072009, available at https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/1576514/ 
Kafkaesque_poster_A4_download.pdf (finding that, of eighty-two HIV prosecu-
tions identified in a twenty-five-month period in the United States, only seven 
(8.5%) involved an allegation of transmission).  
 10. See, e.g., Guevara v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 421, 42527 (Ct. 
App. 1998); State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d 734, 757 (Iowa 2006); State v. 
Turner, No. 2005-0078 (La. App. 1 Cir. Nov. 4, 2005); 927 So. 2d 438; State v. 
Gamberella, 633 So. 2d 595, 607 (La. App. 1993); People v. Flynn, No. 199753 
1998 WL 1989782, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 1998); People v. Jensen, 564 
N.W.2d 192, 194 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997), vacated in part, 456 Mich. 935 (1998). 
 11. See infra note 55. 
 12. See infra Part I.C. 
 13. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 3; Ari Ezra Waldman, Exceptions: The 
Criminal Law’s Illogical Approach to HIV-Related Aggravated Assaults, 18 VA. 
J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 550 (2011). 
 14. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF NAT’L AIDS POL’Y, NATIONAL HIV/AIDS 
STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATES 3637 (2010), available at http://www 
.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/NHAS.pdf (noting that criminal 
laws “do not influence the behavior of people living with HIV in those states 
where these laws exist,” they “run counter to scientific evidence about routes 
of HIV transmission,” may undermine public health efforts to encourage test-
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prosecutions seem to be slowing down: rather, since the mid-
2000s, they seem to be on the rise worldwide,16 and there are no 
indications of a slowdown in the United States.17  
The existing critique has largely neglected another influen-
tial rationale for HIV criminalization: sexual autonomy, or “in-
formed consent.”18 If one partner is not told that the other has 
 
ing and treatment, and may deter disclosure by increasing fears of discrimina-
tion). 
 15. Illinois and Iowa are the only states that have amended their HIV 
laws since the Obama Administration’s 2010 urging that they consider doing 
so. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-5.01 (West 2014); IOWA CODE § 709D 
(2015). In response to a 2009 prosecution that failed because the prosecutors 
could not access the medical records of the accused, the Illinois legislature 
amended its HIV legislation to authorize prosecutorial access to such records. 
Ramon Gardenhire, How Illinois’ Criminal HIV Law Has Changed, AIDS 
FOUND. CHI. (July 27, 2012), http://www.aidschicago.org/page/news/all-news/ 
howillinois-hiv-criminalization-law-has-changed. In exchange for not opposing 
the bill, the ACLU of Illinois and two AIDS organizations negotiated changes 
that limited prosecutions to condomless anal or vaginal penetration with the 
specific intent to transmit HIV. Id.; see also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-
5.01 (West 2014). 
 16. See, e.g., Sally Cameron et al., International Trends Towards the 
Criminalization of HIV Transmission UK, New Zealand and Canada: Laws, 
Cases and Response, in NAT’L ASSOC. PEOPLE LIVING WITH AIDS, THE 
CRIMINALISATION OF HIV TRANSMISSION IN AUSTRALIA: LEGALITY, MORALITY 
AND REALITY 32, 32 (Sally Cameron & John Rule eds., 2009), available at 
http://criminalisation.gnpplus.net/sites/default/files/2009_napwa_monograph 
.pdf (noting that prosecutions for HIV transmission began in Scotland in 2001 
and in England in 2003); MATTHEW WEAIT, INTIMACY AND RESPONSIBILITY: 
THE CRIMINALISATION OF HIV TRANSMISSION 11 (2007); UNAIDS, 
BACKGROUND PAPER: CRIMINALISATION OF HIV NON-DISCLOSURE, EXPOSURE 
AND TRANSMISSION: BACKGROUND AND CURRENT LANDSCAPE 7 (2012) (finding 
that the United States and Canada account for “the vast majority of reported 
prosecutions” worldwide); Eric Mykhalovskiy & Glenn Betteridge, Who? What? 
Where? When? And with What Consequences? An Analysis of Criminal Cases of 
HIV Non-Disclosure in Canada, 27 CAN. J. L. & SOC’Y 31, 3738 (2012) (noting 
a sharp increase in HIV-nondisclosure prosecutions in Canada beginning in 
2004); Asha Persson & Christy Newman, Making Monsters: Heterosexuality, 
Crime and Race in Recent Western Media Coverage of HIV, 30 SOC. OF HEALTH 
& ILLNESS 632, 63233 (2008) (finding an increase in prosecutions in the 
West).  
 17. Comprehensive HIV prosecution data are not available for the United 
States as a whole, but the two comprehensive jurisdiction-wide surveys of HIV 
prosecutions that have been conducted to date—in Nashville and in Michi-
gan—found no decline in prosecutions. See CHLP, PROSECUTIONS, supra note 
2 (identifying nineteen prosecutions in 2008, thirty-four in 2009, thirty-three 
in 2010, forty-four in 2011, twenty-six in 2012, and twenty-eight in 2013); 
Galletly & Lazzarini, supra note 9, at 2628 fig.1 (reporting arrests occurring 
each year between 2000 and 2010); Hoppe, supra note 9, at 14445 tbl.1 (de-
scribing prosecutions for almost every year between 1992 and 2010). 
 18. This Article uses “sexual autonomy” and “informed consent” inter-
changeably to describe an intuition that the criminal law should protect a 
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HIV, his or her sexual consent can be said to be invalid because 
it is uninformed. This reasoning, which the Supreme Court of 
Canada has adopted and many U.S. courts have assumed,19 
frames HIV nondisclosure as a crime akin to sexual assault. 
This rationale might obviate the public health critique: an un-
informed partner might be injured by having had sex he or she 
might otherwise have refused, regardless of whether he or she 
was harmed or even put at risk. Perhaps because of its intui-
tive and doctrinal link to sexual assault, feminist and other le-
gal scholars have rarely questioned the sexual autonomy ra-
tionale for HIV criminalization.20 Thus the first major 
 
right of HIV-negative people to know in advance whether their partners have 
been diagnosed with HIV. Part II.C, infra, elaborates three potential interpre-
tations of the informed-consent rationale for HIV criminalization. 
 19. See infra Part II.B.  
 20. U.S. critics of HIV criminalization have yet to substantively engage 
with the sexual autonomy rationale. Alison Symington, a Canadian HIV advo-
cate, offers the only systematic critique of the notion that HIV nondisclosure 
vitiates sexual consent. Alison Symington, HIV Exposure As Assault: Progres-
sive Development or Misplaced Focus? in SEXUAL ASSAULT IN CANADA: LAW, 
LEGAL PRACTICE AND WOMEN’S ACTIVISM 635, 655 (Elizabeth A. Sheehy, ed., 
2012); see also Burris & Weait, supra note 1, at 13 (discussing nondisclosure 
and consent). Other Canadian legal scholars have criticized HIV criminaliza-
tion for various reasons, but have not seriously challenged the holding of the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s 1998 holding in R. v. Cuerrier, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371, 
376 (Can.), that nondisclosure vitiates sexual consent. See, e.g., 10 Reasons 
Why Criminalization of HIV Exposure or Transmission Harms Women, 
ATHENA NETWORK (2009), http://www.athenanetwork.org (follow “10 Reasons 
Why Criminalization Harms Women” hyperlink); Rebecca J. Cook, Develop-
ments in Judicial Approaches to Sexual and Reproductive Health, 21 MED. & 
L. 155, 161 (2002) (discussing prejudice towards and discrimination against 
people with AIDS); Matthew Cornett, Criminalization of the Intended Trans-
mission or Knowing Non-Disclosure of HIV in Canada, 5 MCGILL J. L. & 
HEALTH 61 (2011); Isabel Grant, The Boundaries of the Criminal Law: The 
Criminalization of the Non-Disclosure of HIV, 31 DAL. L.J. 123, 12380 (2008) 
[hereinafter Grant, Boundaries] (arguing for a limited application of criminal 
law to nondisclosure); Isabel Grant, The Over-Criminalization of Persons with 
HIV, 63 U. TORONTO L.J. 475, 481 (2013) [hereinafter Grant, Over-
Criminalization] (suggesting alternatives such as criminal negligence causing 
bodily harm or common nuisance); Isabel Grant, The Prosecution of Non-
Disclosure of HIV in Canada: Time To Rethink Cuerrier, 5 MCGILL J.L. & 
HEALTH 7, 4849, 57 (2013) [hereinafter Grant, Time To Rethink Cuerrier] 
(arguing that nondisclosure without transmission should be charged as simple 
sexual assault or common nuisance, rather than aggravated sexual assault); 
Isabel Grant, A Tale of Two Cases: Urging Caution in the Prosecution of HIV 
Non-Disclosure, 15 HIV/AIDS POL’Y & L. REV. 1519 (2011) (same); Isabel 
Grant, Rethinking Risk: The Relevance of Condoms and Viral Load in HIV 
Nondisclosure Prosecutions, 54 MCGILL L.J. 389, 395404 (2009) (discussing 
the scope of and approaches to criminal laws related to HIV nondisclosure); 
Sara Klemm, Keeping Prevention in the Crosshairs: A Better HIV Exposure 
Law for Maryland, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 495, 519 n.192 (2010) (not-
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contribution of this Article is to challenge the sexual autonomy 
rationale for singling out HIV as a crime.  
Given the weakness of public health, retributive, and au-
tonomy justifications for the continued criminalization of HIV, 
we should consider other explanations. The seemingly arbitrary 
inclusions and exclusions of HIV criminal laws (whether for 
nondisclosure, prostitution, or biting or spitting), and the strik-
ing gender disparities in HIV prosecutions, all tend to raise 
suspicion that discriminatory impulses may be at work. 
The second contribution of this Article, then, is to examine 
the role of race, gender, and sexual inequalities in shaping legal 
and public perceptions about whether, when, and why HIV is a 
crime. In previous work, I have shown that discriminatory fal-
lacies about gender, race, and sexuality may shape popular 
perceptions and legal responses to prison rape. While academ-
ics, judges, and policymakers focus disproportionate attention 
on abuses that conform to preconceptions about race, gender, 
and sexuality, sexual abuse that confounds stereotypical expec-
tations is largely ignored.21 This Article reveals a similar dy-
namic in HIV prosecutions. On paper and in practice, such 
prosecutions seem to reflect an inchoate expectation that heter-
osexuals should be free from anxiety about HIV when they are 
doing what they should: having heterosexual sex and not inject-
ing drugs. Criminal laws tend to treat HIV as morally and le-
gally unproblematic when contained within stigmatized groups 
such as intravenous drug users, sex workers, Africans, and es-
pecially gay men. When HIV-positive people transgress these 
stereotypical boundaries and cause more privileged heterosex-
uals to worry about HIV, this transgression seems more likely 
to be perceived and punished as a crime. 
 
ing the difference between deceit and nondisclosure); Emily MacKinnon & 
Constance Crompton, The Gender of Lying: Feminist Perspectives on the Non-
Disclosure of HIV Status, 45 U. BRITISH COLUMBIA L. REV. 407 (2012); 
Carissima Mathen & Michael Plaxton, HIV, Consent and Criminal Wrongs, 57 
CRIM. L.Q. 464 (2011); Martha Shaffer, Sex, Lies, and HIV: Mabior and the 
Concept of Sexual Fraud, 63 U. TORONTO L.J. 476, 47074 (2013) (arguing, 
largely on the ground of transmission risk, that sexual assault is “too blunt an 
instrument” to address HIV nondisclosure). 
 21. See, e.g., Kim Shayo Buchanan, Engendering Rape, 59 UCLA L. REV. 
1630 (2012) [hereinafter Buchanan, Engendering Rape]; Kim Shayo Buchan-
an, E-race-ing Gender: The Racial Construction of Prison Rape, in 
MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH (Frank R. 
Cooper & Ann C. McGinley eds., 2012) [hereinafter Buchanan, E-race-ing 
Gender]; Kim Shayo Buchanan, Our Prisons, Ourselves: Race, Gender and the 
Rule of Law, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2010) [hereinafter Buchanan, Our 
Prisons, Ourselves]. 
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Part I of this Article considers two rationales for HIV crim-
inalization: public health and moral retribution. The ways in 
which criminal laws diverge from their public health justifica-
tion tend systematically to favor prosecution when the victim is 
engaged in heteronormative social behavior, and to preclude 
prosecution on behalf of low-status victims: intravenous drug 
users, sex workers, or men who have sex with men. Moreover, 
moral retribution standing alone cannot explain the frequent 
prosecution of nondisclosures that are not (or are not especial-
ly) morally blameworthy.  
Part II addresses informed-consent rationales for HIV 
criminalization. Sexual autonomy offers little reason to single 
out HIV nondisclosure as a crime when almost all other sexual 
deception is lawful. HIV disclosure requirements are also in-
commensurable with medical models of informed consent. Fi-
nally, although proponents of criminalization tend to assume it 
would promote gender equality by requiring HIV-positive men 
to disclose to their female partners, HIV nondisclosure is not 
gendered in the way these commentators assume.  
Part III considers the role of race, gender, and sexual hier-
archies in the origins of HIV criminalization. HIV was largely 
ignored by criminal law until well-publicized allegations that 
black men had infected white women. By reframing nondisclo-
sure as sexual assault, HIV laws tend to shift discursive and 
prosecutorial focus from the people most affected by HIV—men 
who have sex with men—to heterosexual women. HIV nondis-
closure starts to look and feel like a racialized crime that mat-
ters most when men do it to women.  
Part IV examines the striking gender disparity in HIV 
prosecutions found throughout the Anglo-American legal world. 
Although most HIV transmission—and, apparently, most non-
disclosure—takes place between men, most prosecutions in-
volve female complainants and male accused. This Part consid-
ers potential explanations for this disparity; they are largely 
consistent with stereotypical expectations that heterosexuals 
should be exempt from anxiety about HIV.  
Part V addresses the policy implications of this critique, 
arguing that the discriminatory social meaning and effects of 
HIV criminalization are best addressed by ratcheting down (de-
criminalization), rather than ratcheting up (criminalizing other 
diseases and deceptions). In the absence of defensible public 
health, retributive, or autonomy reasons to criminalize HIV, 
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the discrimination that seems to pervade the theory and im-
plementation of HIV crime points toward repeal.  
I.  RATIONALES FOR HIV CRIMINALIZATION: PUBLIC 
HEALTH AND MORAL RETRIBUTION   
Arguments from moral retribution (and sexual autonomy) 
depend in part on perceptions about how dangerous HIV is, and 
how likely it is that sexual contact would result in transmis-
sion. If sex with an HIV-positive person were very likely to 
transmit HIV, and transmission would certainly cause prema-
ture death, then retributive and sexual autonomy rationales for 
criminalizing nondisclosure might be more compelling than 
they are today. Nondisclosure of HIV might matter more to 
sexual consent than nondisclosure of another, less dangerous 
sexually transmissible infection (STI). Or it might be uniquely 
morally blameworthy. Exposing someone to such a terrible risk 
might warrant criminal punishment in a way other nondisclo-
sures might not, and it might warrant punishment even if 
criminalization had no deterrent effect. Thus an accurate un-
derstanding of the health risks of HIV is essential to evaluating 
arguments based on moral retribution. This Part addresses 
those risks. (Readers who are familiar with the public health 
critique of HIV criminalization may wish to skip directly to 
Sections B and C of this Part.)  
Neither public health nor moral retribution explains why 
nondisclosure should be a crime when the criminalized behav-
ior cannot transmit HIV. For example, Kanay Mubita and Nick 
Rhoades, like most nondisclosure accused, did not transmit 
HIV. Moreover, neither man exposed his uninformed partner to 
any transmission risk. Mubita, a Zambian-American, was sen-
tenced to four years’ imprisonment for nondisclosure after per-
forming oral sex on an Idaho woman.22 This activity cannot 
transmit HIV.23 Likewise, Nick Rhoades, a gay man in Iowa, 
was receiving antiretroviral treatment that had reduced his vi-
ral load (the concentration of HIV in his bloodstream) to unde-
 
 22. State v. Mubita, 188 P.3d 867, 871, 882–83 (Idaho 2008). 
 23. Saliva cannot transmit HIV. HIV Transmission: “Can I Get HIV from 
Being Spit on or Scratched by an HIV-Infected Person?,” CDC, http://www 
.cdc.gov/hiv/basics/transmission.html (last updated Sept. 23, 2014). Thus per-
formance of oral sex by a person with HIV carries “little to no risk.” Oral Sex 
and HIV Risk, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/risk/behavior/oralsex.html# 
references (last updated May 21, 2014); see also Mubita, 188 P.3d at 882–83 
(noting Mubita’s argument that he could not have exposed his partner to HIV, 
because they only engaged in oral sex). 
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tectable levels.24 As a result, he was incapable of transmitting 
HIV.25 Moreover, he used a condom when he had one-time sex 
with a new partner.26 This activity posed “no “realistic possibil-
ity of transmission.”27 He was sentenced to twenty-five years’ 
imprisonment.28 After a letter-writing campaign on his behalf, 
his sentence was suspended and he was released, but Rhoades 
had to register as a sex offender and was forbidden to see his 
nieces and nephews.29  
Many critics have argued that HIV criminalization does 
not advance public health. I contend here that the seemingly 
arbitrary ways in which HIV crimes diverge from their public 
health rationale tend systematically to construct HIV as fairly 
benign when contained within stigmatized populations such as 
sex workers, intravenous drug users, and men who have sex 
with men. At the same time, these laws tend to criminalize the 
conduct of HIV-positive people when their behavior causes anx-
iety to more privileged heterosexuals,30 even when it poses no 
transmission risk. Unlike rape, HIV nondisclosure is not al-
ways so grievously wrong that it should be a crime. Many HIV-
positive people, like Mubita and Rhoades, have been prosecuted 
for nondisclosures that are not morally blameworthy, or are not 
blameworthy enough to deserve criminal punishment.  
 
 24. Rhoades v. State, 848 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Iowa 2014). 
 25. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 26. Rhoades, 848 N.W.2d at 25–26. 
 27. R. v. Mabior, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 584, 622 (Can.) (reviewing scientific evi-
dence and concluding that sex with a condom while viral load is negligible 
does not put partner at “significant risk” of HIV infection); see also infra notes 
39, 41–42 and accompanying text. 
 28. Saundra Young, Imprisoned Over HIV: One Man’s Story, CNN (Nov. 9, 
2012, 8:42 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/02/health/criminalizing-hiv/index 
.html. 
 29. Id. As this Article went to press, the Iowa Supreme Court granted 
postconviction relief on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, given 
that transmission was not “reasonably possible on the facts and circumstances 
of the case.” Rhoades, 848 N.W.2d at 28, 32–33.  
 30. Complainants in nondisclosure cases are usually, but not invariably, 
women who had sex with men. See infra Part IV. As the Rhoades prosecution 
demonstrates, some complainants are men who had sex with men. Like the 
Rhoades complainant, many of these men seem to be fairly privileged. See in-
fra note 356. 
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A. THE PUBLIC HEALTH CRITIQUE 
Public health researchers are near unanimous in arguing 
that HIV should be decriminalized.31 They contend that, by 
 
 31. See, e.g., GLOBAL COMMISSION ON HIV AND THE LAW, RISKS, RIGHTS & 
HEALTH 97 (2012) [hereinafter GLOBAL COMMISSION REPORT], available at 
http://www.hivlawcommission.org/resources/report/FinalReport-Risks, 
Rights&Health-EN.pdf (“Countries must not enact laws that explicitly crimi-
nalise HIV transmission.”); NAT’L ALLIANCE OF STATE & TERRITORIAL AIDS 
DIRS., UNDERSTANDING STATE DEPARTMENTS OF HEALTH AND CORRECTIONS 
COLLABORATION: A SUMMARY OF SURVEY FINDINGS—PART II AND STRATEGIC 
GUIDANCE TOWARDS ENDING CRIMINALIZATION-RELATED STIGMA AND 
DISCRIMINATION 4 (2011), available at http://www.nastad.org/HIVC/ 
decriminalization_findings.pdf (arguing that HIV criminalization statutes 
“must be strongly opposed”); UNAIDS, GUIDANCE NOTE: ENDING OVERLY 
BROAD CRIMINALIZATION OF HIV NON-DISCLOSURE, EXPOSURE AND 
TRANSMISSION: CRITICAL SCIENTIFIC, MEDICAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 
41–42 (2013) [hereinafter UNAIDS, GUIDANCE NOTE], available at http:// 
www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/en/media/unaids/contentassets/docments/ 
document/2013/05/20130530_Guidance_Ending_Criminalisation.pdf (recom-
mending that governments “[r]eview laws in order to limit criminal prosecu-
tion in the context of HIV to cases that involve intentional HIV transmission”); 
UNAIDS, GLOBAL REPORT: UNAIDS REPORT ON THE GLOBAL AIDS EPIDEMIC 
83 (2012), available at http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/en/media/ 
unaids/contentassets/documents/epidemiology/2012/gr2012/20121120_UNAID
S_Global_Report_2012_with_annexes_en.pdf (urging governments to “refrain 
from explicitly criminalizing HIV exposure, non-disclosure or transmission”); 
UNAIDS, POLICY BRIEF: CRIMINALIZATION OF HIV TRANSMISSION 6–7 (2008) 
[hereinafter POLICY BRIEF], available at http://www.unaids.org/sites/ 
default/files/en/media/unaids/contentassets/dataimport/pub/basedocument/ 
2008/20080731_jc1513_policy_criminalization_en.pdf (advising that govern-
ments “[r]epeal HIV-specific criminal laws” and “[a]pply general criminal law 
only to the intentional transmission of HIV”); WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF NAT’L 
AIDS POL’Y, supra note 14, at 36–37 (urging states to reconsider statutes that 
criminalize nondisclosure given that such statutes “do not influence the behav-
ior of people living with HIV in those states where these laws exist,” that they 
“run counter to scientific evidence about routes of HIV transmission,” may un-
dermine public health efforts to encourage testing and treatment, and that 
they may deter disclosure by increasing fears of discrimination); Scott Burris 
& Edwin Cameron, The Case Against Criminalization of HIV Transmission, 
300 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 578, 580 (2008) (“The use of criminal law to address 
transmission of HIV is inappropriate . . . .”); Carol L. Galletly & Steven D. 
Pinkerton, Toward Rational Criminal HIV Exposure Laws, 32 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 327, 335–36 (2004); Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1569 (suggesting that the 
costs of criminalizing HIV are too great); Zita Lazzarini et al., Criminalization 
of HIV Transmission and Exposure: Research and Policy Agenda, 103 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 1350, 1352 (2013) (presenting a number of concerns about cur-
rent HIV criminalization laws); Mykhalovskiy & Betteridge, supra note 16, at 
50–51 (observing that there is a critique of HIV criminalization that “regards 
the criminal law as a blunt and ineffective mechanism”); see also POSITIVE 
JUSTICE PROJECT, CONSENSUS STATEMENT ON THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HIV 
IN THE UNITED STATES (2012) (opposing criminalization and endorsed by, inter 
alia, HIV Justice Network, HIV Medicine Association, Gay and Lesbian Medi-
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criminalizing low-risk activities, HIV statutes “contribute to 
the already substantial public misunderstanding of transmis-
sion risk,”32 encouraging mistaken fears that risk reduction 
strategies such as oral sex and sex with a condom do not work. 
Most criminal nondisclosure laws punish sexual activities that 
pose negligible risk of transmission (e.g., penetration with a 
condom,33 or receiving oral sex34), alongside sexual activities 
that cannot transmit HIV at all (e.g., performing oral sex35).  
Even “high risk” sexual activities, these critics point out, 
do not entail anything close to a probable risk of transmission.36 
 
cal Association, Lambda Legal, U.S. Positive Women’s Network, AIDS Foun-
dation of Chicago, various HIV advocacy organizations, a few politicians, and 
several other community groups). But see Council on Ethical and Judicial Af-
fairs, Ethical Issues Involved in the Growing AIDS Crisis, 259 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N 1360, 1361 (1988) (recommending “serious consideration” of criminaliza-
tion of nondisclosure).  
 32. Symington, supra note 20, at 653; see also, e.g., CHLP, ENDING AND 
DEFENDING, supra note 2, at 3–4 (noting the effect of overly broad statutes on 
persons with HIV); GLOBAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 31, at 20, 22–23 
(“The criminal justice system fights the health care system . . . .”); Burris & 
Cameron, supra note 31, at 579–80 (noting that criminal prosecutions “un-
dermine public health efforts”); Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 31, at 336 
(recommending that “HIV exposure laws and public health recommendations 
should avoid sending mixed messages to HIV-infected persons . . . regarding 
what is or is not risky”); Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1524–25, 1535, 1539, 1552, 
1557–58, 1563 (discussing the effect of HIV statutes in creating misunder-
standings about the risks of transmission); Lazzarini et al., supra note 31, at 
1350–51 (noting the negative effects of HIV laws on public health efforts). 
 33. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.  
 34. The transmission risk of performing oral sex on an HIV-positive per-
son is estimated to be “very low but not zero”—about 0.04%. Rebecca F. 
Baggaley et al., Systematic Review of Orogenital HIV-1 Transmission Proba-
bilities, 37 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1255, 1262, 1264 (2008); see also Eric 
Vittinghoff et al., Per-Contact Risk of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Trans-
mission Between Male Sexual Partners, 150 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 306, 309 
(1999) (listing a 0.04% per-contact risk for oral sex).  
 35. See supra note 23. 
 36. See Carol L. Galletly & Steven D. Pinkerton, Conflicting Messages: 
How Criminal HIV Disclosure Laws Undermine Public Health Efforts To Con-
trol the Spread of HIV, 10 AIDS & BEHAV. 451, 455 (2006). The per-act proba-
bility of HIV transmission may vary greatly, depending on several factors, the 
most important of which are the viral load of the infected person, and the 
stage of infection (viral loads are higher during the acute stage immediately 
after infection, and late stage, when the person has AIDS). Julie Fox et al., 
Quantifying Sexual Exposure to HIV Within an HIV-Serodiscordant Relation-
ship: Development of an Algorithm, 25 AIDS 1065, 1076 (2011). Viral loads are 
lower during the years-long chronic stage of HIV infection. The lower the viral 
load, the lower the transmission risk, and vice versa. Kimberly A. Powers et 
al., Rethinking the Heterosexual Infectivity of HIV-1: A Systematic Review and 
Meta-Analysis, 8 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 553, 561 (2008). Other factors 
that can influence the transmissibility of HIV between two people include the 
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Recent studies estimate the per-act risk of sexual transmission 
through unprotected vaginal sex at about 0.08% (1 in 1,250) for 
the HIV-negative woman and about 0.04% (1 in 5,000) for the 
HIV-negative man.37 The highest-risk sexual activity—
unprotected receptive anal intercourse—presents a per-act risk 
of 1.4 to 1.7% (1 in 59 to 1 in 71) to the receptive partner, re-
gardless of gender.38 Researchers have long known that correct 
use of condoms can reduce this risk by 95%,39 reducing the risks 
of, for example, vaginal intercourse to 1 in 25,000 for the wom-
an and 1 in 50,000 for the man. HIV criminal laws also take no 
account of the effectiveness of highly active antiretroviral 
treatment (HAART), which has been standard HIV treatment 
protocol since about 1996.40 HAART can reduce viral load (the 
concentration of HIV in the infected person’s bloodstream) to 
undetectable levels, making sexual transmission of HIV almost 
impossible.41 Thus, after a 2008 study, the Swiss Federal Com-
 
presence of ulcerative diseases of the genitals (e.g., active herpes or syphilis 
sores), which can increase transmissibility of HIV, and circumcision, which 
can reduce a man’s susceptibility to HIV transmission. Fox et al., supra, at 
1076. Pregnancy can increase a woman’s susceptibility to HIV infection. Id. 
 37. Marie-Claude Boily et al., Heterosexual Risk of HIV-1 Infection Per 
Sexual Act: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Observational Studies, 9 
LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 118, 120 (2009). 
 38. Rebecca F. Baggaley et al., HIV Transmission Risk Through Anal In-
tercourse: Systematic Review, Meta-Analysis and Implications for HIV Preven-
tion, 39 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1048, 1053–54, 1055 (2010) (estimating the 
per-act infectivity of anal intercourse at 1.4% for the receptive partner and 
0.3% for the insertive partner).  
 39. See Steven D. Pinkerton & Paul R. Abramson, Effectiveness of Con-
doms in Preventing HIV Transmission, 44 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1304, 1310 (1997) 
(asserting that the correct use of condoms reduces per-act transmission risk by 
ninety-five percent); see also S.C. WELLER & K. DAVIS-BEATY, CONDOM 
EFFECTIVENESS IN REDUCING HETEROSEXUAL HIV TRANSMISSION 6 (2002), 
available at http://apps.who.int/rhl/reviews/langs/CD003255.pdf (concluding 
that “consistent use of condoms results in 80% reduction in HIV incidence”). 
 40. See Burris & Weait, supra note 1, at 7–8 (“The growing evidence that 
treatment with ARV medicines significantly reduces the likelihood of trans-
mission is likely to influence the ethical discussion in the future.”); Kaplan, 
supra note 3, at 1527–28 (arguing that “statutes defined in terms of status and 
activities are inherently problematic,” because they do not recognize other fac-
tors affecting the risk of transmission, such as whether the individual is on 
antiretroviral therapy); James B. McArthur, Note, As the Tide Turns: The 
Changing HIV/AIDS Epidemic and the Criminalization of HIV Exposure, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 707, 732–33 (2009) (commenting that “[a]s treatments for 
HIV infection become more effective, [] justification for HIV-specific legislation 
will continue to erode”). 
 41. Pietro Vernazza et al., Les Personnes Séropositives Ne Souffrant 
d’Aucune Autre MST et Suivant un Traitment Antirétroviral Efficace Ne 
Transmettent Pas le VIH par Voie Sexuelle, 89 BULLETIN DES MÉDECINS 
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mission on HIV/AIDS concluded that an HIV-positive person 
with an undetectable viral load who has no other STI “cannot 
pass on the virus through sexual contact.”42 
Finally, although judges, prosecutors and journalists con-
tinue to characterize sexual exposure to HIV as a “death sen-
tence,”43 this description is no longer accurate. Since 1996, 
HAART has transformed HIV from a lethal disease to a chron-
ic, though life-changing, illness that is manageable with medi-
cation.44 Today, people who receive HAART are likely to enjoy a 
near-normal lifespan and die of a cause unrelated to HIV.45 HIV 
remains incurable, but AIDS is now preventable.  
 
SUISSES 165, 167 (2008), English translation available at http://www 
.edwinjbernard.com/pdfs/Swiss%20Commission%20statement_May%202008_t
ranslation%20EN.pdf. A trial has shown that early treatment with HAART 
reduces the risk of transmission to an uninfected partner by ninety-six per-
cent. Myron S. Cohen et al., Prevention of HIV-1 Infection with Early An-
tiretroviral Therapy, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 493, 503 (2011). The CDC de-
scribed it as a trial that “definitively showed that early treatment of HIV-
infected persons dramatically cuts the rate of new infections.” CDC, 
BACKGROUND BRIEF ON THE PREVENTION BENEFITS OF HIV TREATMENT 1 
(2013). But see Elizabeth Hamlyn et al., Plasma HIV Viral Rebound Following 
Protocol-Indicated Cessation of ART Commenced in Primary and Chronic HIV 
Infection, 7 PLOS ONE 1, 6–7 (2012) (explaining that a patient with sup-
pressed viral load may sometimes rebound to infectious levels, increasing their 
risk of transmission, even though they are following the treatment regimen). 
 42. Vernazza et al., supra note 41, at 165. 
 43. Hoppe, supra note 9, at 143; see also, e.g., Shana Druckerman & Su-
san Welsh, How Women United To Stop HIV-Positive Man, ABC NEWS (Sept. 
16, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/2020/hiv-criminal-busted-women-lied/story? 
id=8579258 (reporting that a woman who received news of HIV-positive test 
results thought to herself “I’m going to die, I’m going to die”).  
 44. See GLOBAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 31, at 20 (noting the 
“success of antiretroviral treatment (ART) in significantly reducing transmis-
sion risk and improving the quality of life and longevity for people with HIV”); 
Antiretroviral Therapy Cohort Collaboration, Causes of Death in HIV-1-
Infected Patients Treated with Antiretroviral Therapy, 1996–2006: Collabora-
tive Analysis of 13 HIV Cohort Studies, 50 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 
1387, 1395 (2010) (“ART continues to dramatically reduce rates of mortality 
attributable to HIV-1 infection in high-income countries.”); Waldman, supra 
note 13, at 559–61 (describing the ability of HAART treatments to neutralize 
HIV in the body).  
 45. See Antiretroviral Therapy Cohort Collaboration, supra note 44, at 
1392 (finding that the “cumulative incidence of non-AIDS-related deaths ex-
ceeded that of AIDS-related deaths after ~4 years of ART”). Although AIDS 
deaths continue to occur in Western countries, many such deaths occur be-
cause the people were diagnosed late and did not start treatment early 
enough. HEALTH PROTECTION AGENCY, HIV IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: 2012 
REPORT 10–13 (2012), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/ 
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/335452/HIV_annual_report_2012.pdf. 
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Public health critics also object that HIV prosecutions un-
dermine public health interventions that, unlike criminaliza-
tion, have been proven to reduce the spread of HIV: reducing 
stigma46 and encouraging testing,47 treatment, and safer sexual 
behaviors,48 including mutual responsibility for risk reduction 
through condom use.49 They argue that, by criminalizing 
knowledge of HIV status, nondisclosure laws disincentivize 
 
 46. Nondisclosure laws stigmatize all people with HIV as “vectors of dis-
ease and potential criminals.” Symington, supra note 20, at 653–54; see also 
CHLP, ENDING AND DEFENDING, supra note 2, at 3–4 (“[B]eing the subject of a 
law enforcement investigation of HIV exposure can have significant negative 
impact on the life of someone with HIV.”); GLOBAL COMMISSION REPORT, su-
pra note 31, at 20, 25; Burris & Cameron, supra note 31, at 579–80 (“Society’s 
obligation is not to condemn . . . . The blunt use of HIV-specific criminal stat-
utes and prosecutions does the opposite.”); Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 
36, at 457–58 (HIV “laws counteract the public health goal of reducing HIV-
related stigma and the associated benefits to HIV-positive persons and to soci-
ety.”); Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1519–20, 1527, 1557, 1563 (discussing the ef-
fect of HIV statutes in encouraging stigma and the negative results on public 
health); Lazzarini et al., supra note 31, at 1350–51 (“Laws that criminalize 
HIV exposure may actually undermine public health efforts by . . . exacerbat-
ing HIV-related stigma.”).  
 47. See Symington, supra note 20, at 653–54; Burris & Cameron, supra 
note 31, at 579; Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 36, at 457, 459; Kaplan, su-
pra note 3, at 1562; Lazzarini, supra note 2, at 250–51; Lazzarini et al., supra 
note 31, at 1350; cf. CHLP, ENDING AND DEFENDING, supra note 2, at 3 (de-
scribing types of laws in which an individual believed by public health officials 
to be a risk for disease transmission can be detained, even indefinitely). 
 48. Criminalization of low- and no-risk behaviors tend to contravene the 
“public health emphasis on harm reduction, which encourages people to mini-
mize risk when risk elimination is unfeasible.” Galletly & Pinkerton, supra 
note 36, at 453, 455. See also Burris & Cameron, supra note 31, at 579; 
Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1530; Mykhalovskiy & Betteridge, supra note 16 at 
39; cf. CHLP, ENDING AND DEFENDING, supra note 2, at 3 (explaining the pos-
sibility, under certain laws, of indefinite detention for persons with HIV 
“based on sexual activity posing no risk of HIV transmission”). As Baggaley 
points out, supra note 38, at 1056, “practising oral sex with an HIV-infected 
individual considerably reduces the risk of HIV acquisition compared with 
that for [receptive or insertive anal sex], but does not reduce it to zero. Indi-
viduals often make sophisticated choices regarding the balance of risk and 
pleasure.” 
 49. Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 36, at 453, 455; Kaplan, supra note 
3, at 1541, 1546; Mykhalovskiy & Betteridge, supra note 16, at 44; see also, 
CDC, HIGH-IMPACT PREVENTION: CDC’S APPROACH TO REDUCING HIV 
INFECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 3–5 (Aug. 2011), http://cdc.gov/hiv/ 
strategy/hihp/report/pdf/NHPC_Booklet.pdf [hereinafter CDC, HIGH-IMPACT 
PREVENTION] (listing destigmatization, HIV testing, HAART treatment, and 
testing and treatment for other STIs as HIV-prevention strategies that have 
been “proven effective”).  
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testing.50 People who know they have HIV are more likely to 
disclose, take precautions, and receive treatment than those 
who have not been tested, and are much less likely than their 
untested counterparts to transmit HIV.51 For example, a recent 
analysis estimated that the 20% of HIV-positive Americans 
who do not know of their infection are responsible for about 
half of all transmissions.52 Public health critics also fear that 
HIV criminalization “may foster a false sense of security among 
HIV-negative persons who may choose to forgo condom use un-
less notified of their partners’ HIV-positive status.”53  
There is no reason to assume that most, or much, HIV 
transmission results from nondisclosure. The public health ra-
tionale for criminalizing nondisclosure relies on a premise that 
HIV-negative people will not take sexual risks with partners 
they know to be HIV-positive. But, as public health research 
and the facts of HIV prosecutions show, they often do.54 Unsur-
 
 50. See, e.g., Sean Strub, Prosecuting HIV: Take the Test—and Risk Ar-
rest?, POSITIVELY AWARE, May–June 2012, at 38–39, http://s423995880 
.onlinehome.us/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/PA+MayJune2012.pdf. It seems 
unlikely, though, that the remote prospect of prosecution would actually deter 
testing, as HIV laws have been shown to have little effect on behavior. See in-
fra note 55. 
 51. See Symington, supra note 20, at 653–54; Burris & Cameron, supra 
note 31, at 579; Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 36, at 456; Kaplan, supra 
note 3, at 1563; see also Gary Marks et al., Meta-Analysis of High-Risk Sexual 
Behavior in Persons Aware and Unaware They Are Infected with HIV in the 
United States: Implications for HIV Prevention Programs, 39 J. ACQUIRED 
IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 446, 448 (2005).  
 52. H. Irene Hall et al., HIV Transmissions from Persons Living with HIV 
Who Are Aware and Unaware of Their Infection, 26 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE 
DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 893, 893 (2012) (finding undiagnosed persons respon-
sible for approximately 49% of HIV transmissions in the United States). 
 53. Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 36, at 455; see also Kaplan, supra 
note 3, at 1557, 1563.  
 54. Previously uninformed partners often continue to have sex, including 
condomless sex, after learning that the other person has HIV. See, e.g., State 
v. Yonts, 84 S.W.3d 516, 518 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002); R. v. D.C., [2012] S.C.R. 626, 
630 (Can.); R. v. Cuerrier, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371, 416 (Can.); Kate Buchacz et al., 
Sociodemographic, Behavioral, and Clinical Correlates of Inconsistent Condom 
Use in HIV-Serodiscordant Heterosexual Couples, 28 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE 
DEFICIENCY SYNDROME, 289, 289, 292 (2001) (studying serodiscordant hetero-
sexual couples who do not consistently use condoms); Teresa J. Finlayson et 
al., CDC, HIV Risk, Prevention, and Testing Behaviors Among Men Who Have 
Sex with Men—National HIV Behavioral Surveillance System, 21 US Cities, 
United States, 2008, 60 SURVEILLANCE SUMMARIES 1, 6 (2011) (finding similar 
rates of condomless anal sex among MSM who said their most recent partner’s 
HIV status was positive, negative or unknown); see also TIM DEAN, UNLIMITED 
INTIMACY: REFLECTIONS ON THE SUBCULTURE OF BAREBACKING 48 (2011) (de-
scribing self-identified “bug chasers”: HIV-negative gay men who seek unpro-
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prisingly, these critics point out, HIV criminalization does not 
work: empirical studies have found that criminal laws are un-
likely to increase disclosure, reduce risky behaviors, or reduce 
HIV transmission.55 
Police and prosecutors might mitigate the 
overinclusiveness of nondisclosure laws by exercising their dis-
cretion to prosecute only when the complainant has been in-
fected, or at least when the complainant was put at risk. They 
do not consistently do this, however, and several appellate 
courts have recently upheld convictions for performing oral 
sex,56 receiving oral sex,57 and for vaginal or anal intercourse 
 
tected receptive anal sex with HIV-positive partners with the intention of be-
coming infected with HIV). 
 55. See CHLP, ENDING AND DEFENDING, supra note 2; GLOBAL 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 31, at 20, 25; NAT’L ALLIANCE OF STATE & 
TERRITORIAL AIDS DIRS., supra note 31, at 1–4; UNAIDS, POLICY BRIEF, su-
pra note 31, at 4–5; Burris & Cameron, supra note 31, at 578–80; Galletly & 
Pinkerton supra note 36, at 458; Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1520, 1557, 1562–63; 
Lazzarini et al., supra note 2, at 250–51; Lazzarini et al., supra note 31, at 
1350; see also Burris, supra note 1, at 497, 502–03 (finding that “[n]either anal 
nor vaginal sex without a condom was significantly associated with beliefs 
about whether law requires condom use”); Carol L. Galletly et al., New Jersey’s 
HIV-Exposure Law and the HIV-Related Attitudes, Beliefs, and Sexual and 
Seropositive Status Disclosure Behaviors of Persons Living with HIV, 102 AM. 
J. PUB. HEALTH 2135, 2135 (2012) (finding that HIV-positive persons’ 
knowledge of their state’s criminal disclosure requirements was not associated 
with increased sexual abstinence, condom use, or serostatus disclosure; also 
finding that knowledge of the law was not associated with increased percep-
tion of stigma); Carol L. Galletly et al., A Quantitative Study of Michigan’s 
Criminal HIV Exposure Law, 24 AIDS CARE 174, 174 (2012) (finding mixed 
impact of law); Horvath, supra note 1, at 1225–26 (finding that HIV-disclosure 
statutes did not have a deterrent effect on unprotected anal intercourse be-
tween men); Patrick O’Byrne et al., Nondisclosure Prosecutions and HIV Pre-
vention: Results from an Ottawa-Based Gay Men’s Sex Survey, 24 J. ASS’N 
NURSES AIDS CARE 81, 85 (2013) (finding that some respondents who knew 
about nondisclosure prosecutions were more reluctant to talk with health pro-
viders about their sexual behavior, less likely to seek out testing, and more 
likely to have engaged in unprotected penetrative sex in the last two months); 
cf. Trevor A. Hart et al., Partner Awareness of the Serostatus of HIV-
Seropositive Men Who Have Sex with Men, 9 AIDS & BEHAV. 155, 163 (2005) 
(finding relation between partner awareness of serostatus and rates of unpro-
tected sex). But see Adeline Delavande et al., Criminal Prosecution and Hu-
man Immunodeficiency Virus—Related Risky Behavior, 53 J.L. & ECON. 741, 
755–56 (2010) (finding that HIV prosecutions are associated with a reduction 
in the number of partners, an increase in safe sex, but also an increase in sex 
with prostitutes, and a reduced disclosure rate by HIV-positive persons. This 
study measured risk behaviors observed in 1998 against the number of prose-
cutions between 1986 and 2001).  
 56. See, e.g., State v. Mubita, 188 P.3d 867, 881–83 (Idaho 2008); Shelton 
v. State, No. 50001, 2009 WL 1490929, at *1 (Nev. 2009); Commonwealth v. 
Cordoba, 902 A.2d 1280, 1289 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006); cf. Hoppe, supra note 9, at 
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where a condom was used.58 In 2006, the Iowa Supreme Court 
held that it was “common knowledge” that “oral sex is a well-
recognized means of transmission of the HIV [sic],”59 and took 
judicial notice of this erroneous “fact.”60 In 2009, a Michigan ex-
otic dancer was convicted of nondisclosure after a lap dance cli-
ent rubbed her vulva with his nose61—a form of contact which 
cannot transmit HIV. 
Thus, public health critics contend, HIV nondisclosure is 
neither risky enough nor harmful enough to warrant the 
unique, broad, and undifferentiated criminal penalties imposed 
for nondisclosure.  
B. LOW-STATUS VICTIMS: IV DRUG USERS, SEX WORKERS, AND 
MEN WHO HAVE SEX WITH MEN 
Perhaps because they oppose criminalization, legal and 
public health critics have not pointed out that nondisclosure 
statutes and prosecutions are underinclusive with respect to 
their public health objectives in two notable ways: they tend 
not to punish nondisclosure to men who have sex with men 
(MSM) or to those who share needles to inject drugs. Status-
based exemptions from HIV criminal rules raise concern that—
as critical race feminists and criminal justice scholars have 
long recognized in rape prosecutions—the gender, sexual orien-
tation, and social status of the complainant (much more than 
that of the accused) tends to shape perceptions of whether and 
when sex is a crime.62  
 
142–43 (discussing “Eric,” the first defendant convicted under Michigan’s HIV 
disclosure statute); Oklahoma City Man Arrested on Suspicion of ‘Transmit-
ting AIDS,’ NEWS OK (Aug. 27, 2009), http://newsok.com/man-arrested-on 
-suspicion-of-transmitting-aids/article/3396100. 
 57. See, e.g., State v. Stevens, 719 N.W.2d 547, 548 (Iowa 2006). But see 
L.A.P. v. State, 62 So. 3d 693, 694–95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (reversing de-
fendant’s conviction because oral sex does not constitute sexual intercourse as 
required by statute). 
 58. See, e.g., Rhoades v. State, 848 N.W.2d 22, 31, 40 (Iowa 2014); cf. 
Hoppe, supra note 9, 145–46 (discussing “Charlie”). 
 59. Stevens, 719 N.W.2d at 551. 
 60. Id. But see Rhoades, 848 N.W.2d at 25 (holding that, based on the 
state of medicine at the time of the defendant’s guilty plea in 2009, a court 
could not take judicial notice that anal sex with a condom could transmit HIV 
regardless of viral load). 
 61. Hoppe, supra note 9, at 145–46. 
 62. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Iden-
tity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 
1279–80 (1991); Adrienne D. Davis, Slavery and the Roots of Sexual Harass-
ment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 457, 459–61 (Catharine A 
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One status-based exemption is sexual orientation: Florida’s 
HIV-exposure statute has been held to require disclosure of 
HIV status before penile-vaginal intercourse, but not before 
other sexual activity, including between same-sex partners.63 
All other state disclosure mandates are facially gender-neutral. 
Nonetheless—despite the high-profile prosecution of Nick 
Rhoades—as discussed in Part IV, prosecutions seem to follow 
a distinctive pattern: vigorous enforcement against HIV-
positive men who nondisclose to women, alongside 
underenforcement on behalf of HIV-negative MSM.  
Another status-based exemption is needle sharing.  Legis-
lators and others who advocated criminalization of HIV doubt-
less believed that criminalizing nondisclosure would help pre-
vent transmission of an incurable disease they viewed as a 
 
MacKinnon & Reva B Siegel eds., 2004) (describing slave women’s complete 
lack of protection against sexual exploitation in the antebellum United 
States); Angela Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. 
L. REV. 777, 779 (2000); Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, Sex, Culture and 
Rights: A Re/Conceptualization of Violence for the Twenty-First Century, 60 
ALB. L. REV. 607, 607–09 (1997); Katharine M. Tellis & Cassia C. Spohn, The 
Sexual Stratification Hypothesis Revisited: Testing Assumptions About Simple 
Versus Aggravated Rape, 36 J. CRIM. JUST. 252, 252, 260 (2008); see also 
Christopher D. Maxwell et al., The Impact of Race on the Adjudication of Sex-
ual Assault and Other Violent Crimes, 31 J. CRIM. JUST. 523, 534 (2003) (citing 
studies indicating that 68% of black men serving prison sentences for sexual 
assault had white victims, even though only 15% of white sexual assault vic-
tims report that their assailant was black, and 98% of black victims report a 
black assailant); Elizabeth Ehrhardt Mustaine, Social Disorganization and 
Unfounded Sexual Assault Case Clearances, 28 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 90, 96 
(2013) (finding male-victim sexual assault cases 52% more likely to be deemed 
“unfounded” than female-victim sexual assault allegations); Cassia Spohn et 
al., Prosecutorial Justifications for Sexual Assault Case Rejection: Guarding 
the ‘Gateway to Justice,’ 48 SOC. PROBS. 206, 224 tbl.3 (2001); Melinda Tasca 
et al., Police Decision Making in Sexual Assault Cases: Predictors of Suspect 
Identification and Arrest, 28 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1157, 1171 (2012) 
(“[V]ictims with a history of drug use, particularly in the context of prostitu-
tion, were not seen as genuine victims and were depicted as undeserving of 
legal protection.”). See generally DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND 
THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 162–64 (1990); David 
C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-
Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from 
Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1658–60 (1998). 
 63. See L.A.P. v. State, 62 So. 3d 693, 694–95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
But see State v. D.C., 114 So. 3d 440, 443 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (certifying 
conflict with L.A.P. v. State by interpreting a broader definition of “sexual in-
tercourse”). The Florida Supreme Court heard argument on this issue as this 
Article went to press: see Reuters, Florida Supreme Court Asked To Define 
“Sexual Intercourse” in HIV Case, AL JAZEERA AMERICA (Feb. 4, 2015), http:// 
america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/2/4/florida-supreme-court-to-define-sex-in 
-hiv-case.html.  
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death sentence. HIV statutes, though, generally fail to crimi-
nalize nondisclosure before sharing an unsterilized needle—an 
activity that poses a risk of transmission “an order of magni-
tude higher” than high-risk sex.64 As early as the late 1980s, 
legislators knew, or should have realized, that many of the 
criminalized behaviors could not transmit HIV. Michigan’s 
1988 statute, for example, is a prototypical example of HIV 
nondisclosure legislation (and one of the few for which legisla-
tive history is available). As part of the legislative process, the 
state health department provided a report advising that “sexu-
al intercourse is a prime mode of contagion, as is the use of 
shared needles and syringes for intravenous drugs.”65 Nonethe-
less, the Michigan legislature criminalized nondisclosure before 
oral sex and digital penetration—and did not criminalize non-
disclosure before sharing an unsterilized needle.66 
Although around ten percent of recent transmissions are 
attributed to intravenous drug use,67 only seven states and ter-
ritories nominally require disclosure of HIV prior to sharing a 
needle or injection equipment.68 The Center for HIV Law and 
 
 64. JACQUES PEPIN, THE ORIGINS OF AIDS 106–07 (2011); see also David 
Gisselquist et al., Efficiency of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Transmission 
Through Injections and Other Medical Procedures: Evidence, Estimates, and 
Unfinished Business, 27 INFECTION CONTROL AND HOSP. EPIDEMIOLOGY 944, 
950 (2006) (discussing transmission via intravenous drug injection).  
 65. MICH. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, AIDS IN MICHIGAN: A REPORT TO THE 
GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE, at V (Feb. 1987); see also Richard Green, 
The Transmission of AIDS, in AIDS AND THE LAW: A GUIDE TO THE PUBLIC  
28, 31 (Harlon L. Dalton et al. eds., 1987).  
 66. See, e.g., BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON AIDS, ACQUIRED 
IMMUNODEFICIENCY SYNDROME IN MICHIGAN 2 (Mar. 1988); HOUSE 
REPUBLICAN TASK FORCE ON AIDS, FINAL REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 
10 (Mich. 1988). 
 67. Of 47,500 HIV infections in 2010, 2,400 were men infected through 
“[i]njection drug use,” 1,500 were women infected this way, and 1,600 were 
men who reported both “[m]ale-to-male sexual contact” and intravenous drug 
use. CDC, ESTIMATED HIV INCIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2007–2010: HIV 
SURVEILLANCE SUPPLEMENTAL REP. 15 tbl.1 (2012), available at http://www 
.cdc.gov/hiv/surveillance/resources/reports/2010supp_vol17no4/pdf/hssr_vol_1_
no_4.pdf#page=14. 
 68. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60(c)(2) (West 2014) (Georgia); IND. CODE 
§§ 16-41-7-1(c), (d) (2014) (Indiana); MO. REV. STAT. § 191.677(2)(b) (2014) 
(Missouri); 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 41A.0202(1)(b), (f), (g) (2015) (North Caro-
lina); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-145(5) (2014) (South Carolina); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS §§ 22-18-31(3), -33 (2015) (South Dakota); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-
109(a)(3), (c)(1) (2014 LexisNexis) (Tennessee); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 888(a) 
(2014 LexisNexis) (Virgin Islands); IOWA CODE §§ 709C.1(2)(c), (5) (repealed 
2014) (Iowa). Idaho, Illinois, Minnesota, and North Dakota criminalize sharing 
an unsterilized needle even if HIV status is disclosed. See IDAHO CODE §§ 39-
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Policy (CHLP) estimates that seven other HIV statutes could be 
construed to allow prosecution for needle sharing.69 There have 
been several prosecutions for deliberate needle-stabbings that 
were intended to transmit HIV, but neither the CHLP nor ei-
ther of the two jurisdiction-wide studies conducted to date70 has 
found a single prosecution for consensual sharing of needles or 
drug injection equipment.71 In a search of Google, LexisNexis, 
and Westlaw, I have not found one, either.  
One explanation for the dearth of needle-sharing prosecu-
tions might be that drug possession is already illegal. Intrave-
nous drug users are engaged in a criminal offense—drug pos-
session—and the potential victims of their nondisclosure are 
fellow lawbreakers, who might hesitate to approach police with 
a complaint. But the same is true of prostitution. Unlike needle 
sharing, though, engaging in prostitution with HIV is subject to 
enhanced penalties in many states, and these laws are vigor-
ously enforced.72 In Nashville, there are more prosecutions for 
“aggravated prostitution” than for sexual nondisclosure be-
tween nonpaying partners.73 Police do not wait for johns to 
come forward with criminal complaints: most Nashville prose-
cutions involved plainclothes police stings.74 In Tennessee, as in 
 
608(1)–(2) (2014); 170 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-5.01(a)(2) (2014); MINN. STAT. § 
609.2241, subdiv. 3 (2014); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-17(1), (2) (2013). Kan-
sas and the U.S. Virgin Islands criminalize sharing an unsterilized needle 
with the intent to transmit HIV. Act Effective 2011, ch. 136, sec. 59(a)(3), 2010 
Kan. Sess. Laws; V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 888(a) (2014 LexisNexis). 
 69. State-by-State Chart of HIV-Specific Statutes and Prosecutorial Tools, 
CHLP, http://www.hivlawandpolicy.org/sites/www.hivlawandpolicy.org/files/ 
State%20By%20State%20HIV%20Laws%20Chart%20updated%2010-21-
13.pdf (last updated Oct. 21, 2013). 
 70. See supra note 9. 
 71. CHLP reports one recent prosecution for consensual needle sharing, 
but the man was charged only after he allegedly stabbed a detective with a 
used needle. CHLP, PROSECUTIONS, supra note 2; see also Michelle Hunter, 
Kenner Man Accused of Exposing JPSO Detective, Two Others to HIV, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans), April 14, 2014, available at http://www.nola.com/ 
crime/index.ssf/2014/04/kenner_man_accused_of_exposing.html. 
 72. See generally CHLP, ENDING AND DEFENDING, supra note 2 (discuss-
ing the enhanced penalties of HIV-specific statutes among various states for 
prostitution offenses).  
 73. Galletly & Lazzarini, supra note 9, at 2627, 2628 fig.1 (finding twenty-
six arrests for “aggravated prostitution” and sixteen for sexual nondisclosure). 
Hoppe’s Michigan study looked only at prosecutions for sexual nondisclosure: 
it did not consider HIV-prostitution. See generally Trevor Alexander Hoppe, 
Disparate Risks of Conviction Under Michigan’s Felony HIV Disclosure Law: 
An Observational Analysis of Convictions and HIV Diagnosis, 1992–2010, 17 
PUNISHMENT & SOC. 73 (2015). 
 74. Galletly & Lazzarini, supra note 9, at 2630. 
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other states that criminalize HIV-prostitution, HIV-
prostitution is a felony regardless of transmission risk, and re-
mains so even if the sex worker discloses her or his serostatus.75 
A majority of the Nashville prosecutions—thirteen of twenty-
five—involved sex workers who agreed to perform oral sex,76 
which cannot transmit HIV.77 Nashville is unique only in that 
researchers have had access to comprehensive data about pros-
ecutions: such prosecutions have been documented in many 
other states, as well.78  
At the same time, state laws and their enforcers do not ag-
gressively punish HIV exposure or transmission when the vic-
tims are sex workers. Only eight states criminalize HIV-
positive clients, as well as sex workers.79 In Colorado, it is a 
lesser offense for an HIV-positive john to “patroniz[e] a prosti-
tute” than for a sex worker to be HIV-positive.80 In Nashville, 
 
 75. See HIV-prostitution statutes reproduced in CHLP, ENDING AND 
DEFENDING, supra note 2, at 218, 224; see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-516 
(LexisNexis 2014). 
 76. Galletly & Lazzarini, supra note 9, at 2630 tbl.4. HIV-prostitution 
statutes also typically criminalize offering oral sex for hire while HIV-positive, 
regardless of disclosure or condom use. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-201.7 
(LexisNexis 2014); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 796.07 (LexisNexis 2014); GA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 16-5-60(c)(3)–(4) (Westlaw 2014); 9 GUAM CODE ANN. § 25.10(8)–(9) 
(LexisNexis 2014); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5902(a.1)(4) (LexisNexis 2014); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 44-29-145(2) (2014). 
 77. See supra note 23.  
 78. See, e.g., People v. Hall, No. B190199, 2007 WL 2121912, at *3, *6 
(Cal. Ct. App. July 25, 2007) (affirming a sex worker’s sentence of six years for 
felony prostitution for agreeing to perform oral sex and intercourse on an un-
dercover police officer); State v. Richmond, 708 So. 2d 1272, 1273, 1278 (La. 
Ct. App. 1998) (affirming five-year sentence of hard labor for sex worker who 
agreed to perform oral sex on an undercover police officer); State v. West, No. 
22966, 2009 WL 4268554, slip op. at *1, *5 (Ohio App. 2d Nov. 25, 2009); 
CHLP, ENDING AND DEFENDING, supra note 2, at 25, 44, 100–01 (discussing 
prosecution of HIV-positive sex worker in California despite carrying condoms 
(2007) and of HIV-positive sex workers for offering oral sex to an undercover 
police officer in Florida (2007) and Louisiana (1998)); CHLP, PROSECUTIONS, 
supra note 2 (discussing prosecutions of HIV-positive sex workers for offering 
oral sex in Florida (June 2013), Nebraska (June 2013) and Colorado (Feb. 
2011)); Michael A. Scarcella, Woman Charged with Exposing Men to HIV, 
HERALD TRIB. (Sarasota, Fla.), Oct. 10, 2007, available at http://www 
.heraldtribune.com/article/20071010/NEWS/710100460 (discussing the charg-
es against an alleged prostitute who offered oral sex to an undercover officer).  
 79. CHLP, ENDING AND DEFENDING, supra note 2, at 18–26 (California), 
27–32 (Colorado), 46–53 (Georgia), 91–95 (Kentucky), 144–47 (Nevada), 170–
185 (Ohio), 194–203 (Pennsylvania), 233–37 (Utah). 
 80. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-7-201.7(2), -1.3-401(1)(a)(v)(A) (LexisNexis 
2014) (classifying HIV-prostitution as a Class 5 felony, carrying a maximum 
sentence of three years); id. §§ 18-7-205.7, -1.3-401(1)(a)(v)(A) (classifying pat-
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no client has ever been prosecuted.81 The CHLP has not identi-
fied any case in which a client was prosecuted for exposing a 
sex worker, although it does report a Utah prosecution in which 
an HIV-positive would-be john propositioned a young person 
who turned out not to be a sex worker.82  
These inclusions and exclusions are incoherent from a pub-
lic health perspective, but they do not seem arbitrary. They are 
consistent with a discriminatory intuition that HIV is tolerable 
when contained within low-status groups such as MSM, sex 
workers, and intravenous drug users, but intolerable when 
higher-status heterosexuals are put at risk. 
C. MORAL RETRIBUTION 
Although criminal law is not an effective public health 
strategy, it can send potent symbolic messages. HIV criminali-
zation might be justified by “[t]he urge to punish or seek retri-
bution.”83 Prosecution might represent “a visible political sym-
bol of seriousness of purpose in controlling AIDS.”84  
Public health and legal critics have challenged the retribu-
tive rationale, pointing out that HIV nondisclosure is not al-
ways morally blameworthy.85 The stigma and discrimination 
faced by people with HIV make disclosure risky as well as diffi-
cult, they point out, and partners could protect themselves by 
using condoms or engaging in safer sexual behaviors.86  
These critics note that news reportage often conflates sex 
without disclosure with malicious attempt to transmit HIV.87 
 
ronizing a prostitute while HIV-positive as a Class 6 felony, carrying a maxi-
mum sentence of eighteen months). 
 81. Galletly & Lazzarini, supra note 9, at 2627 tbl.2. 
 82. CHLP, PROSECUTIONS, supra note 2 (citing Erin Alberty, Price Police 
Say HIV-Positive Man Solicited Sex from Teen, SALT LAKE TRIB., June 7, 2013, 
available at http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/news/56428611-78/mead-barnes 
-police-sex.html.csp). 
 83. Grant, Boundaries, supra note 20, at 154. 
 84. Larry Gostin, The Politics of AIDS: Compulsory State Powers, Public 
Health, and Civil Liberties, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1017, 1019 (1998–89). 
 85. See, e.g., CHLP, ENDING AND DEFENDING, supra note 2, at 4; GLOBAL 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 31, at 20; Burris & Cameron, supra note 31, 
at 579–80; Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1521–54. 
 86. See GLOBAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 31, at 20; WEAIT, supra 
note 16, at 34–35, 186–87; Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1529, 1531, 1533; 
Mykhalovskiy & Betteridge, supra note 16, at 39. 
 87. See, e.g., GLOBAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 31, at 23; WEAIT, 
supra note 16, at 29–30; Persson & Newman, supra note 16, at 633–34, 641; 
Edwin J. Bernard, The Evolution of Global Criminalisation Norms: The Role 
of the United States, NAM, available at http://www.aidsmap.com/The 
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Reports on the most notorious prosecutions, especially those 
involving white women’s allegations against black men, often 
characterize defendants as “AIDS monsters,” “AIDS avengers,” 
and “HIV predators.”88 In reality, these critics note, people who 
have sex without disclosure rarely set out to infect their unin-
formed partners. As Kathleen Sullivan and Martha Field 
pointed out in 1988, “[h]aving sex or sharing needles is a highly 
indirect modus operandi for the person whose purpose is to 
kill.”89 Edwin Bernard’s review of HIV prosecutions found that 
substantiated cases of malicious transmission are extremely 
rare, and the few that have been substantiated often “do not 
involve sex but are equally likely to involve an individual who 
was not HIV-positive but who obtained HIV-infected blood 
elsewhere and injected it into their victim.”90 Reports of inten-
tional sexual transmission, Bernard observes, have often 
turned out to be hoaxes.91  
Nonetheless, legislators and others may equate nondisclo-
sure with intent to transmit HIV. For example, a Tennessee 
legislator observed, during a 1994 legislative debate, “HIV is 
not spread accidentally. HIV is spread because of conduct that 
is basically intentional between parties, either through sexual 
contact or through transmission of fluids with the exception of 
blood transfusions . . . people engage in conduct knowingly that 
 
-evolution-of-global-criminalisation-norms-the-role-of-the-United-States/ 
page/1442035/#ref1499470 (last visited Mar. 16, 2015).  
 88. See infra Part III. 
 89. Kathleen M. Sullivan & Martha A. Field, AIDS and the Coercive Pow-
er of the State, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 139, 163 (1988) (emphasis in origi-
nal). 
 90. Bernard, supra note 87, at n.1 (discussing an Illinois case in which an 
American man was convicted of injecting his 11-month-old son with HIV-
infected blood to avoid paying child support (citing Father Is Guilty in H.I.V. 
Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 1998), available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1998/12/06/us/father-is-guilty-in-hiv-case.html)); see also State v. Schmidt, 771 
So. 2d 131, 135–42, 160 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (affirming conviction and sentence 
for physician who extracted HIV-infected blood from two patients and injected 
it into his ex-lover). 
 91. Edward J. Bernard, China: Woman Accused of Intentionally Infecting 
30 Men, CRIMINAL HIV TRANSMISSION (Oct. 19, 2009), http:// 
criminalhivtransmission.blogspot.com/2009/10/china-woman-accused-of-
intentionally.html (discussing allegations that turned out to be a malicious 
smear against an HIV-negative woman by a vengeful ex-boyfriend); Bernard, 
supra note 87, at n.2 (citing Porn Star Jackie Braxton Sparks Mass Panic with 
Hoax Claim To Have Infected 500 Men with AIDS, DAILY MAIL (U.K.) (Jan. 19, 
2010), available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1244257/Porn-star 
-Jackie-Braxton-sparks-mass-panic-claiming-infected-500-men-Aids.html). 
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puts other people at risk.”92 To address this intuition, this Sec-
tion will consider the moral dynamics of nondisclosure prosecu-
tions as they have actually occurred. Since comprehensive sur-
veys of HIV prosecutions in the United States do not yet exist, 
the accounts in this Section are necessarily anecdotal and can-
not claim to be representative. However, the scenarios dis-
cussed here seem common enough to raise doubt that the peo-
ple charged with nondisclosure typically deserve condemnation 
as felons.  
Many—though by no means all—prosecutions do involve 
defendants who grievously betrayed their partners. Some lied 
about their HIV status, claiming they were uninfected;93 some 
even faked evidence of negative HIV test results.94 Many had 
unprotected vaginal or anal sex,95 both of which are “high-risk” 
behaviors for HIV transmission (although the infection risk of a 
single incident of unprotected penetration remains quite low96). 
Some misled partners over the course of a long-term relation-
ship;97 some had unprotected sex over a sustained period and 
 
 92. HIV—Criminal Exposure—Penalties: Hearing on S.B. 2244 Before the 
Tenn. S. Judiciary Comm., 1994 Leg., 99th Sess. 4-5 (Tenn. 1994) (Statement 
of Sen. Jordan) (on file with author); see also HIV—Criminal Exposure—
Penalties: Hearing on S.B. 2244 Before the Tenn. S. Reg. Sess., 1994 Leg., 99th 
Sess. 4-20 (Tenn. 1994) (Statement of Sen. Rice) (on file with author) (“Evi-
dence indicates that a small number of HIV positive victims are intent on in-
fecting others and simply do not care enough to change their sexual behavior. 
These persons who attempt to transmit the virus through sexual contact, 
through the use of drug paraphernalia, the donation of blood, should be pre-
pared to give up their freedom.”).  
 93. See, e.g., State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d 734, 741 (Iowa 2006); Man w/ 
HIV Gets Prison Time for Assault, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Spokane, Wash.) (Oct. 
11, 2010), http://www.spokesman.com/blogs/sirens/2010/oct/11/man-w-hiv-gets 
-prison-time-assault/ [hereinafter Man w/ HIV]; Lisa Marchesoni, Husband 
Indicted for Kidnapping Domestic Violence Worker, MURFREESBORO POST 
(Murfreesboro, Tenn.) (Nov. 15, 2008), http://www.murfreesboropost 
.com/husband-indicted-for-kidnapping-domestic-violence-worker-cms-14006.  
 94. US: New York Man Faked HIV Test, Charged with Reckless Endan-
germent, HIV JUSTICE NETWORK (Dec. 10, 2008), http://www.hivjustice.net/ 
case/us-new-york-man-faked-hiv-test-charged-with-reckless-endangerment/. 
 95. See, e.g., State v. Rick, 821 N.W.2d 610, 612 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012); 
Meghan M. Cuniff, HIV-Positive Teen Accused of Assault, SPOKESMAN-REV. 
(Spokane, Wash.) (Oct. 13, 2010), http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2010/ 
oct/13/hiv-positive-teen-accused-assault; John W. Goodwin, Jr., Randal Brown 
Reaches Plea Deal in HIV Assault, VINDY.COM (Mar. 2, 2012), http:// 
66.232.150.6/news/2012/mar/02/man-who-transmitted-hiv-reaches-plea-dea/? 
newswatch; Police: Fitchburg Man with HIV Put Partners at Risk, supra note 
94.  
 96. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
 97. See, e.g., Sykes v. State, 372 S.W.3d 33, 35 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012); Rhon-
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infected their partners;98 and a few impregnated their female 
partners without telling them they were HIV-positive, putting 
both woman and baby at risk of infection.99 A few were alleged 
to have intentionally sought to transmit HIV.100  
However, many nondisclosure prosecutions involve HIV-
positive people who made poor choices that do not present Man-
ichean cases of moral breach. It is not self-evident that criminal 
defendants like Kanay Mubita and Nick Rhoades (described in 
the introduction to this Part) deserve prosecution and punish-
ment as criminals.  Because their sexual activities posed no 
“realistic possibility of transmission of HIV,”101 the retributive 
justification for prosecuting them is not readily apparent—
especially in a legal culture where other sexual deceptions are 
 
da Cook, Man Arrested for Giving HIV to Partner, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Aug. 5, 
2011), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local/man-arrested-for-giving-hiv-to 
-partner/nQKNS/; Kevin Held, Jermaine Johnson Charged with Spreading 
HIV, KSDK.COM (Jan. 24, 2012, 12:59 PM), http://archive.ksdk.com/ 
news/article/299200/0/Jermaine-Johnson-charged-with-spreading-HIV; Patrick 
Lakamp, Man Admits Exposing 5 to HIV; Faces 1 Year in Jail, BUFFALO NEWS 
(July 9, 2011), http://www.buffalonews.com/article/20110709/ 
CITYANDREGION/307099979; Katie Thomas, Equestrian Charged with HIV-
Related Offense, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/ 
12/sports/12hiv.html; Dino Thompson-Sarmiento, Exclusive: “Uncle Poodle” 
Reveals: “My [HIV] Test Results Came Back Positive.” FENUXE (Jan. 10, 2013), 
http://www.fenuxe.com/2013/01/10/exclusive-honey-boo-boo-star-uncle-poodle 
-reveals-my-hiv-test-results-came-back-positive. 
 98. See, e.g., State v. Tabor, 797 N.W.2d 622, at *1 (Iowa 2011) (un-
published table decision); Beth Burger, More HIV Victims Speak Out, 
CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS (July 30, 2011), http://www.timesfreepress 
.com/news/news/story/2011/jul/30/more-hiv-victims-speak-out/55220; Cook, su-
pra note 97; Goodwin, supra note 95; Held, supra note 97. 
 99. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 785 N.E.2d 1134, 1137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); 
Burger, supra note 98; Cook, supra note 97; Rachel E. Leonard, Man Accused 
of Knowingly Exposing Girlfriend to HIV, GOUPSTATE.COM (Mar. 21, 2008, 
9:48 AM), http://www.goupstate.com/article/20080321/NEWS/803210376? 
Title=Man-accused-of-knowingly-exposing-girlfriend-to-HIV. 
 100. See, e.g., Druckerman & Welsh, supra note 43; John Tuohy, Police Say 
Man Put 26 Women at Risk of AIDS Through Dating Site, KDSK.COM (Feb. 
25, 2010, 10:40 AM), http://archive.ksdk.com/news/local/story.aspx?storyid= 
196687; M. Alex Johnson, Michigan Man May Have Intentionally Infected 
Hundreds with HIV, NBC NEWS (Dec. 30, 2011, 11:58 AM), http://usnews 
.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/12/30/9833291-michigan-man-may-have 
-intentionally-infected-hundreds-with-hiv?lite (discussing man who turned 
himself in to police claiming that he was HIV-positive and had “set out to in-
tentionally infect as many people as he could”). 
 101. See, e.g., R. v. Mabior, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 586, 616 (Can.); see also id. at 
616, 621 (reviewing scientific evidence that sex with a condom while viral load 
is negligible does not put partner at “significant risk” of HIV infection). 
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not crimes.102 Yet prosecutions like theirs, in which the unin-
formed partner was put at no (or negligible) risk, are not ra-
re.103 
Why would people with HIV fail to disclose? The remote 
prospect of subsequent prosecution may be balanced by more 
immediate concerns about rejection or retaliation, exposure of 
their HIV status to others, distrust of the partner, dislike of 
condoms, a desire for spontaneity, hesitation to ruin the mood, 
fear that a partner may think the discloser is unfaithful or gay, 
or fear of violence.104 Ironically, nondisclosure laws may exacer-
bate these barriers to disclosure: by confiding HIV status, a 
person may expose himself or herself to the allegation that he 
or she did not disclose.105 Alison Symington questions “whether 
legal provisions could ever be a significant factor in decision 
making about safer sex ‘in the heat of the moment,’ particularly 
if alcohol, drugs, or domestic violence are involved.”106  
Thus, as Carol Galletly and Steven Pinkerton observe, the 
nondisclosure that prosecutors and reporters construct as “a 
conscious effort to deceive” may actually result from “denial, 
 
 102. See infra Part II.C. 
 103. See, e.g., supra notes 56–61 and accompanying text; see also L.A.P. v. 
State, 62 So. 3d 693, 693–94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (finding that a statute 
requiring HIV disclosure before “sexual intercourse” did not apply to an HIV-
positive woman who did not disclose before “oral sex and digital penetration” 
by a man; disclosure obligations only applied to “‘the penetration of the female 
sex organ by the male sex organ’” (quoting FLA. STAT. § 826.04 (2008))). 
 104. See, e.g., CHLP, ENDING AND DEFENDING, supra note 23, at 4; GLOBAL 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 31, at 23; Symington, supra note 20, at 651; 
WEAIT, supra note 16, at 34–35; Burris & Cameron, supra note 31, at 580; 
Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1542; see also Edwin J. Bernard, Challenges Associat-
ed with Disclosing One’s HIV-Positive Status, http://www.aidsmap.com/ 
page/1442642 (last visited Mar. 16, 2015); Nicolas Sheon & G. Michael Crosby, 
Ambivalent Tales of HIV Disclosure in San Francisco, 58 SOC. SCI. & MED. 
2105, 2116 (2004).  
 105. The HIV-positive person may fear that a new or untrusted partner 
might report him or her to police if the relationship does not work out. Angela 
Perone, From Punitive to Proactive: An Alternative Approach for Responding to 
HIV Criminalization That Departs from Penalizing Marginalized Communi-
ties, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 363, 365 (2013). For examples, see R. v. D.C. 
[2012] 2 S.C.R. 626, 630 (Can.) (noting complainant reported D.C.’s initial 
nondisclosure to police only after he was convicted of assaulting her and her 
son when she ended the relationship); Brook Kelly, The Modern HIV/AIDS 
Epidemic and Human Rights in the United States: A Lens into Lingering Gen-
der, Race, and Health Disparities and Cutting Edge Approaches to Justice, 41 
U. BALT. L. REV. 355, 365–66 (2012) (describing prosecution in which abusive 
HIV-negative ex-boyfriend filed nondisclosure charges after his HIV-positive 
ex-girlfriend ended the relationship and obtained a restraining order). 
 106. Symington, supra note 20, at 651.  
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lack of self-efficacy to disclose, or concerns over potential reper-
cussions of disclosure.”107 The criminal law makes HIV-positive 
people criminals when they respond to the real constraints of 
their lives by reserving disclosure to partners they know and 
trust. 
Unsurprisingly, people with HIV are much more likely to 
disclose their status to a long-term partner than a new or casu-
al one. More than ninety percent of people with HIV disclose 
their status to long-term, intimate, or exclusive partners.108 By 
contrast, they report high rates of nondisclosure—anywhere 
from thirty to seventy-six percent—to casual partners.109 It 
would be unfair and unrealistic to call HIV-positive people 
criminals for having sex in a relationship that is not intimate 
or trusting.  
Many nondisclosure prosecutions arise from sexual inter-
actions that are exploitative or abusive. In some prosecutions, 
the HIV-positive partner was especially vulnerable. Sociologist 
Trevor Hoppe found that, of fifty-eight Michigan prosecutions 
that resulted in conviction, eight defendants were “described in 
various ways as having ‘limited intelligence.’”110 For example, 
“Sandra,” a Michigan woman whose IQ of 72 sets her at the 
borderline of developmental disability,111 was released from an 
adult foster care facility, and moved into what the court charac-
terized as “a rundown motel notorious for sex work and drug 
use.”112 Two days later, “Sandra called and begged . . . for per-
mission to return to the foster care home,” saying that she had 
been having sex with another tenant at the motel.113 The guard-
 
 107. Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 36, at 456. 
 108. See Daniel H. Ciccarone et al., Sex Without Disclosure of Positive HIV 
Serostatus in a US Probability Sample of Persons Receiving Medical Care for 
HIV Infection, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 949, 952 tbl.2 (2003). 
 109. See infra notes 288–368 and accompanying text. 
 110. Hoppe, supra note 9, at 143; see also Cameron, supra note 16, at 36 
(discussing findings that in New Zealand, three of eight male-to-female non-
disclosure accused “suffered from a diagnosed mental illness or low intellectu-
al ability”). 
 111. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, Intellectual Disability Fact Sheet, available 
at http://www.psychiatry.org/file%20library/practice/dsm/dsm-5/dsm-5 
-intellectual-disability-fact-sheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2015) (discussing 
the revised diagnosis of intellectual disability, published in AM. PSYCHIATRIC 
ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (5th ed. 
2014)). 
 112. Hoppe, supra note 9, at 142. 
 113. Id. 
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ian of the foster home reported her to police, and Sandra was 
convicted for nondisclosure.114  
Other HIV-positive women have been convicted of nondis-
closure after they ended long relationships with HIV-negative 
men who were abusing them. When a person with HIV leaves 
an abusive relationship, the ex-partner can report him or her to 
police for nondisclosure at the outset of the relationship.115 
Another HIV nondiscloser, cocaine addict Kala Pierce, gave 
oral sex to a drug dealer in exchange for crack cocaine. Upon 
being told that Pierce had HIV, he helped beat her to death 
with a two-by-four.116 Nondisclosers like “Sandra” and Kala 
Pierce (had she survived) should not be treated as criminals. 
Given the apparent coercion surrounding the sex they had, it is 
not at all clear that their nondisclosures were morally wrong. 
Some—perhaps most—sex involves some degree of love, 
trust, affection, or at least attraction. However, as the HIV 
nondisclosure prosecutions demonstrate, it is not uncommon for 
people to have sex with partners they hardly know.117 In such 
circumstances, the person with HIV cannot know whether dis-
closure will result in acceptance, rejection, exposure, ostracism, 
or violence. He or she may thus fail to disclose even when there 
is no obvious threat to his or her safety. For example, Donald 
Bogardus, like Nick Rhoades, was an Iowa man who was non-
infectious because his viral load was undetectable.118 Despite 
the well-publicized Rhoades prosecution, Bogardus failed to tell 
a one-time partner he had HIV because he was “afraid of what 
kind of reaction he would get.”119 He wanted to disclose, but 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. See supra note 105. 
 116. Chattmon v. State, No. 05-93-01605-CR, 1996 WL 156914, at *1 (Tex. 
Apr. 4, 1996).  
 117. See, e.g., State v. Newlon, 216 S.W.3d 180, 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007); 
David MacAnally, Prosecutor: Woman Didn’t Tell Partner of HIV Status, 
WTHR.COM (July 1, 2010, 3:01 PM), http://www.wthr.com/global/story.asp?s= 
12655922; Man Wanted for HIV Exposure Turns Himself In, CLARKSVILLE 
ONLINE (July 12, 2011), http://www.clarksvilleonline.com/2011/07/21/man 
-wanted-for-hiv-exposure-turns-himself-in; Man w/ HIV, supra note 93; Jen-
nifer Mann, 2 Guilty of Risking Transmission of HIV at St. Louis Mardi Gras 
Party, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (June 12, 2012), http://www.stltoday.com/ 
news/local/crime-and-courts/guilty-of-risking-transmission-of-hiv-at-st-louis 
-mardi/article_33d9d61d-057e-582d-b319-894164df2710.html; Young, supra 
note 28. 
 118. Lindsey Moon, Critics Address Flaws in Iowa’s HIV Criminalization 
Law, DAILY IOWAN (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.dailyiowan.com/2012/02/ 
09/Metro/26931.html. 
 119. Id. 
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“clammed up,” because, he says, “I was afraid he was going to 
blab it out to everybody.”120 Bogardus says he wanted to use a 
condom, but the partner refused.121 The other man did not be-
come infected.122 Bogardus, who was charged under Iowa’s dra-
conian HIV law but sentenced as the state legislature and 
courts reconsidered it, received a suspended sentence.123 He had 
to register as a sex offender, and is likely to lose his job.124  
The criminal law should not encourage HIV-negative peo-
ple like Bogardus’s partner to have condomless sex with 
strangers on the assumption that, if they were HIV-positive, 
they would say so. Given the general ineffectiveness of nondis-
closure laws, it seems unlikely that, empirically, they would 
have any such effect.125 Still, this message is normatively unde-
sirable, and criminal sanctions should not be used to convey it. 
A narrower nondisclosure law  better tailored to risk and 
moral culpability—say, one that targeted nondisclosure only in 
long-term or exclusive relationships involving unprotected 
sex—might spare nondisclosers who do not put their partners 
at risk (like Kanay Mubita or Nick Rhoades), who could not 
safely be expected to disclose (like Sandra or Kala Pierce), or 
those (like Donald Bogardus) whose nondisclosures, though 
ethically wrong, do not warrant the threat of imprisonment or 
the stigma of sex offender registration. Still, such a law would 
criminalize some nondisclosures that are not morally blame-
worthy. While many long-term relationships are intimate and 
trusting, some involve financial or emotional dependency, or 
physical or sexual abuse. A partner whose unequal relationship 
compromises his or her ability to negotiate condom use may 
have good reason to fear the consequences of disclosure. The 
criminal law is a blunt instrument that cannot distinguish be-
 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. MacKenzie Elmer & Jeff Reinitz, ‘Draconian’ Law May Change: Law-
makers Seek To Decriminalize HIV: Too Late for Local Man Sentenced Under 
Transmission Law, WCFCOURIER.COM (Feb. 4, 2014), http://wcfcourier.com/ 
news/local/crime-and-courts/lawmakers-seek-to-decriminalize-hiv-too-late-for-
local-man/article_036c935d-107a-5fc8-9516-466e68e72f4e.html. 
 124. Id.  
 125. See Burris et al., supra note 1, at 472 (finding no evidence that the ex-
istence of criminal laws encourages sexual risk-taking by HIV-negative per-
sons).  
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tween nondisclosures that are morally blameworthy and those 
that are not.126  
Fortunately, criminal prosecution is not the only available 
strategy for encouraging disclosure. Disclosure is not central to 
public health HIV-prevention strategies, but public health 
workers invariably advise people with HIV to disclose their 
serostatus to all their partners. Public health researchers have 
developed non-criminal interventions that encourage disclosure 
without the bias and injustice involved in many nondisclosure 
prosecutions.127 The Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) maintains a website dedicated to “High Impact Preven-
tion” strategies it recommends to help health departments and 
community-based organizations  “provide the best evidence-
based HIV prevention services.”128 None of these evidence-based 
strategies involves criminal punishment. Judges, legislators, 
and legal scholars may find it hard to “conceive of sex outside of 
law,”129 but criminal prosecution is not the only, or the best, 
way to persuade people with HIV to disclose. Like other STIs 
less freighted with fear and stereotype, HIV can best be ad-
dressed through public health channels. 
As a general rule, people with HIV should disclose their 
serostatus before sex. In addition to enhancing partners’ ability 
to make informed sexual choices, disclosure may be linked to 
increased condom use.130 But, given the real constraints facing 
HIV-positive people and the ability of partners to protect them-
 
 126. See infra Part V.  
 127. See, e.g., Seth C. Kalichman et al., Effectiveness of an Intervention To 
Reduce HIV Transmission Risks in HIV-Positive People, 21 AM. J. PREVENTIVE 
MED. 84, 90–91 (2001); Carla Makhlouf Obermeyer et al., Facilitating HIV 
Disclosure Across Diverse Settings: A Review, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1011, 
1018 (2011); Richard J. Wolitski et al., Effects of a Peer-Led Behavioral Inter-
vention To Reduce HIV Transmission and Promote Serostatus Disclosure 
Among HIV-Seropositive Gay and Bisexual Men, 19 AIDS S99, S105–08 
(2005); Compendium of Evidence-Based Interventions and Best Practices for 
HIV Prevention–Healthy Relationships, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/ 
prevention/research/compendium/rr/healthyrelationships.html (last visited 
Mar. 16, 2015).  
 128. Effective Interventions: HIV Prevention That Work, CDC, https://www 
.effectiveinterventions.org/en/Home.aspx (last visited Mar. 16, 2015). 
 129. Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and 
the Legal Construction of Intimate Life, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1253, 1312 (2009). 
 130. See, e.g., Gary Marks & Nicole Crepaz, HIV-Positive Men’s Sexual 
Practices in the Context of Self-Disclosure of HIV Status, 27 J. ACQUIRED 
IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES 79, 79 (2001); Steven D. Pinkerton & Carol 
Galletly, Reducing HIV Transmission Risk by Increasing Serostatus Disclo-
sure: A Mathematical Modeling Analysis, 11 AIDS BEHAV. 698 (2007). 
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selves by choosing safer sexual activities, the failure to fulfill 
this obligation should not be a crime.  
II.  SEXUAL AUTONOMY AND HIV DISCLOSURE   
This Part presents the sexual autonomy rationale for non-
disclosure prosecutions: nondisclosure violates a right of the 
HIV-negative partner to know whether someone has HIV be-
fore deciding whether to have sex. This vision of sexual auton-
omy would require that valid sexual consent be “informed,” at 
least with respect to HIV. Under this rationale, it might not 
matter whether the criminalized behavior could transmit HIV, 
or whether the nondisclosure caused any harm. The unin-
formed partner has been injured simply by having sex he or she 
would otherwise have refused.  
The sexual autonomy rationale for criminalization has 
been adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada and suggested 
by several state and federal courts in the United States. If HIV 
nondisclosure vitiates sexual consent, it could transform oth-
erwise-wanted sex into a violation akin to rape. Sexual assault 
imposes grievous physical, dignitary, and psychic harm that 
warrants prosecution even if prosecution offers no utilitarian 
benefit.  
This Article will not attempt a comprehensive assessment 
of what sexual autonomy requires of the criminal law. This 
Part argues instead that arguments based on sexual autonomy 
or “informed consent” cannot justify targeting HIV for criminal-
ization when other serious diseases, and other material sexual 
deceptions, are not crimes.  
As for a working definition of sexual autonomy, I will ask 
the reader to assume that the criminal law can and should pro-
tect the right of every adult to accept or refuse sex for his or her 
own reasons. My critique of the sexual autonomy rationale rec-
ognizes—as does sexual assault law more generally—that deci-
sions to accept or refuse sex are not always fully informed. 
Criminal law does not (and cannot) ensure that sexual 
decisionmaking be perfectly free and perfectly informed or that 
every departure from that ideal be treated as a crime.   
Moreover, although proponents of criminalization tend to 
assume that it will protect vulnerable women against deceitful 
HIV-positive men, this Part points out that HIV nondisclosure 
is not gendered in this way—and the sexual deceptions that are 
stereotypically associated with heterosexual men have been af-
firmatively decriminalized. To the extent that proponents of 
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criminalization hope to promote gender equality, it does not 
make sense to start and end with HIV. 
A  PARTNERS’ INTEREST IN HIV DISCLOSURE 
The notion that HIV nondisclosure vitiates sexual consent 
has considerable intuitive appeal. Nondisclosure of sexually 
transmissible infection can be “very scary.”131 Thus most HIV-
negative people, including me, might feel betrayed to learn that 
a trusted spouse or sexual partner had HIV and did not tell. 
For many, disclosure that a partner or potential partner has 
HIV might be a dealbreaker: the uninformed partner might 
have refused sex, regardless of transmission risk. Others might 
have chosen different, lower-risk sexual activities had they 
known the partner to be HIV-positive. As Adam Plendl, the 
Nick Rhoades complainant, put it: “Individuals should have the 
choice as to whether or not they would engage with someone 
who is HIV positive when they are not. In this case, that 
choice—and what I also consider a right—was not afforded to 
me.”132 Plendl’s intuition that people have a right to know 
whether potential partners are HIV-positive is appealing, and 
seems to be widely shared.133 Most people would probably want 
to know if a current or prospective partner had HIV—although 
HIV might be only one of many material circumstances that 
could, if disclosed, affect our decisions whether to have sex.   
Most nondisclosure complainants have not been physically 
harmed.134 They may, however, experience fear, anger, or be-
trayal upon learning of the nondisclosure. An uninformed part-
ner may feel very worried for three to six months, until he or 
 
 131. Christine Boyle, The Judicial Construction of Sexual Assault Offences, 
in CONFRONTING SEXUAL ASSAULT: A DECADE OF LEGAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
136, 145 (Julian V. Roberts & Renate M. Mohr eds., 1994). 
 132. Young, supra note 28.  
 133. See, e.g., Ciccarone et al., supra note 108, at 953 (arguing that sex 
without disclosure is always “ethically indefensible” because even if the 
nondisclosing partner uses a condom, “[u]nilateral risk reduction strategies 
. . . do not allow one’s partner the opportunity of exercising informed choice 
about what level of risk is acceptable”); Carol L. Galletly & Steven D. Pinker-
ton, Preventing HIV Transmission via HIV Exposure Laws: Applying Logic 
and Mathematical Modeling To Compare Statutory Approaches to Penalizing 
Undisclosed Exposure to HIV, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 577, 584 (2008) (ac-
knowledging that laws that permit nondisclosure or restrict disclosure obliga-
tions to high-risk (but not low-risk) activities can “compromise partner auton-
omy insofar as it is the law rather than the partner that establishes when risk 
is great enough to warrant disclosure”). 
 134. See supra note 9. 
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she receives a negative HIV-test that is comfortably outside the 
“window period” for producing antibodies detectable by the 
most commonly used tests.135 Plendl, for example, felt terrified 
of infection despite the fact that he was not put at risk. “It was 
181 days of pure fear, that six-month window when you don’t 
know,” he said.136 Uninformed partners who are especially anx-
ious may not be reassured by a negative HIV test, even after 
the window period has closed.137  
Another harm uninformed partners might experience is 
the fact that they had sex that they would have refused had 
they known the truth.  But this rationale for HIV criminaliza-
tion is exceptional: in general, our laws do not treat sex by de-
ception as a legal wrong. With narrow exceptions, sexual decep-
tion is neither a crime nor a tort.138 Moreover, there is no 
evidence that a person who learns, after sex, that the partner 
had HIV suffers the kind of physical, psychic, or dignitary 
harm that often results from sexual assault. 
B. NONDISCLOSURE AS SEXUAL ASSAULT 
Defenders of nondisclosure prosecutions often take for 
granted that mandatory disclosure empowers the partner to 
make what courts often describe as “an informed decision” 
about consent to sex.139 This involves a plausible, though inac-
curate, assumption that informed partners will refuse sex, or 
will engage only in low- or no-risk sexual activities.140 “Only 
those willing to risk HIV transmission, or who know how to 
 
 135. The most commonly used HIV tests look for HIV-specific antibodies in 
the blood. The “window period” between initial infection and the detectability 
of antibodies in a test is variable. According to the CDC, “[t]he immune system 
usually takes 3 to 8 weeks to make antibodies against HIV,” and “[n]inety-
seven percent of people will develop antibodies in the first three months.” 
HIV/AIDS, Testing, When Should I Get Tested?, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/ 
hiv/basics/testing.html (last updated Jan. 16, 2015). “In very rare cases, it can 
take up to six months to develop antibodies to HIV.” Id.  
 136. Young, supra note 28.  
 137. See, e.g., People v. Clayton, No. 230328, 2002 WL31058331 at *1 
(Mich. App. Sept. 13, 2002) (stating that after sex without disclosure, com-
plainant was tested for HIV “about forty times”). 
 138. See infra Section II.C. 
 139. See, e.g., State v. Musser, 721 N.W. 2d 734, 749 (Iowa 2006); State v. 
Gamberella, 633 S.2d 595, 604 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1993); People v. Jensen, 586 
N.W.2d 748, 757 (Mich. App. 1998) (“Requiring an infected person to so inform 
sexual partners so they can make an informed decision before engaging in 
sexual penetration is narrowly tailored to further [the] compelling state inter-
est” in “discouraging the spread of HIV.”). 
 140. See supra note 54. 
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take precautions against the virus, will accept defendant’s offer 
of sexual contact,” a Michigan appellate court predicted,141 ap-
parently assuming either that most HIV-negative people do not 
“know how to take precautions against the virus,” or that they 
should not have to consider such precautions unless their part-
ner tells them that he or she has HIV.142 
1. Canada 
The Supreme Court of Canada has embraced the principle 
that HIV nondisclosure constitutes sexual assault. Until 1998, 
Canadian criminal law, like the laws of many U.S. states, es-
tablished that the only deceptions that vitiate sexual consent 
were impersonation and therapeutic fraud (e.g., the accused 
tricked the victim into thinking that the sexual act was a medi-
cal procedure).143 In 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada unan-
imously held in R. v. Cuerrier that nondisclosure of HIV could 
vitiate the partner’s consent to sexual touching, converting 
sexual activity that had been otherwise consensual into a sexu-
al assault.144 
The Cuerrier majority overruled a 110-year-old precedent 
which had established that nondisclosure of a sexually trans-
missible infection did not vitiate sexual consent, citing the 
“deadly consequences that non-disclosure of the risk of HIV in-
fection [could] have on an unknowing victim. . . . The possible 
consequence of engaging in unprotected intercourse with an 
HIV-positive partner is death.”145 Because a lie or omission 
about HIV could pose a “significant risk of serious bodily 
harm,” it constituted a fraud that vitiates sexual consent, re-
 
 141. Jensen, 586 N.W.2d at 759 n.9. 
 142. Similarly, television actor Lee Thompson, who plays “Uncle Poodle” on 
popular television show Here Comes Honey Boo Boo, contracted HIV from a 
long-term boyfriend who did not disclose his HIV status. “I later learned he 
had been HIV positive and was not taking medication . . . . I would have been 
cool with his HIV status if he had been honest. I don’t have an issue with the 
disease. I would have known how to protect myself.” Thompson-Sarmiento, 
supra note 97. HIV activist Sean Strub noted, in a blog posting: “No, Lee, you 
already knew how to protect yourself. You chose not to and now you’re making 
it someone else’s fault.” Sean Strub, Uncle Poodle Presses Charges, Partner 
Sentenced to 5 Years, POZ BLOGS (Jan. 12, 2013, 11:02 PM), http://blogs.poz 
.com/sean/archives/2013/01. 
 143. R. v. Cuerrier, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371, 421–23 (Can.).  
 144. Id. at 371. Use or threat of force is not an element of sexual assault 
under the Canadian Criminal Code. The absence of consent makes any sexual 
touching a sexual assault, regardless of whether force was used. Canada Crim-
inal Code, R.S.C. 1998 §§ 265, 271, 273.1.  
 145. Cuerrier, 2 S.C.R. at 430–31. 
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gardless of transmission.146 Justice Cory’s majority held that 
sexual consent was invalid without disclosure: “The consent 
cannot simply be to have sexual intercourse. Rather it must be 
consent to have intercourse with a partner who is HIV-
positive.”147  
Chief Justice McLachlin concurred. It seemed “right and 
logical” that “lying” about HIV amounted to fraud that vitiates 
consent.148 Nondisclosure of HIV, unlike other sexual decep-
tions, changed sexual intercourse “from an act that has certain 
natural consequences (whether pleasure, pain or pregnancy), to 
a potential sentence of disease or death.”149 But serious sexually 
transmissible infection is no more or less “natural” a risk of un-
protected intercourse than pregnancy is. By enlisting nature to 
distinguish culpable from nonculpable deception, this argument 
constructs at least some sex as naturally immune to sexually 
transmissible infection.  
Ever since, nondisclosure of HIV (and, on two occasions, 
other sexual deceptions posing a serious risk to health150) has 
generally been prosecuted in Canada as aggravated sexual as-
sault, punishable by life imprisonment.151 HIV and anti-rape 
advocates contend that sentences are longer, and conviction 
rates higher, in HIV prosecutions than in other prosecutions for 
aggravated sexual assault152—that is, where the rapist 
“wounds, maims disfigures or endangers the life” of the vic-
tim.153 In late 2012, the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously 
reaffirmed that HIV nondisclosure is aggravated sexual as-
sault, except where there is no “significant risk of bodily harm” 
 
 146. Id. at 430–33. Justice Cory’s majority opinion left open the question of 
whether the duty to disclose would arise where “careful use of condoms” might 
reduce risk to a level that was insignificant. Id. at 432. 
 147. Id. at 431. 
 148. Id. at 409 (McLachlin, C.J., concurring). 
 149. Id. at 412 (parentheses in original). 
 150. R. v. Jones, [2002] N.B.Q.B. 340, 340 (Can.) (acquittal for nondisclo-
sure of hepatitis C on the basis that a transmission risk of “less than 1 per-
cent” was not “significant”); R. v. Hutchinson, [2010] N.S.C.A. 3, 3 (Can.) (up-
holding sexual assault conviction of an accused who poked holes in the 
condom, resulting in unwanted pregnancy and abortion). 
 151. Grant, Time To Rethink Cuerrier, supra note 20, at 56; Mykhalovskiy 
& Betteridge, supra note 16 at 50; Symington, supra note 20, at 644–45. 
 152. Mykhalovskiy & Betteridge, supra note 16, at 50. 
 153. In Canada, sexual assault is “aggravated” when it “wounds, maims, 
disfigures or endangers the life” of the victim. Canada Criminal Code, § 273(1). 
The sentencing range is five years to life. Id. § 273(2). 
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whatsoever because the nondiscloser has an undetectable viral 
load and uses a condom.154 
2. The United States 
In the United States, where force requirements generally 
preclude prosecuting nondisclosure as rape, statutory and judi-
cial language nonetheless tends to conflate HIV nondisclosure 
with sexual assault.  
Many overbroad criminal nondisclosure statutes seem to 
arise from statutory conflation of nondisclosure and sexual as-
sault. Michigan’s law, for example, requires disclosure before 
“sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or 
any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s 
body or any object into the genital or anal openings of another 
person’s body, but emission of semen is not required.”155 This 
definition was drawn verbatim from a sexual assault statute,156 
and is commonly found in the sexual assault provisions of other 
states. Arkansas, Colorado, Guam, Minnesota, New Jersey, and 
Ohio also import their HIV-disclosure definitions from statutes 
banning incest or sexual assault.157 Similarly, a Florida appel-
 
 154. R. v. Mabior, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 584, 585 (Can.); R. v. D.C., [2012] S.C.R. 
626, 637 (Can.). Grant points out that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Mabior deems any non-negligible risk of transmission to be “significant” 
enough to warrant punishment as aggravated sexual assault. Grant, Over-
Criminalization, supra note 20, at 482. 
 155. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.5210 (West 2001). 
 156. Hoppe, supra note 9, at 141–42. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 750.520a(o) (West 2004), defining “sexual penetration” for the purposes of 
sexual assault laws as “sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal inter-
course, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body or 
of any object into the genital or anal openings of another person’s body, but 
emission of semen is not required.” 
 157. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (2006); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-401(6), 
18-3-415.5 (2014); 9 GUAM CODE ANN. § 28.10 (2014) (defining HIV-
prostitution offense in these terms); MINN. STAT. § 609.2241(1)(e) (2014) (in-
corporating “sexual penetration” definition from MINN. STAT. § 609.341(12)); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-5(b) (prohibiting acts of “sexual penetration” by a per-
son with HIV without the partner’s informed consent). In response to legisla-
tors’ questions as to whether the New Jersey offense was applicable to women, 
the Assembly Judiciary Committee pointed out that “sexual penetration” is 
defined in § 2C:14-1 (the sexual assault section of the Code) as “vaginal inter-
course, cunnilingus, fellatio or anal intercourse between persons or insertion 
of the hand, finger or object into the anus or vagina either by the actor or upon 
the actor’s instruction. The depth of insertion shall not be relevant,” and ap-
plies to both men and women. See Assembly Judiciary Committee Statement, 
Senate, No. 1297--L.1997, c. 201. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.11(B) (2011) 
prohibits “sexual conduct” without disclosure of HIV infection; § 2903.11(E)(4) 
adopts the definition of “sexual conduct” from § 2907.01 from the sexual of-
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late court recently interpreted “sexual intercourse,” which is 
undefined in the HIV-disclosure statute, by drawing upon an 
incest statute which defined the prohibited behavior in almost 
exactly the same way.158 
The importation of such definitions into criminal disclosure 
mandates implies that uninformed but otherwise-consensual 
sex with an HIV-positive person—without transmission159—is a 
moral, psychic, and dignitary harm akin to incest or sexual as-
sault. This questionable conflation becomes more troubling 
when we compare sentences for HIV nondisclosure to those for 
the paradigmatic violation of sexual autonomy: sexual assault. 
According to the U.S. Department of Justice, the median state 
court sentence for rape is eight years,160 and the median sen-
tence for “other sexual assault” (which includes forced sexual 
acts “not involving intercourse,” as well as statutory rape161) is 
three years eight months.162 Nashville is the only jurisdiction 
for which comprehensive HIV sentencing data has been pub-
lished. In Nashville, sentences for nondisclosure were shorter 
than the national average for rape, but longer than for “other 
sexual assault”: for “unprotected sexual exposure with alleged 
transmission” (5 years); unprotected sexual exposure within an 
ongoing relationship, no transmission alleged (8 years and 5 
years); unspecified sexual act within an ongoing relationship, 
no transmission alleged (4 years); and unprotected sex with a 
 
fenses section of the Code (“vaginal intercourse between a male and female; 
anal intercourse, fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex; 
and, without privilege to do so, the insertion, however slight, of any part of the 
body or any instrument, apparatus, or other object into the vaginal or anal 
opening of another. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete vagi-
nal or anal intercourse”), with the exception of penetration with an object, un-
less the offender knew that the object carried his or her “bodily fluid.” 
 158. L.A.P. v. State, 62 So. 3d 693, 693–94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (find-
ing that a statute requiring HIV disclosure before “sexual intercourse” did not 
apply to an HIV-positive woman who did not disclose before “oral sex and digi-
tal penetration” by a man; disclosure obligations only applied to “‘the penetra-
tion of the female sex organ by the male sex organ’” (quoting FLA. STAT. 
§ 826.04 (2008))). But see State v. D.C., 114 So. 3d 440, 440, 443 (Fl. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2013) (refusing to follow L.A.P., and holding that the disclosure statute 
applied to same-sex oral and anal sex). 
 159. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 160. SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006 – 
STATISTICAL TABLES 6 tbl.1.3 (2009), available at http://www.bjs.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf. 
 161. Id. at 3 tbl.1.1. 
 162. Id. at 6 tbl.1.3. Mean sentences were longer: 138 months (11.5 years) 
for rape and 78 months (6.5 years) for “other sexual assault.”  
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casual sex partner (3 years).”163 A man convicted of spattering 
blood on a police officer served six years.164  
In other states, where data on actual sentences are not 
available, maximum sentences may indicate the value legisla-
tures place on sexual autonomy in the context of HIV nondis-
closure as opposed to sexual assault. In Iowa and Washington, 
the maximum sentences for nondisclosure are longer than for 
rape. In Washington, the maximum sentence for nondisclosure 
is twenty-six years six months,165 compared to five years for 
non-aggravated rape.166 In Iowa, the maximum sentence for 
HIV nondisclosure is twenty-five years,167 compared to ten 
years for non-aggravated rape.168 Moreover, it seems that Iowa 
courts and prosecutors routinely use the upper end of the sen-
tencing range in nondisclosure cases involving no particularly 
egregious circumstances,169 although 2014 reforms should 
change this practice.170 In many other states, sentences for HIV 
 
 163. Galletly & Lazzarini, supra note 9, at 2629. 
 164. Id. 
 165. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.94A.510, 9.94A.515, 9A.36.011 (2014) 
(showing first-degree assault for nondisclosure of HIV status is a class “A” fel-
ony punishable by up to twenty-six years, six months). 
 166. WASH REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.94A.510, 9.94A.515, 9A.44.060, 
9A.20.021(1)(c) (showing third-degree rape is a class “C” felony punishable by 
up to seven years). 
 167. IOWA CODE §§ 709D.3, 902.9(2) (2013) (showing “criminal transmis-
sion of a contagious or infectious disease,” including HIV, can be a class “B” 
felony punishable by up to twenty-five years).  
 168. Id. §§ 709.4, 902.9 (showing third-degree sexual abuse is a class “C” 
felony punishable by up to ten years).  
 169. See, e.g., supra notes 25–29 and accompanying text (describing the 
case of Nick Rhoades, who was sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment for HIV 
nondisclosure, despite posing no realistic possibility of transmission); Musser 
v. Mapes, 854 F. Supp. 2d 652, 655 (S.D. Iowa 2012) (denying habeas corpus to 
a man sentenced to 50 years’ imprisonment for nondisclosure to two women 
before consensual sex; no allegation of transmission), aff’d, 718 F.3d 996 (8th 
Cir. 2013).  
 170. In May 2014, as this Article went to press, Iowa revised its law. See 
IOWA CODE § 709D (2015). While HIV exposure remains a class B felony sub-
ject to twenty-five years’ imprisonment, this penalty is now limited to circum-
stances where the risk of transmission is “substantial,” where the accused had 
the specific intent to infect the uninformed partner, and where transmission 
does, in fact, occur. Id. The revisions also expanded criminalization to three 
other transmissible diseases: meningitis, hepatitis, and tuberculosis. Id. 
Where transmission of any of these diseases does not occur despite a substan-
tial risk and despite the specific intent of the accused, or where the accused 
acted with “reckless disregard” for transmission and causes transmission de-
spite a lack of specific intent, nondisclosure is a Class D felony, subject to a 
maximum of five years’ imprisonment. Id. Where reckless disregard does not 
result in transmission, nondisclosure is a misdemeanor. Id.  
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nondisclosure are comparable to those for rape: the sentencing 
ranges overlap.171 To the extent that voluntary sex without dis-
closure is understood to violate sexual autonomy, it must be a 
violation less grave than sexual assault.  
Judges, like lawmakers, tend to assume that sex without 
HIV disclosure is sex without meaningful consent. Although 
U.S. courts uphold HIV nondisclosure crimes as public health 
measures,172 their reasoning often invokes the right of a “part-
ner [to] make an informed decision.”173 As the Iowa Supreme 
Court recently explained, “Surely it cannot be disputed that one 
considering having sexual intercourse with another would want 
to know whether the other person is infected with HIV prior to 
engaging in such intimate contact. Consent in the absence of 
such knowledge is certainly not a full and knowing con-
sent . . . .”174 A federal court recently suggested that sex without 
HIV disclosure was not fully consensual. By requiring the HIV-
positive person to “give another person the option of informed 
consent,” it held, the disclosure law “is aimed at protecting non-
consenting persons.”175  
 
 171. In Missouri, HIV nondisclosure is punishable by ten to thirty years’ 
imprisonment if transmission occurs (and five to fifteen years if transmission 
does not occur), MO. REV. STAT. §§ 191.677.1(2); 558.011.2(1) (2014), while 
rape is punishable by five years to life, id. § 566.030.2(2). In North Dakota, 
nondisclosure is punishable by up to twenty years’ imprisonment, while “sexu-
al imposition” is punishable by up to ten years, and “gross sexual imposition” 
is normally punishable by up to twenty years, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-32-01; 
12.1-20-03, -04, -17 (2014). See also, e.g., Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-
401(a); 5-14-23; 5-14-103(c)(1) (2013) (nondisclosure: 6–30 years; rape: 10–40 
years); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 777.13k; 750.520d(1)(b), (2); 
750.520e(1)(b), (2) (2013) (nondisclosure: up to 4 years; forced “sexual contact”: 
up to 2 years; forced “sexual penetration”: up to 15 years); and Ohio, OHIO 
REV. CODE §§ 2929.14(A)(1), (2); 2903.11(B), (D); 2907.02(2) (2015) (nondisclo-
sure: 2–8 years; rape: 3–11 years). 
 172. See supra note 43 and accompanying text; M. Severson, Omnibus 
AIDS Bill, 5 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 397, 398–99 (1988) (explaining that the stated 
purpose of the omnibus bill which, inter alia, criminalized HIV nondisclosure, 
was “to protect the health of Georgia’s citizenry”).  
 173. State v. Gamberella, 633 So. 2d 595, 604 (La. Ct. App. 1993); see also 
State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d 734, 744 (Iowa 2006) (endorsing the court’s rea-
soning in Gamberella); People v. Jensen, 586 N.W.2d 748, 757 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1998) (“Requiring an infected person to so inform sexual partners so they can 
make an informed decision before engaging in sexual penetration is narrowly 
tailored to further th[e] compelling state interest [of discouraging the spread of 
HIV].”). 
 174. Musser, 721 N.W.2d at 748. 
 175. Musser v. Mapes, 854 F. Supp. 2d 652, 666–67 (S.D. Iowa 2012), aff’d, 
718 F.3d 996 (8th Cir. 2013). 
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Civil courts have also adjudicated tort claims arising from 
nondisclosure or deceit with respect to HIV. In tort law, a per-
son who knows he or she has a sexually transmissible infection 
owes “a duty to either abstain from sexual contact with others 
or, at least, to warn others of the infection prior to having con-
tact with them.”176 One California appellate court has held that 
“consent to sexual intercourse [is] vitiated by one partner’s 
fraudulent concealment of the risk of infection with venereal 
disease.”177 In contrast to criminal prosecutions, though, a tort 
claim requires proof that the nondisclosure resulted in physical 
injury.  
Fear of HIV does not, on its own, ordinarily result in tort 
liability.178 In contrast to the criminal context, where HIV-
positive people are punished for nonrisky activities, civil courts 
have been skeptical of tort claims by plaintiffs who feared HIV 
transmission in circumstances where the transmission risk was 
so remote that their fears were unreasonable.179 They have re-
jected claims by patients who became fearful after learning 
 
 176. Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So. 2d 686, 689 (Ala. 1989) (quoted with ap-
proval in McPherson v. McPherson, 712 A.2d 1043, 1046 (Me. 1998)); see also, 
e.g., Meany v. Meany, 639 So. 2d 229, 235 (La. 1994) (“The duty of the infected 
party is either to abstain from sexual contact with others or to warn others of 
the infection before sexual contact.”); Mussivand v. David, 544 N.E.2d 265, 270 
(Ohio 1989) (“[A] person who knows, or should know, that he or she is infected 
with a venereal disease has the duty to abstain from sexual conduct or, at the 
minimum, to warn those persons with whom he or she expects to have sexual 
relations of his or her condition.”); Lockhart v. Loosen, 943 P.2d 1074, 1080 
(Okla. 1997) (“If Loosen knew or should reasonably have known that she had 
herpes and copulated with Mr. Lockhart during a period when she was infec-
tious, . . . she had a duty to warn him of her contagion.”); Howell v. Spokane & 
Inland Empire Blood Bank, 818 P.2d 1056, 1059 (Wash. 1991) (stating that a 
duty to refrain from donating blood arose “if [the donor] knew or should have 
known of his seropositivity at the time of the donation”). 
 177. Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276–77 (Ct. App. 1984); 
see also Leleux v. United States, 178 F.3d 750, 755 (5th Cir. 1999) (where a 
person knows he is infected with herpes, “the unwanted transmission of a ve-
nereal disease during consensual sex vitiates the consent,” transforming the 
consensual sex into a battery).  
 178. The torts of negligent transmission of sexually transmitted disease 
and fraudulent misrepresentation both require transmission. See Mary G. 
Leary, Tort Liability for Sexually Transmitted Disease, 88 AM. JUR. TRIALS 
153, § 10 (2003 & Supp. 2014) (listing elements, facts and circumstances that 
tend to establish each cause of action). 
 179. See, e.g., Pendergist v. Pendergrass, 961 S.W.2d 919, 924 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1998) (reviewing cases holding that, where plaintiff has not been infect-
ed, a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress requires “actual expo-
sure” to HIV). 
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that a dentist or surgeon had HIV.180 Unlike prosecutions, tort 
claims require “a genuine basis for the fear . . . not premised on 
public misconceptions about AIDS.”181 A Kansas appellate court 
rejected a plaintiff’s emotional distress claim for picking up a 
used condom in a hotel room on the basis that she had not ex-
perienced “actual exposure” to HIV, and her fears were unrea-
sonable as she had tested negative four times.182 A 1987 New 
York court rejected a wife’s claim that she suffered “AIDS-
phobia” upon discovering her husband’s infidelity with men.183 
Occasionally, a state court has upheld a tort claim for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress for fear of HIV unaccompanied 
by transmission or risk.184 In general, though, civil courts are 
unwilling to recognize groundless fear of HIV as a compensable 
harm. 
C. THREE VERSIONS OF “INFORMED CONSENT” 
If the criminal law aims to protect sexual autonomy by re-
quiring that sexual consent be “informed,” at least with respect 
to HIV, we would need to decide what information would be re-
quired for valid consent. This Section will sketch three theories 
of “informed consent” that might be offered to support the tar-
geted criminalization of HIV nondisclosure. None of them ade-
quately explains it. 
 
 180. See, e.g., Kerins v. Hartley, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172, 179 (Ct. App. 1994) 
(denying plaintiff emotional distress damages for her fear of contracting HIV 
from a surgeon where the probability of infection was “statistically insignifi-
cant”); Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355 (Del. 1995) (rejecting battery claims 
that were based on dentist’s failure to advise patients that he was infected 
with HIV); Majca v. Beekil, 701 N.E.2d 1084 (Ill. 1998) (finding no cause of 
action for plaintiffs’ fears of contracting AIDS through a normal dental proce-
dure). 
 181. Pendergist, 961 S.W.2d at 926. 
 182. Reynolds v. Highland Manor, Inc., 954 P.2d 11, 15–16 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1998). 
 183. Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595, 596 (Sup. Ct. 1987).  
 184. See, e.g., John & Jane Roes, 985 P.2d 661, 663, 666 (Haw. 1999) (certi-
fying question of state law as to whether airport baggage handlers who were 
“exposed” to HIV-infected blood when it leaked from luggage could recover 
damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress based on “fear of devel-
oping AIDS” without physical harm, because “a reasonable person would fore-
seeably be unable to cope with the mental stress engendered by an actual, di-
rect, imminent, and potentially life-endangering threat to his or her physical 
safety”). 
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i. Rape by Deception  
A strong version of the “informed consent” argument might 
support criminalizing all sexual nondisclosure or deception, as 
long as it was material to a partner’s decision to have sex. This 
Subsection will question this theory as a justification for sin-
gling out HIV. Part IV will return to the notion of rape-by-
deception, offering reasons to be skeptical of assumptions that 
straight women would benefit from criminalizing male decep-
tion.  
Many HIV-negative people might not want to have sex 
with an HIV-positive partner, regardless of whether the sex 
poses any risk of transmission. Under my working definition of 
sexual autonomy, they have a perfect right to refuse on that 
basis (or, indeed, on any basis that others might feel is discrim-
inatory). Even if the refusal is based on fear, stigma, or miscon-
ception, the HIV-positive person has no right to have sex with 
the refuser. Arguably, then, the law should protect sexual au-
tonomy by punishing the person who withholds or lies about 
her or his serostatus, knowing there’s a good chance it would be 
a dealbreaker. The rape-by-deception argument, though, re-
turns us to retributive questions: if criminalization is inde-
pendent of any health risk, it is not clear why nondisclosure of 
HIV should be a crime while nondisclosure of other foreseeable 
dealbreakers is not. 
Where there is no risk of transmission, HIV nondisclosure 
is comparable to nondisclosure of any noninfectious health con-
dition, like a cancer diagnosis, that might have changed a part-
ner’s mind. A person with a diagnosis of Stage IV cancer might 
well fail to disclose it to a new or casual partner, as Mubita and 
Rhoades did.185 Like theirs, this person’s nondisclosure would 
hide no risk to the health of the uninformed partner. The rape-
by-deception version of “informed consent” might assert that 
the uninformed partner was harmed by having sex she or he 
would have rejected had she or he known the truth. Yet nondis-
closure of cancer is not a crime, nor should it be. If criminal 
laws were to single out nondisclosure of cancer as a crime while 
permitting almost all other sexual deceptions, we might fairly 
suspect that unfounded fears and stigma were at work.  
The greatest difficulty with the rape-by-deception argu-
ment for HIV criminalization is that criminal law does not, in 
 
 185. See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text. 
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general, require that sexual consent be “informed.”186 In gen-
eral, criminal law takes a caveat emptor approach to sexual de-
ception. “As a rule, it is not a crime to obtain sex by decep-
tion.”187 It is not a crime to deceive another into sex by 
misrepresenting one’s age, health, fertility, wealth, ethnicity, 
employment, feelings, intentions, fidelity, marital status, or 
almost any other factor that might have materially changed the 
partner’s decision to have sex.188 Decker and Baroni conclude, in 
a recent fifty-state survey of sexual assault laws: “Use of decep-
tion is [a] tolerated mechanism for achieving sex.”189 
The exceptions to this general rule are extremely limited. 
There are two main instances in which many—though not all—
states treat nonforcible sex-by-deception as a crime: impersona-
tion of a husband (but generally not a boyfriend190), and thera-
peutic fraud.191 There is little case law interpreting these of-
fenses, however,192 and even in the few states that purport to 
 
 186. See John F. Decker & Peter G. Baroni, “No” Still Means “Yes”: The 
Failure of the “Non-Consent” Reform Movement in American Rape and Sexual 
Assault Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1081, 1133, 1146 (2011). 
 187. David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 457 
(2000). 
 188. See id. at 457, 460–75; Decker & Baroni, supra note 186, at 1132–41; 
Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 39, 
70 (1998).  
 189. Decker & Baroni, supra note 186, at 1167; see also STEPHEN J. 
SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE 
FAILURE OF LAW 101, 112 (1998); Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-
Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy, 122 YALE L.J. 1372 (2013). 
 190. See People v. Morales, 150 Cal. Rptr. 3d 920 (Ct. App. 2013) (reversing 
conviction and remanding for a new trial where the accused had sex with the 
victim by impersonating the victim’s boyfriend; the original 1872 statute crim-
inalized nonforcible sex as rape when it was obtained by impersonating a 
spouse, but not by impersonating a boyfriend; the California legislature has 
since reformed the law); Suliveres v. Commonwealth, 865 N.E.2d 1086 (Mass. 
2007) (concluding that “[f]raudulently obtaining consent to sexual intercourse 
does not constitute rape as defined in [the Massachusetts] statute,” and ac-
quitting the defendant who had impersonated the victim’s boyfriend); People 
v. Hough, 607 N.Y.S.2d 884 (Crim. Ct. 1994) (holding that the defendant did 
not commit sexual misconduct when he tricked the victim into having sex by 
impersonating her boyfriend). But see State v. Mitchell, No. M1996-00008-
CCA-R3-CD, 1999 WL 559930, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 30, 1999) (convict-
ing the defendant of rape by fraud for impersonating victims’ boyfriends and 
noting that “[t]he rape statute is clear on its face that a person commits a . . .  
felony when he or she engages in sexual penetration that is accomplished by 
fraud”). 
 191. See Decker & Baroni, supra note 186, at 1135–40; Rubenfeld, supra 
note 189, at 1397–98. 
 192. See Decker & Baroni, supra note 186, at 1146. 
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criminalize sexual deception outside these two categories,193 
prosecutions are rare.194 Decker and Baroni found no prosecu-
tions for mere nondisclosure of (or lying about) an important 
fact that might have changed the complainant’s mind. Rather, 
sex-by-deception prosecutions invariably involved either imper-
sonation, therapeutic deceit, or an abuse of power.195  
Even where consent is obtained by impersonation or by 
therapeutic deceit, courts do not consistently treat sex by de-
ception as a crime.196 Courts in California, New York, and Mas-
sachusetts have acquitted boyfriend-impersonators on the basis 
that, in the absence of a statutory prohibition, impersonation 
could not fulfill the force requirement for a rape conviction. 
“[I]ntercourse where consent is achieved by fraud does not con-
stitute rape,” explained the Massachusetts Supreme Court.197 
 
 193. See id. at 1140–41. Three states retain the once-ubiquitous crime of 
seduction, which criminalizes a man’s use of a false promise of marriage to ob-
tain sex from a previously chaste woman or girl, but it is no longer used. See 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-55 (2014); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1120 (2014); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 16-15-50 (2014); Bryden, supra note 187, at 459 (“Although a 
number of the old [seduction] laws are still on the books, successful prosecu-
tions are now virtually unheard-of.”); Melissa Murray, Marriage As Punish-
ment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 38 (2012) (“[S]eduction statutes were in desue-
tude by the 1950s . . . .”). 
 194. Decker & Baroni, supra note 186, at 1146–47 (concluding that “either 
deception provisions are not being prosecuted, prosecutions of these provisions 
are uniformly resulting in acquittals, or convictions based on these provisions 
are never appealed”).  
 195. Id. at 1141–46 (describing sex-by-deception prosecutions). 
 196. See, e.g., Boro v. Superior Ct., 210 Cal. Rptr. 122 (Ct. App. 1985) (de-
fendant called the victim, pretending to be a doctor, telling her she had a dan-
gerous blood disease that could only be cured by expensive, painful surgery or 
by having sex with a donor who had been injected with curative serum; he 
then had sex with her, claiming to be the donor; defendant was acquitted be-
cause the fraud was in the inducement, not in the factum); Tony Rizzo, Case 
Shows Need for Rape Law Change, Prosecutors Say; Judge Drops Felony 
Charges in Incident That Didn’t Involve Force, KAN. CITY STAR, July 29, 1995, 
at C2 (explaining sexual assault charges dismissed for absence of “force or 
fear” elements; Kansas subsequently amended its statute to criminalize ther-
apeutic fraud). In two future articles, I argue that such conduct should be rec-
ognized as sexual assault: not because it is deceptive, but because it is coer-
cive. Kim Shayo Buchanan, Rape by Fraud, U. TORONTO L.J. (forthcoming); 
Kim Shayo Buchanan, Deception, Coercion, and Rape (forthcoming) (on file 
with author). 
 197. Suliveres v. Commonwealth, 865 N.E.2d 1086, 1089 (Mass. 2007); see 
also, e.g., People v. Morales, 150 Cal. Rptr. 3d 920, 929 (Ct. App. 2013) (hold-
ing “reluctantly” that “a person who accomplishes sexual intercourse by im-
personating someone other than a married victim’s spouse is not guilty” of 
rape under California law; the legislature later reformed the law); People v. 
Hough, 607 N.Y.S.2d 884 (Crim. Ct. 1994) (acquitting accused who imperson-
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Relying on this permissive jurisprudence of sexual decep-
tion, contemporary state courts have also rejected rape charges 
for other blameworthy forms of sexual deceit such as therapeu-
tic fraud198 and abuses of trust by persons in authority.199 This 
jurisprudence offers what Canadian Chief Justice Beverley 
McLachlin has justifiably criticized as a “crabbed view of con-
sent and fraud.”200 The objective of this Part is not to defend 
this “crabbed view” of sexual consent, but to make the more 
limited point that sexual autonomy cannot explain the crimi-
nalization of HIV nondisclosure when almost all other material 
sexual deceptions are lawful.  
As Jed Rubenfeld points out, a rape law whose primary ob-
jective was to vindicate sexual autonomy “would not limit rape-
by-deception cases to the two old scenarios,” husband imper-
sonation and therapeutic fraud.201 Why, then, is sexual decep-
tion criminalized in these two cases, and not in others? Anne 
Coughlin has advanced the most persuasive explanation: these 
rules developed in the nineteenth century, when most 
nonmarital sex was punishable as a crime.202 These two decep-
tions tended to exonerate a blameless woman who had engaged 
in an act of fornication or adultery only because of an “exculpa-
tory mistake of fact”203—she had been tricked into believing 
that the act was nonsexual or that the partner was her hus-
band. Any other mistaken belief the woman held—for example, 
a mistake as to her partner’s status, feelings, intentions, or 
health—would be irrelevant to her guilt with respect to the 
crime of adultery or fornication.204 Accordingly, other deceptions 
did not affect a man’s (or woman’s) liability for unlawful sex. 
 
ated victim’s boyfriend because he did not use force, and expressing doubt that 
husband impersonation vitiates sexual consent). 
 198. See supra note 191. 
 199. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 792 P.2d 1103 (Mont. 1990) (acquitting 
high school teacher of rape because no force was used; he coerced her into sex 
by saying she would not graduate if she did not have sex with him); Common-
wealth v. Mlinarich, 542 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1988) (per curiam) (acquitting adult 
guardian of 14-year-old girl of rape after he told her she would be sent to juve-
nile detention if she did not comply). 
 200. R. v. Mabior, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 584, 604 (Can.). 
 201. Rubenfeld, supra note 189, at 1395–98 (noting that “American sex law 
today appear[s] to be animated by” sexual autonomy, but explaining that “this 
picture of American sex law can’t account for” limiting rape-by-deception cases 
to the two historical exceptions). 
 202. Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1, 32, 38 (1998).  
 203. Id. at 32 (that is, the woman “neither knew nor should have known 
that her conduct was of the forbidden character”). 
 204. Id. at 32–33. 
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If this is the rationale for these exceptions, it is obviously 
irrelevant today. Despite their archaic logic, though, I would 
not argue husband impersonation or therapeutic fraud should 
be legalized. Because these rules are longstanding, would-be 
sexual deceivers are on notice that such lies are prohibited. Un-
like most other sexual deceptions (including HIV nondisclo-
sure), impersonation and therapeutic fraud are always morally 
blameworthy, and they will often be coercive.205 Philosophical 
consistency does not seem to be a compelling reason to decrimi-
nalize such reprehensible deceptions. 
While courts often hold that force requirements tie their 
hands with respect to blameworthy and coercive sexual decep-
tions by heterosexual men, they have nonetheless managed to 
convict when faced with allegations that a transgender man or 
boy failed to disclose his (female) biological sex. Israeli scholar 
Aeyal Gross documents four such prosecutions in the United 
States, the United Kingdom and Israel, all of which resulted in 
criminal conviction.206 More recently, in 2013, the English Court 
of Appeal held that deceit as to gender—that is, presenting 
one’s gender in a way that does not correspond to biological 
sex—can vititate sexual consent. It upheld the conviction of a 
transgender teenager for “assault by penetration” because he 
failed to disclose that he was, in the Court’s view, a girl.207 
Aeyal Gross contends that, by declaring that such nondisclo-
sure vitiates sexual consent, courts privilege complainants’ 
identity as heterosexuals, protecting them against “non-
voluntary and undesired homosexuality.”208 As another British 
 
 205. See supra notes 188–191 and accompanying text. 
 206. Aeyal Gross, Gender Outlaws Before the Law: The Courts of the Bor-
derland, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 165 (2009) (discussing four such prosecu-
tions in the United States, United Kingdom, and Israel, all of which resulted 
in a criminal conviction).  
 207. McNally v. R., [2013] EWCA Crim 1051 at para. 11 (Eng. C.A.) (ex-
plaining that the accused, who, it appears from the decision, is biologically fe-
male, presented himself as a boy named Scott, and wore male clothing with a 
“strap-on dildo” underneath. The complainant had sex with him several times; 
the relationship ended when the complainant’s mother “confronted” the ac-
cused “about really being a girl.” It is not entirely clear whether the complain-
ant realized that the accused was not a cisgender boy: “Although one or two 
answers might be said to be equivocal, she said that she did not know that 
‘Scott’ was a girl.”). 
 208. Gross, supra note 206, at 190. See, e.g., McNally, [2013] EWCA Crim 
1051 at paras. 11, 26 (“[The complainant] considered herself heterosexual and 
had consented to the sexual acts because she believed she was engaging in 
them with a boy called Scott. . . . She chose to have sexual encounters with a 
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trial court put it, “[y]ou have called into question [the com-
plainants’] whole sexual identity, and I suspect both those girls 
would rather have been actually raped by some young man 
than have happened to them what you did.”209 
If HIV prosecutions purport to vindicate an interest that 
sexual consent be fully informed, we must ask why expanded 
criminal protection of this interest would be limited to nondis-
closures about HIV and transgender identity. In the absence of 
persuasive justifications for singling out these nondisclosures, 
we must ask whether heterosexist gender norms might inform 
a jurisprudence that affirmatively permits the kinds of sexual 
deception that are stereotypically associated with heterosexual 
men,210 while punishing sexual deception by transfolk and peo-
ple with HIV who violate conventional expectations of hetero-
sexual privilege. 
2. Undisclosed Health Risks 
Where the sexual activity does pose a significant risk of 
transmission, HIV nondisclosure is distinguishable from most 
other sexual deceptions: it withholds information that might 
affect the health of the uninformed partner. But in general, our 
criminal laws do not penalize sexual deceptions that can  jeop-
ardize health. Nondisclosure of other sexually transmissible in-
fections is generally not a crime. Neither is contraceptive fraud. 
These deceptions are not even torts, unless they result in phys-
ical harm.  
a. HIV and other dangerous infections 
Some scholars argue that nondisclosure of HIV (or certain 
other STIs) constitutes an extraordinary form of sexual decep-
tion that should vitiate sexual consent because of the risk to 
the health of the uninformed partner.211 Because HIV can be fa-
 
boy and her preference (her freedom to choose whether or not to have a sexual 
encounter with a girl) was removed by the complainant’s deception.”). 
 209. Id. at 207–08 (quoting R v. Saunders, (1991) (Doncaster Crown Ct.) 
(unpublished, available from the Cornell Library)). 
 210. See infra Part IV.E. 
 211. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 189, at 158–59; Boyle, supra note 131, at 
146 (“At least the law of sexual assault should cover lies such as denials of in-
fectious disease or defrauding a prostitute into providing sexual services. This 
would be respectful of physical and economic autonomy.”); Mathen & Plaxton, 
supra note 20, at 471–72, 482–84 n.84; cf. Bryden, supra note 187, at 474 (not-
ing that most survey respondents “want[ed] to criminalize sexual deception 
only when some additional element of culpability [was] present,” such as “de-
liberately creat[ing] a risk of venereal disease”). 
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tal, many commentators characterize HIV nondisclosure or de-
ceit as “life-threatening.”212 Often, such arguments rely on an 
exaggerated perception of the likelihood that a single act of sex 
would lead to infection and inevitable premature death.213 
Carissima Mathen and Michael Plaxton, for example, argue 
that HIV nondisclosure, unlike all other sexual deceptions, “as-
sume[s] the worthlessness of [the partner’s] other life plans,”214 
and “effectively denies that one’s partner has any meaningful 
autonomy in any sphere, not just in the instant sexual con-
text.”215 
The fact that HIV can be deadly does not distinguish it 
from other communicable infections that are generally not 
criminalized. If the potentially lethal consequences of HIV are 
to justify its criminalization, we might expect to see criminal 
interventions aimed at other infections which, like HIV, can be 
lethal if untreated.216 Other potentially deadly communicable 
diseases, such as hepatitis, human papillomavirus (HPV), or 
tuberculosis, are not subject to the fear and stigma associated 
with HIV, and are not in practice treated as crimes. 
Some states criminalize transmission of, or exposure to, 
other sexually transmissible infections (STIs), but the offenses 
are generally misdemeanors and are rarely prosecuted.217 No 
 
 212. See, e.g., SCHULHOFER, supra note 189, at 158 (describing HIV nondis-
closure as the misrepresentation of a “significant health risk[]”); Boyle, supra 
note 131, at 145–46; Mathen & Plaxton, supra note 20, at 483–84 n.84. 
 213. See supra notes 36–42 and accompanying text. 
 214. Mathen & Plaxton, supra note 20, at 484 n.84. 
 215. Id. at 483 (emphasis in original). 
 216. See, e.g., Jason Clayworth, Bill To Align Iowa Crimes of HIV Trans-
mission with Similar Laws Clears Senate Subcommittee, DES MOINES REG. 
(Feb. 22, 2012), http://blogs.desmoinesregister.com/dmr/index.php/2012/ 
02/22/bill-to-align-iowa-crimes-of-hiv-transmission-with-similar-laws-clears 
-senate-subcommittee (arguing that separating out HIV in criminal statutes 
“‘adds to the stigma that goes along with HIV because we single this disease 
out for some reason and treat it differently than similarly serious diseases’” 
(quoting Randy Mayer of the Iowa Department of Public Health)); cf. Burris & 
Cameron, supra note 31, at 579 (“Every day, millions of individuals have un-
protected sex with partners they must assume might be infected. . . . [C]onduct 
that seems normal to many—ie, sex without protection despite the presence of 
risk—exposes those who have HIV to severe criminal penalties, including life 
imprisonment.”); McArthur, supra note 40, at 732–33 (“[I]t is no longer clear 
that HIV infections are inevitably fatal. . . . Individuals who pass along a 
treatable form of the virus do less harm than they did when states initially 
enacted HIV-specific legislation.” (citation omitted)). 
 217. See supra note 4; see also, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 384.24(1), (2), 384.34 
(2014) (nondisclosure of “chancroid, gonorrhea, granuloma inguinale, 
lymphogranuloma venereum, genital herpes simplex, chlamydia, 
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other STI has been singled out for targeted felony prosecution. 
Hepatitis, for example, is about as common as HIV, but is easi-
er to transmit. Like HIV, hepatitis is incurable, generally 
treatable, and sometimes fatal.218 Nonetheless, of twenty-four 
state laws that criminalize nondisclosure of HIV, only five also 
nominally criminalize nondisclosure of hepatitis.219 In one of 
these states, Tennessee, HIV nondisclosure is a felony punish-
able by three to fifteen years’ imprisonment, while nondisclo-
sure of hepatitis B or C is a misdemeanor subject only to fine or 
restitution.220 Although I have not found any studies of hepati-
tis disclosure, it seems unlikely that people are much more like-
 
nongonococcal urethritis (NGU), pelvic inflammatory disease (PID)/acute 
salpingitis, or syphilis” is a first-degree misdemeanor, but nondisclosure of 
HIV is a first- or third-degree felony).  
 218. Hepatitis A, B, and C can all be sexually transmitted. Viral Hepatitis 
Surveillance – United States, 2010, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/hepatitis/ 
Statistics/Commentary.htm (last updated May 24, 2013). The prevalence of 
hepatitis is comparable to (but greater than) that of HIV. The CDC estimates 
that 800,000–1.4 million people are chronically infected with hepatitis B alone, 
and 2.7–3.9 million are chronically infected with hepatitis C. Id. Chronic infec-
tion with hepatitis A does not occur. Statistics and Surveillance, CDC, 
http://www.cdc.gov/hepatitis/Statistics/index.htm (last updated Aug. 28, 2014) 
[hereinafter CDC, Statistics and Surveillance]. The CDC estimates that 29.1–
33.5% of Americans have ever been infected with hepatitis A, 4.3–5.6% have 
ever been infected with hepatitis B, and 1.3–1.9% have ever been infected with 
hepatitis C. Disease Burden from Viral Hepatitis A, B, and C in the United 
States, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/hepatitis/PDFs/disease_burden.pdf [hereinaf-
ter CDC, Disease Burden].  
  The most recent CDC estimate for HIV prevalence (from 2010) indi-
cates that about 1,145,500 people age thirteen and over are currently living 
with HIV. Statistics Overview, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/statistics/ 
basics/index.html (last updated Nov. 10, 2014) [hereinafter CDC, Statistics 
Overview] (“HIV Prevalence Estimate”). This represents about 0.6% of the U.S. 
population. See GLOBAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 31.  
  The incidence of hepatitis is likewise comparable to HIV (but greater). 
The CDC estimates that approximately 50,000 Americans are newly infected 
with HIV every year. See CDC, Statistics Overview, supra (“HIV Incidence Es-
timate”). The CDC estimates for 2010 estimate about 21,800 new infections 
with hepatitis B, and 11,400 new infections with hepatitis C in the same year, 
for a total of about 33,200 new hepatitis B and C infections in one fairly typi-
cal year. See CDC, Statistics and Surveillance, supra. While vaccines are 
available for hepatitis A and B, there is no vaccine against hepatitis C, the 
most dangerous and least treatable strain. CDC, Hepatitis FAQs for the Pub-
lic, http://www.cdc.gov/hepatitis/c/cfaq.htm#cFAQ71 (last updated Dec. 4, 
2014). 
 219. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-41-7-1 (1993); IOWA CODE § 709D.3 (2014) 
(criminalizing nondisclosure of HIV, hepatitis, and meningitis); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 97-27-14 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-109 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 18.2-67.4:1(B) (2004). 
 220. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-109(e)(1)-(2), 40-35-111(b)(3). 
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ly to volunteer their hepatitis diagnosis to casual partners than 
they are to disclose HIV. Yet if prosecutions have occurred, 
they seem to be extremely rare: the CHLP has not identified 
any prosecutions for hepatitis nondisclosure in the United 
States.221 My search of Google, Lexis, and Westlaw has not 
turned up a hepatitis nondisclosure prosecution, either.222  
Human papillomavirus (HPV) is another STI that can, if 
untreated, lead to death. Nearly all cases of cervical cancer re-
sult from sexual transmission of HPV.223 It also causes fatal 
cancers of the head, neck, and anogenital region.224 Today, HPV 
causes about 12,000 cases of cervical cancer and nearly 16,000 
other genital, anal, and oropharyngeal cancers every year.225 
HPV is much more common than HIV: the CDC estimates that 
“nearly all sexually-active men and women will get [at least one 
type of HPV] at some point in their lives.”226 About 79 million 
Americans are currently infected, with about 14 million new in-
fections every year.227  
As with HIV, illness and death from untreated HPV infec-
tion are largely preventable through screening and timely 
treatment.228 Governmental and public health responses to 
 
 221. CHLP’s fifty-state survey finds no prosecutions for hepatitis nondis-
closure in the context of consensual sex, and only a handful of prosecutions for 
violent or nonsexual exposure. CHLP, ENDING AND DEFENDING, supra note 2. 
Another CHLP publication points out that “[h]erpes simplex virus type 2 
(HSV-2) and human papilloma virus (HPV) are more prevalent than HIV. 
Gonorrhea and HPV are far more easily transmissible than HIV during unpro-
tected sexual activity. Like HIV, HSV-2 is not curable. Potential consequences 
of HPV, gonorrhea, and HSV- 2 include cancer, pelvic inflammatory disease, 
infertility, and infant death.” CHLP, CHART: HIV, STIS AND RELATIVE RISKS 
IN THE UNITED STATES (2011), available at http://www.hivlawandpolicy.org/ 
sites/www.hivlawandpolicy.org/files/HIV%20Infectious%20Disease%20Compar
ative%20Risk%20Table%20-%20U.pdf.  
 222. See infra note 522 and accompanying text (discussing the one hepati-
tis prosecution that has been brought in Canada). 
 223. See Genital HPV Infection - Fact Sheet 1, CDC, http://www.cdc 
.gov/STD/HPV/STDFact-HPV.htm (last updated Mar. 20, 2014) [hereinafter 
CDC, HPV Fact Sheet 1]. 
 224. See Human Papillomavirus, WHO (Sept. 3, 2010), http://www.who.int/ 
immunization/topics/hpv/en.  
 225. See How Many Cancers Are Linked with HPV Each Year?, CDC, http:// 
www.cdc.gov/cancer/hpv/statistics/cases.htm (last updated June 23, 2014) (es-
timating that HPV causes 3,000 vulvar cancers, 700 vaginal cancers, 1,000 
penile cancers, 2,800 anal cancers in women, 1,500 anal cancers in men, 2,400 
oropharyngeal cancers in women, and 10,000 oropharyngeal cancers in men).  
 226. CDC, HPV Fact Sheet 1, supra note 223. 
 227. See id.  
 228. See id. (estimating that of the 12,000 cervical cancers and nearly 
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HPV offer a striking contrast to the criminalization of HIV. No 
state punishes HPV transmission as a felony, nor is criminali-
zation part of governmental HPV-prevention strategies. In-
stead, global, national, and state HPV-prevention initiatives 
promote screening (Pap smears), early treatment of cancerous 
and precancerous lesions, and, most recently, vaccination of 
young people before they become sexually active.229 These non-
criminal interventions have been remarkably effective. Until 
about 40 years ago, cervical cancer was the leading cause of 
cancer death among women in the United States;230 in 2010, the 
most recent year for which statistics are available, about 4,000 
women died from cervical cancer.231 Moreover, HPV prevalence 
has decreased 56% among young women 15 to 19 years old 
since the 2006 introduction of an HPV vaccine for 11-year-old 
girls.232 
HIV is, of course, much more lethal than HPV, and there is 
no vaccine.233 Nonetheless, because HPV is so much more com-
 
16,000 other cancers associated with HPV, “about 21,000 . . . could be prevent-
ed [with] vaccine[s]”); WHO, WHO GUIDANCE NOTE: COMPREHENSIVE 
CERVICAL CANCER PREVENTION AND CONTROL: A HEALTHIER FUTURE FOR 
GIRLS AND WOMEN 7 (2013), available at http://apps.who.int/iris/ 
bitstream/10665/78128/3/9789241505147_eng.pdf (“Early detection and treat-
ment of precancerous lesions can prevent the majority of cervical cancers.”). 
 229. See id. at 2–7 (advocating screening and vaccination, and documenting 
their effectiveness); Gynecologic Cancers, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/cancer/ 
cervical/basic_info/screening.htm (last updated Mar. 7, 2014) (advocating uni-
versal Pap screening for women aged 21–65); Human Papillomavirus (HPV), 
CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/hpv/prevention.html (last updated Jan. 22, 2015) 
(advocating HPV vaccination for males and females).  
 230. The introduction of widespread cervical cancer screening in the 1970s 
greatly reduced illnesses and deaths resulting from HPV infection. See 
NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, CONSENSUS DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE 
STATEMENT: CERVICAL CANCER, (Apr. 1–3, 1996), available at http://consensus 
.nih.gov/1996/1996cervicalcancer102html.htm; Cervical Cancer Statistics, 
CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/cancer/cervical/statistics (last updated Sept. 2, 2014) 
[hereinafter CDC, Cervical Cancer Statistics].  
 231. Four thousand and ninety-two women died from cervical cancer in the 
United States in 2010. See CDC, Cervical Cancer Statistics, supra note 230. By 
contrast, the CDC records 8,369 deaths from HIV in 2010. Sherry L. Murphy 
et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2010, 61 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. 1, 37 (2013), 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_04.pdf.  
 232. See Lauri E. Markowitz et al., Reduction in Human Papillomavirus 
(HPV) Prevalence Among Young Women Following HPV Vaccine Introduction 
in the United States, National Health and Nutrition Examination Surveys, 
2003-2010, 208 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 385, 385 (2013) (finding a 56% reduc-
tion in the prevalence of the HPV types targeted by the vaccine among girls 
aged 14–19 within four years of the vaccine’s introduction). 
 233. More than forty strains of HPV have been identified; most of them are 
not associated with cancer. Information About the Human Papillomavirus 
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mon, it kills more women than HIV does: in 2010, 2,270 women 
died of AIDS,234 compared to 4,092 who died of cervical can-
cer.235 Hepatitis kills more Americans every year than HIV 
does.236 Governments and legislators have generally chosen 
nonpunitive approaches to deal with these infections. The suc-
cess of noncriminal harm reduction approaches to HPV—and 
HIV237—suggests that public health critics are right to contend 
that criminal punishment is not necessary to protect public 
health.238 
Finally, nonsexual infectious diseases, such as tuberculo-
sis, meningitis, measles, pertussis and SARS (severe acute res-
piratory syndrome), can also be life-threatening—and, unlike 
HIV, they can be transmitted through the air.239 Like hepatitis 
and HPV, they are generally not criminalized. In recent years, 
several well-publicized outbreaks of deadly vaccine-preventable 
diseases have led to the hospitalization of hundreds of people, 
and to several infant deaths.240 The CDC has traced these out-
breaks to “groups of unvaccinated people” who contract these 
 
(HPV), WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/sexual-conditions/hpv-genital-warts/ 
hpv-virus-information-about-human-papillomavirus (last visited Mar. 16, 
2015). Most HPV-related cancers are attributed to only two strains: HPV 16 
and HPV 18. Id.  
 234. See Murphy, supra note 231 at 47. HIV killed 8,369 people in total; 
most were men. Id. 
 235. See supra note 231. 
 236. The CDC attributes 3,000 yearly deaths to chronic liver disease asso-
ciated with hepatitis B, and 12,000 yearly deaths to chronic liver disease asso-
ciated with hepatitis C, for a total of 15,000 yearly deaths. See CDC, Disease 
Burden, supra note 218. The CDC estimates that, in 2011, 13,834 people died 
(of any cause) while they had a diagnosis of AIDS. HIV in the United States: At 
a Glance, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/statistics/basics/ataglance.html (last 
updated Nov. 25, 2014).  
 237. See CDC, HIGH-IMPACT PREVENTION, supra note 49. 
 238. See Burris & Cameron, supra note 31; Galletly & Pinkerton, supra 
note 36; Lazzarini, supra note 31; Mykhalovskiy & Betteridge, supra note 16 
at 50–51. 
 239. See WHO, TUBERCULOSIS AND AIR TRAVEL: GUIDELINES FOR 
PREVENTION AND CONTROL 2 (2008), available at http://www.who.int/tb/ 
publications/2008/WHO_HTM_TB_2008.399_eng.pdf (“Airborne and droplet-
borne diseases that are potentially transmissible on board aircraft include TB, 
influenza, meningococcal disease, measles and SARS.”).  
 240. See, e.g., CDC, 2013 FINAL PERTUSSIS SURVEILLANCE REPORT, availa-
ble at http://www.cdc.gov/pertussis/downloads/pertuss-surv-report-2013.pdf 
(reporting 13 infant deaths from pertussis in 2012-13); CDC, MEASLES CASES 
AND OUTBREAKS, available at http://www.cdc.gov/measles/cases-outbreaks. 
html (documenting 644 cases in 2014 and 127 cases in a single multistate out-
break in 2015, all resulting from “spread in communities with groups of un-
vaccinated people”). 
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viruses and transmit them to others who have not been or can-
not be vaccinated.241 Unlike people with HIV, though, vaccine 
refusers (who are often wealthy and well-educated242) have nev-
er been prosecuted for exposure or transmission of pertussis or 
measles. Rather, nearly every state authorizes nonmedical rea-
sons for parents to refuse to vaccinate their children.243 
Some public health tuberculosis-prevention programs pro-
vide for quarantine as a last resort for recalcitrant patients 
who refuse to take treatment, but they do not provide for prose-
cution.244 A number of air passengers have boarded commercial 
flights to or within the United States after having been diag-
nosed with “highly infectious” tuberculosis, without advising 
passengers or airline staff.245 Two of them carried multi-drug-
resistant strains, which are notoriously difficult to treat.246 At 
least two of them infected nearby passengers or crew.247 These 
nondisclosers are dealt with through quarantine laws and do-
not-fly lists. They have not been prosecuted.248  
 
 241. Id. People with certain health conditions, and very young infants, 
cannot be vaccinated against pertussis or measles. Id. 
 242. See Amanda Paulson, Measles Outbreak: Why Do Some Parents 
Choose Not To Vaccinate?, CSMONITOR.COM (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www 
.csmonitor.com/USA/Society/2015/0203/Measles-outbreak-Why-do-some-
parents-choose-not-to-vaccinate-video (characterizing vaccine-refusing parents 
as “affluent, educated, [and] focused on a natural lifestyle,” and quoting an 
expert urging that vaccination campaigns “maintain [these parents’] goodwill 
. . . listen to their concerns and engage in meaningful dialogue”). 
 243. All states mandate the vaccination of schoolchildren; 48 of 50 states 
protect a religious exemption to the mandate; 20 of 50 states allow a nonreli-
gious “personal” or “philosophical” objection. State Legislatures Magazine, 
Calling the Shots, NCSL.ORG (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/bookstore/ 
state 
-legislatures-magazine/trends-february-2015.aspx.  
 244. See, e.g., M. Rose Gasner et al., The Use of Legal Action in New York 
City To Ensure Treatment of Tuberculosis, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 359, 359 
(1999); Sullivan & Field, supra note 89, at 139–40. 
 245. WHO, TUBERCULOSIS AND AIR TRAVEL, supra, note 239, at 3; see also, 
e.g., Lawyer Infected with Tuberculosis Apologizes to Airline Passengers, N. Y. 
TIMES (June 1, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/01/”world/americas/ 
01iht-health.3.5960013.html [hereinafter Lawyer Apologizes]; Tuberculosis 
Patient Flies Despite Being on Banned List, CNN (Jan. 13, 2010), http://www 
.cnn.com/2010/HEALTH/01/12/tuberculosis.flight/index.html [hereinafter TB 
Patient Flies].  
 246. See WHO, TUBERCULOSIS AND AIR TRAVEL, supra note 239, at 3. 
 247. See id. 
 248. See Lawyer Apologizes, supra note 245; TB Patient Flies, supra note 
245. 
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b. Contraceptive fraud 
The lies and omissions that give rise to contraceptive fraud 
claims—“I’ve had a vasectomy” or “I’m on the Pill”—can result 
in a pregnancy that is unplanned and unwanted by the de-
ceived partner. If the pregnancy is carried to term, this decep-
tion can transform the life of the uninformed partner. If the un-
informed partner is a woman, such deceptions can also  
jeopardize her health.249 Yet civil courts recognize that, in the 
exercise of their sexual autonomy through sex and relation-
ships, adults take risks that their partners may deceive and be-
tray them in ways that matter very much. Rather than protect 
people against the risks of heterosexual sex, civil courts have 
been reluctant to intervene. Contraceptive fraud is rarely a 
tort, and never a crime. 
Courts tend to take a critical perspective on contraceptive-
fraud claims, asking questions that are notably absent from 
opinions in HIV-nondisclosure cases. While nondisclosure laws 
treat the partners’ failure to discuss HIV as a criminal wrong 
committed by the HIV-positive partner, civil courts do not typi-
cally accept that failure to discuss birth control constitutes a 
misrepresentation by one partner. For example, when a man 
failed to mention his vasectomy to a woman who said she would 
never have slept with him had she known about it, a Massa-
chusetts appellate court found no egregious wrongdoing: 
“[W]hen the parties became sexually intimate, they did not dis-
cuss any methods of birth control,”  it pointed out.250 Even if the 
defendant had deliberately misled the plaintiff by not mention-
ing the vasectomy, the court held, his conduct did not “rise to 
the ‘high order of reckless ruthlessness or deliberate malevo-
lence’ required for a showing of conduct that is ‘intolerable.’”251 
Judicial opinions in contraceptive fraud tort claims also 
tend to note that plaintiffs could have taken steps to protect 
themselves. While a woman’s false representation that she was 
taking “the Pill” did not “fully effectuate and respect” a male 
plaintiff’s choices with respect to procreation, a New York ap-
pellate court noted that if he cared that much about preventing 
 
 249. As the Supreme Court has observed in Roe v. Wade (and in Casey v. 
Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)), unplanned pregnancy can force up-
on the person a “distressful life and future.” 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). It can 
also cause life-threatening health problems. See, e.g., Barbara A. v. John G., 
145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 375 (Ct. App. 1983). 
 250. Conley v. Romeri, 806 N.E.2d 933, 935 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004). 
 251. Id. at 938. 
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conception, he could have used a condom. Her deception, the 
court observed, “in no way limited his [own] right to use contra-
ception.”252 Criminal laws, by contrast, punish nondisclosure 
whether or not a complainant used (or refused to use) condoms.  
In tort claims, nondisclosure about STI or contraception is 
not actionable unless it results in physical harm: sexually 
transmissible infection, reproductive injury, or abortion.253 Vol-
untary sex that the partner would otherwise have refused does 
not count. Some of the public policy considerations underlying 
this rule are inapposite to HIV: civil courts are rightly skeptical 
of male plaintiffs who might “attempt[] to circumvent [their] 
child support obligations”254 by claiming that their ex-
girlfriends said they were on the Pill, and they express legiti-
mate concern that allowing damages for contraceptive fraud 
would contravene the best interests of the unwanted child.255 
These courts also hold, though, that it would be inappropriate 
for the judiciary to supervise promises exchanged among con-
senting adults—even if they lie to each other about important 
sexual matters. As a California appellate court put it, “certain 
sexual conduct and interpersonal decisions are, on public policy 
grounds, outside the realm of tort liability.”256  
For example, a California appellate court held that a wom-
an who falsely claimed she was taking the Pill “may have lied 
and betrayed the personal confidence reposed in her” by her 
boyfriend, who became a father against his will. Nonetheless, 
the court held, “the circumstances and the highly intimate na-
 
 252. L. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 499 N.E.2d 713, 716 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).  
 253. See, e.g., Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (Ct. App. 1984) 
(regarding unfaithful husband’s transmission of herpes to uninformed wife); 
Barbara A., 145 Cal. App. 3d at 373 (involving man’s representation that he 
was infertile, which led to ectopic (tubal) pregnancy that left the woman infer-
tile); McPherson v. McPherson, 712 A.2d 1043, 1045 (Me. 1998); Doe v. John-
son, 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1389 (W.D. Mich. 1993); Carsanaro v. Colvin, 716 
S.E.2d 40 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (upholding husband’s tort action for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress against wife’s nonmarital lover for transmitting 
herpes to him via her); In re Alice D. v. William M., 113 Misc. 2d 940 (N.Y. 
Civ. Ct. 1982) (involving pregnancy and abortion resulting from man’s false 
claim that he was sterile); Hamblen v. Davidson, 50 S.W.3d 433, 438 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 2000) (“[A]ll the jurisdictions which have considered the issue.”). 
 254. Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682, 683 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001). 
 255. See Barbara A., 145 Cal. App. 3d at 378–79. 
 256. Perry v. Atkinson, 195 Cal. App. 3d 14, 19 (Ct. App. 1987) (rejecting 
cause of action for fraud and deceit where woman had an unwanted abortion 
in reliance on her lover’s false promise that he would impregnate her the fol-
lowing year); accord Richard P. v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 1095 
(Ct. App. 1988). 
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ture of the relationship wherein the false representations may 
have occurred, are such that a court should not define any 
standard of conduct therefor.”257 It characterized the ex-
boyfriend’s claim as “asking the court to supervise the promises 
made between two consenting adults as to the circumstances of 
their private sexual conduct,”258 holding that the court should 
not intrude upon “matters affecting the individual’s right to 
privacy.”259 In rejecting another man’s claim for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress after a former lover told him she was 
pregnant, another California court held in 2005 that such a 
complaint merely “depict[s] the . . . aftermath that all too often 
follows casual sexual encounters and failed romances. . . . For 
the court to intervene in such personal matters, there must be 
some conduct by the defendant that is particularly egregious, 
which causes serious injury to the plaintiff.”260 Anxiety about 
unwanted pregnancy does not count. 
iii. Informed Consent: The Medical Model 
A third version of “informed consent” that might be offered 
to justify HIV criminalization could be based on a medical mod-
el. Tort law and rules of professional conduct require that phy-
sicians and other health care providers  inform patients of the 
risks and benefits of every procedure so that the patient may 
exercise “intelligent” or “informed” consent to the treatment. A 
physician who fails to do so breaches his or her duty of care, 
and may face tort liability or professional sanctions.  
Unlike the absolute duty imposed by most criminal HIV 
statutes, the physician’s duty to disclose does not extend to eve-
ry conceivable risk, no matter how remote. It is a duty to make 
the “reasonable disclosure” that “a reasonable medical practi-
tioner would make under the same or similar circumstances.”261 
Even if the physician fails to disclose material risks, an 
underinformed patient has no cause of action unless, among 
other requirements, the medical treatment caused harm to the 
 
 257. Stephen K. v. Roni L., 105 Cal. App. 3d 640, 643 (Ct. App. 1980). 
 258. Id. at 644–45. 
 259. Id. at 645. 
 260. Starr v. Woolf, No. CO47594, 2005 WL 1532369, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. 
June 30, 2005) (emphasis added); see also Richard P., 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1094 
(“Unlike the present case, both of those cases involved physical injury to the 
plaintiff and had no potential for harming innocent children.”). 
 261. See, e.g., W. M. Moldoff, Malpractice: The Physician’s Duty To Inform 
Patient of Nature and Hazards of Disease or Treatment, 79 A.L.R.2D 1028, § 2 
(originally published in 1961). 
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patient (or a reasonable patient, if fully informed, would have 
refused the treatment).262 This duty does not extend to risks 
that are extremely unlikely, purely speculative, or nonexistent. 
Some patients would no doubt refuse any treatment by an 
HIV-positive health care provider, regardless of any risk of 
transmission. Nonetheless, “informed consent” does not ordi-
narily require the HIV-positive physician to disclose his or her 
serostatus to the patient. Rather, the American Medical Asso-
ciation recommends that the HIV-positive health care provider 
simply abstain from “any activity that creates a significant risk 
of transmission.”263 If there is no transmission risk, there is no 
obligation to disclose. The existence of “significant risk” is not a 
judgment left to the patient. Rather, the physician, in consulta-
tion with a committee comprised of other physicians with ex-
pertise in HIV and knowledge of the physician’s medical condi-
tion, determines which procedures pose a “significant” 
transmission risk.264   
The disclosure obligation imposed by HIV criminal laws is 
not analogous to physicians’ duty to ensure that their patients’ 
consent is fully informed. Unlike medical interactions, the so-
cial relationships and interactions leading to first sex do not 
ordinarily involve explicit discussion of the risks and benefits of 
sexual activity. Often, the people are drunk.265 They may, but 
do not invariably, discuss STI or pregnancy before first sex.266 
Unlike physicians, people with HIV must disclose even when 
the prospect of transmission is remote or nonexistent. If they 
fail to disclose their HIV status, they are criminals even if their 
conduct caused no harm and posed no appreciable risk. 
 
 262. See id. 
 263. Opinion 9.131 - HIV-Infected Patients and Physicians, AM. MED. 
ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/ 
code-medical-ethics/”opinion9131.page (last updated June 1998). 
 264. See id.; see also AM. MED. ASS’N, H-20.912 GUIDANCE FOR HIV-
INFECTED PHYSICIANS AND OTHER HEALTH CARE WORKERS 7 (2008), available 
at http://hr.med.sc.edu/Employee_Health_Policies.doc. The Guidance permits 
the HIV-positive physician to perform an “exposure-prone procedure” only 
with the permission of the committee and the informed consent of the patient. 
Id. 
 265. See, e.g., Mary McFarlane et al., Women, the Internet, and Sexually 
Transmitted Infections, 13 J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 689, 691 (2004) (noting 46.3–
55.4% of (self-selected) female respondents said they were drunk or otherwise 
intoxicated during first sex with a new partner). 
 266. See id. (noting 60–62.4% of female respondents said they had dis-
cussed HIV or STIs with new partners, that is, about 40% of female respond-
ents said they had never discussed HIV or STIs with a new partner). 
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D. SEXUAL AUTONOMY AND GENDER EQUALITY 
Advocates of HIV criminalization often draw upon feminist 
insights and gendered intuitions. Since the 1970s, an influen-
tial feminist critique of rape law “has bred sensitivity to coer-
cion, and skepticism of consent, in conditions of gender subor-
dination.”267 This feminist critique expanded the impoverished 
view of women’s autonomy embedded in pre-reform rape law, 
which, among other problems, traditionally measured women’s 
virtue by their chastity, suspected rape complainants of lying, 
required corroboration of women’s evidence, condoned consid-
erable use of force and coercion against women, and enforced 
racial hierarchies while leaving women largely unprotected 
against sexual assault by men they knew.268 Feminist challeng-
es to these and other subordinating aspects of traditional rape 
law greatly expanded legal and cultural notions about who the 
perpetrators and victims of sexual assault might be, and ex-
panded the kinds of sexual coercion that could be recognized as 
crimes. Feminist-inspired rape law reform promoted sexual au-
tonomy and gender equality by criminalizing sexual behaviors 
which had been tolerated or defined away by traditional rape 
law, including marital rape, acquaintance rape, the sexual as-
sault of men and boys, and the rape of intoxicated or unchaste 
women.269 As Jennifer Hendricks has observed, “feminists 
should regret neither their underlying critique of consent and 
choice nor their efforts to honor the ways in which women suf-
fer.”270 
If HIV nondisclosure is understood as a kind of sexual as-
sault, its criminalization might seem to promote gender equali-
ty just as earlier rape law reforms did.271 But feminists should 
 
 267. Jeannie Suk, The Trajectory of Trauma: Bodies and Minds of Abortion 
Discourse, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1198 (2010). 
 268. See, e.g., Coughlin, supra note 202, at 38. See generally SUSAN 
ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 70, 102–03 (1987) [hereinafter ESTRICH, REAL RAPE]; 
CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 145–46, 
175–77 (1989); Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986) [hereinafter 
Estrich, Rape]. 
 269. See generally SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, 
WOMEN AND RAPE (1975); ESTRICH, REAL RAPE, supra note 268; MACKINNON, 
supra note 268; Estrich, Rape, supra note 268. 
 270. Jennifer S. Hendricks, Converging Trajectories: Interest Convergence, 
Justice Kennedy, and Jeannie Suk’s “The Trajectory of Trauma,” 110 COLUM. 
L. REV. SIDEBAR 63, 71 (2010).  
 271. See, e.g., Mary Fan, Decentralizing STD Surveillance: Toward Better 
Informed Sexual Consent, 12 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 15 (2012) 
(arguing that nondisclosure vitiates sexual consent); Grant, Boundaries, supra 
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not uncritically assume that every expansion of criminal liabil-
ity for sex will promote gender equality.272 HIV criminalization 
is especially ill-suited to promote equality or benefit women: 
the perception that it might rests on inaccurate gendered as-
sumptions that conflate nondisclosure with sexual assault.  
The sexual autonomy argument for HIV criminalization of-
ten relies on an unexamined assumption that nondisclosers will 
be men, and uninformed partners will be women.273 In Cuerrier, 
for example, the Supreme Court of Canada took for granted 
that HIV deception was typically a heterosexual act, explicitly 
“assum[ing] that it will more often be the man who lies,” and 
that the deceived partner would be a woman.274 Legal argu-
ments in favor of HIV criminalization typically invoke scenari-
os of male deception and female vulnerability—especially the 
notorious case of Nushawn Williams, a young black man ac-
cused of infecting thirteen young women and girls, most of 
them white, in Jamestown, New York, in 1997.275 Criminaliza-
tion, these advocates hope, will protect women against infection 
by unfaithful or bisexual men.276  
This heteronormative frame for HIV criminalization tends 
to deflect the victim-blaming that pervades public discourse 
about HIV among gay men, positioning nondisclosure com-
plainants as innocent victims who are acting in accordance 
with conventional expectations of female heterosexuality and 
sexual passivity: they submitted to sex with men without ask-
ing many questions. At the same time, the imagined male-to-
 
note 20, at 159; Mathen & Plaxton, supra note 20, at 481 (arguing that be-
cause HIV nondisclosure “objectif[ies]” women, it is “closely bound up with the 
gendered nature of the offence” of “sexual assault” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
 272. See generally Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism and the War on Crime, 84 
WASH. L. REV. 581 (2009). 
 273. It is extremely unlikely that HIV nondisclosure is gendered in this 
way. See infra Part IV.B.  
 274. R. v. Cuerrier, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371, 434 (Can.). 
 275. See Mona Markus, A Treatment For the Disease: Criminal HIV 
Transmission/Exposure Laws, 23 NOVA L. REV. 847, 848–51 (1999); Elisabeth 
Van Vliet, Law, Medicine, HIV and Women: Constructions of Guilt and Inno-
cence, 1 HEALTH L.J. 191, 198–201 (1993); Leslie Wolf & Richard Vezina, 
Crime and Punishment: Is There a Role for Criminal Law in HIV Prevention 
Policy?, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 821, 823–25 (2004); see also infra notes 305–318, 
334.  
 276. See, e.g., GLOBAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 31, at 77–85; 
Mathen & Plaxton, supra note 20, at 464. See generally SCHULHOFER, supra 
note 189. 
BUCHANAN_4fmt 4/7/2015  4:27 PM 
2015] WHEN IS HIV A CRIME? 1291 
 
female dynamics of sexual nondisclosure apparently make HIV 
transmission look and feel more like a sex crime. 
Highlighting the reality that unprotected vaginal sex more 
readily transmits HIV from man to woman than from woman to 
man, these critics deduce a need for criminal protections to 
shield women from HIV nondisclosure—without recognizing 
that women’s higher rates of heterosexual infection may also 
expose them to prosecution as nondisclosers.277 By conflating 
HIV nondisclosure with sexual assault, the gendered sexual au-
tonomy argument distills from the biological reality that wom-
en can become infected through unprotected vaginal inter-
course “the chilling moral that AIDS [is] primarily a man’s 
disease transmitted to women through sexual violence.”278  
Feminist scholars observe that physical or sexual abuse, 
cultural norms, or economic dependence may prevent HIV-
negative women from asking their partners about STIs or in-
sisting on condom use. Despite her concerns that homophobia 
and racism may shape nondisclosure prosecutions, for example, 
Isabel Grant has defended criminalization because “the perva-
sive sex inequality that exists in heterosexual relationships” 
makes it “unrealistic” to assume that women can insist on con-
dom use or refuse sex with male partners279: 
[HIV transmission] raises many issues unique to women because of 
their relative powerlessness in their sexual lives compared to men. 
Women may not be in a position to insist on condom use. Women in 
abusive relationships, women involved in prostitution, young women, 
and women living in poverty and/or social isolation may all have par-
ticular difficulties in insisting on condom use. . . . [T]his subordination 
‘inhibits women’s capacity to protect themselves from exposure to 
HIV.’ Thus, the reality for women may be that they cannot always 
take the best precautions available to prevent transmission of 
HIV/AIDS; rather they must rely on their male partners to cooper-
ate.280 
But there is no reason to presume that, in an abusive rela-
tionship, the HIV-negative partner will be the woman.281 Given 
that women comprise two-thirds of heterosexuals infected with 
 
 277. See, e.g., Mary Anne Bobinski, Women and HIV: A Gender-Based 
Analysis of Disease and Its Legal Regulation, 3 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 7, 43–45 
(1994); see also Grant, Boundaries, supra note 20, at 159.  
 278. James Miller, African Immigrant Damnation Syndrome: The Case of 
Charles Ssenyonga, 2 SEXUALITY RES. & SOC. POL’Y 31, 37 (2005). 
 279. Grant, Boundaries, supra note 20, at 160.  
 280. Id. at 159 (footnote omitted). See also generally Mathen & Plaxton, 
supra note 20; Van Vliet, supra note 275, at 199–200. 
 281. See MacKinnon & Crompton, supra note 20, at 448. 
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HIV,282 it seems more likely that the infected person in a 
serodiscordant283 heterosexual partnership will be the woman. 
Where an HIV-positive woman (or man) is in an abusive rela-
tionship, or is financially or otherwise dependent on a partner, 
or is imprisoned, undocumented, or otherwise vulnerable, she 
may find it extremely difficult to disclose her HIV status.284 Yet 
HIV disclosure laws make her a criminal. As noted in Part I.C, 
prosecutions and convictions of such women are not unusual.285  
Moreover, HIV nondisclosure is not gendered in the way 
that feminist proponents of criminalization have assumed. It is 
not typically something men do to women. In the United States 
as in other Western countries, most people diagnosed with HIV 
are men who have sex with men.286 Furthermore, a substantial 
body of public health research on HIV nondisclosure finds little, 
if any, variation by gender or sexual orientation. To the extent 
that gender differences are found at all, they tend to indicate 
higher rates of nondisclosure between MSM than between men 
and women.287 These studies find that HIV-positive people (of 
all genders and sexual orientations) overwhelmingly disclose 
their serostatus to long-term or emotionally intimate partners, 
and often nondisclose to new or casual ones.288 Researchers 
 
 282. See infra note 451. 
 283. A serodiscordant relationship has one HIV-positive and one HIV-
negative partner. See Raymond A. Smith, Couples, BODY (1998), http://www 
.thebody.com/content/art14009.html. 
 284. Symington, supra note 20, at 653. 
 285. See supra notes 110–116 and accompanying text. 
 286. According to CDC estimates, about 56.8% (652,300 of 1,148,240) of all 
Americans diagnosed with HIV are men who have sex with men: 592,100 
whose infection is attributed to male-male sex, and 60,200 who have also in-
jected drugs. CDC, HIV SURVEILLANCE REPORT, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, 
MONITORING SELECTED NATIONAL HIV PREVENTION AND CARE OBJECTIVES BY 
USING HIV SURVEILLANCE DATA—UNITED STATES AND 6 U.S. DEPENDENT 
AREAS—2010, at 22 (June 2012), available at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pdf/ 
statistics_2010_HIV_Surveillance_Report_vol_17_no_3.pdf.  
 287. Ciccarone, supra note 108, at 952; see also Saramona M. Przybyla et 
al., Serostatus Disclosure to Sexual Partners Among People Living with HIV: 
Examining the Roles of Partner Characteristics and Stigma, 25 AIDS CARE 
566 (2013) (finding that 86% of heterosexual men, 85% of heterosexual women, 
and 69% of MSM enrolled in a safer sex intervention program had disclosed 
their HIV status to all sexual partners in the past three months). 
 288. See, e.g. Ciccarone, supra note 108, at 951 (finding that “[f]ive percent 
of women reported not disclosing their HIV-positive status in serodiscordant 
exclusive partnerships, compared with 1% to 2% of all men,” while men’s non-
disclosure usually occurred in the context of casual sex); Allison G. Dempsey et 
al., Patterns of Disclosure Among Youth Who Are HIV-Positive: A Multistate 
Study, 50 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 315, 315–17 (2012) (finding that 40% of re-
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have documented high rates of self-reported nondisclosure 
among men who have sex with men,289 men who have sex with 
both men and women,290 and among heterosexual women and 
men.291 (Sexual transmission of HIV between women is rare.292) 
This research reveals that men are no more likely to 
nondisclose in heterosexual partnerships than women are; 
there is some evidence that—perhaps because of the gender 
dynamics identified by Grant and others—women may be more 
likely than gay or straight men to nondisclose in an exclusive 
relationship.293  
Although HIV nondisclosure seems to occur mainly among 
MSM, the vulnerability of heterosexual women plays an out-
sized role in judicial, legislative, and academic rationales for 
criminalizing it. Supporters of HIV criminalization do not ex-
 
spondents aged 16–24 reported nondisclosure to at least one partner in the 
past three months, regardless of gender, ethnicity or sexual orientation); Tara 
McKay & Matt G. Mutchler, The Effect of Partner Sex: Nondisclosure of HIV 
Status to Male and Female Partners Among Men Who Have Sex with Men and 
Women (MSMW), 15 AIDS BEHAV. 1140, 1149 (2011) (finding that the predict-
ed probability of nondisclosure was 75–76% for casual partners and 34–36% 
for primary partners, regardless of sex or sexual orientation).  
  Some studies have found that “[n]ot discussing HIV status and not 
knowing a partner’s HIV status were particularly common in the casual part-
nerships of the [MSM] surveyed.” Finlayson, supra note 54, at 8 (finding 53% 
of the survey respondents who reported having had sex with a casual (male) 
partner in the past twelve months did not know that partner’s HIV status; 
19% of men said they did not know the HIV status of their main (male) part-
ner); see also Horvath, supra note 1, at 1226; McKay & Mutchler, supra, at 
1149 (finding evidence of a “Don’t ask, don’t tell” norm among casual partners, 
and to a lesser degree among primary partners, regardless of whether the 
partnerships were same-sex or different-sex); Jeffrey T. Parsons et al., Con-
sistent, Inconsistent, and Non-disclosure to Casual Sexual Partners Among 
HIV-Seropositive Gay and Bisexual Men, 19 AIDS S87, S87; Sheon & Crosby, 
supra note 104, at 2105. 
 289. Ciccarone, supra note 108, at 952; Finlayson, supra note 54, at 8; 
Horvath, supra note 1, at 1226; Parsons, supra note 288, at S87; Sheon & 
Crosby, supra note 104, at 2105 (noting that HIV-positive MSM perceived a 
community-wide shift toward nondisclosure to casual partners, and that they 
saw no point in disclosing to casual partners since they assumed such men to 
be HIV-positive). 
 290. McKay & Mutchler, supra note 288, at 1148 (finding HIV-positive 
“MSMW disclosed their HIV status before sex to slightly more than half of all 
partners and never disclosed their HIV status to one-third of partners”).  
 291. Miriam R. Chacko et al., Understanding Partner Notification (Patient 
Self-Referral Method) by Young Women, 13 J. PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT 
GYNECOLOGY 27, 30 (2000); Ciccarone, supra note 108, at 951–52. 
 292. Shirley K. Chan et al., Likely Female-to-Female Sexual Transmission 
of HIV—Texas, 2012, 63 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 209 (2014). 
 293. See Ciccarone, supra note 288. 
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plain why the presumptive power dynamics of heterosexual re-
lationships should govern the legal response to a virus that is 
typically and stereotypically associated with gay men. The 
heavy reliance on male-to-female transmission in pro-
criminalization rationales raises questions about why this 
transmission dyad should matter to criminal law in a way that 
male-to-male nondisclosure apparently does not. 
Although the underlying behavior—nondisclosure of HIV—
does not seem to vary by gender in the ways some feminists 
predict, it seems that prosecutions do.294 Thus, although HIV 
criminal laws are unlikely to advance sexual autonomy or gen-
der equality in any systematic way, their implementation is 
consistent with an assumption that HIV exposure and trans-
mission matter most when they escape from gay communities 
to threaten heterosexual women and men.  
III.  INNOCENT VICTIMS AND AIDS MONSTERS: THE 
RACE AND GENDER OF HIV CRIME   
Public health, moral retribution, and sexual autonomy of-
fer little reason to single out HIV for criminal punishment. 
Moreover, criminalization diverges from these rationales in 
ways that suggest that HIV seems most invidious when it af-
fects heterosexuals who are acting in accordance with conven-
tional gender expectations. Gendered, racial, and homophobic 
bias are notorious throughout the enforcement of criminal law, 
from drug possession to rape and the death penalty. The role of 
such biases in HIV criminalization may run deeper, shaping 
not only the enforcement of criminal laws (discussed in Part IV) 
but also perceptions about whether, when, and why HIV should 
be treated as a crime. 
Since the beginning of the epidemic, HIV has been associ-
ated with stigmatized groups of people: sex workers, drug us-
ers, Africans and Haitians, and especially gay men.295 The orig-
inal name applied to the mysterious constellation of symptoms 
 
 294. See infra Part IV.A. 
 295. PAUL FARMER, AIDS AND ACCUSATION: HAITI AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF 
BLAME 2 (1992) (noting tendency in the United States to blame Haitians as 
the source of AIDS); AIDS AND THE LAW (Harlon L. Dalton et al. eds., 1987), 
cited in Sanchez v. Lagoudakis, 581 N.W.2d 257, 269 (Mich. 1998) (listing risk 
groups for HIV); WEAIT, supra note 16, at 143; Robert C. Gallo, A Reflection on 
HIV/AIDS Research After 25 Years, 3 RETROVIROLOGY 72, 72 (2006) (dating 
this coinage to 1982); Paula A. Treichler, AIDS, Homophobia, and Biomedical 
Discourse: An Epidemic of Signification, 43 AIDS: CULTURAL ANALYSIS 31, 44 
(1987). 
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was “Gay-Related Immune Disorder,” or GRID.296 Although this 
acronym was abandoned as soon as the other three (presump-
tively heterosexual) “risk group[s]” were identified,297 HIV/AIDS 
was often described in popular discourse as a “gay plague.”298  
An extensive body of critical scholarship documents the 
early cultural and media production of HIV/AIDS as “a disease 
of the ‘other’, making possible the idea that infection was 
linked to identities located outside the ‘mainstream’; outside 
‘proper’ heterosexuality.”299 As Matthew Weait notes in his 
landmark study of HIV criminalization, the homophobic associ-
ation of AIDS and HIV with sexually stigmatized people and 
practices “allowed AIDS to be understood as self-
inflicted . . . reinforc[ing] the idea that AIDS was a punishment 
for morally wrong conduct. ”300 As Weait and many other schol-
ars have observed, the racialized, moralistic, and homophobic 
framing of HIV marked it as a disease whose rightful victims 
were marked by sexual and racial stigma.301 By contrast, hemo-
philiacs, children born to HIV-positive mothers, and heterosex-
ual women who had sex with bisexual men or male intravenous 
drug users were often described in the news media as “innocent 
victims.”302 Women infected through heterosexual sex, in par-
 
 296. WEAIT, supra note 16, at 141. 
 297. Id. at 143; see, e.g., Steven Eisenstadt, The HIV Infected Health Care 
Worker: The New AIDS Scapegoat, 44 RUTGERS L. REV. 301, 302 n.3 (1992) 
(discussing a 1988 survey in which twenty percent of respondents believed 
that people with HIV “got their rightful due,” and a 1990 survey in which few-
er than half of respondents said they thought people who got HIV “through 
homosexual conduct, illicit intravenous drug use, or sexual relations with an 
IV drug user” deserved compassion). 
 298. WEAIT, supra note 16, at 143 (describing the tabloid media as embrac-
ing this phrase with “vile abandon”). 
 299. See, e.g., id. at 120–46 (summarizing this scholarship); Persson & 
Newman, supra note 16, at 632. 
 300. WEAIT, supra note 16, at 142. 
 301. The African origin of HIV and its association with Haitians, Africans, 
and others of African descent resonated with existing stereotypes of black peo-
ple as hypersexual, irresponsible, ape-like, and perpetrators of sex crimes 
against white women. THOMAS SHEVORY, NOTORIOUS H.I.V.: THE MEDIA 
SPECTACLE OF NUSHAWN WILLIAMS 11–13 (2004); see also Grant, Boundaries, 
supra note 20, at 154–55; Persson & Newman supra note 16, at 633–34. 
 302. Persson & Newman, supra note 16, at 637; see, e.g., CATHY J. COHEN, 
THE BOUNDARIES OF BLACKNESS: AIDS AND THE BREAKDOWN OF BLACK 
POLITICS 166–67 (1999) (discussing the media portrayal of black women as 
“innocent victims” of heterosexual transmission); SHEVORY, supra note 301, at 
17 (describing media portrayal of Nushawn Williams as “a pied piper who 
used drugs to attract and corrupt the innocent teenagers of Jamestown”); 
WEAIT, supra note 16, at 143; Russell K. Robinson, Racing the Closet, 61 STAN. 
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ticular, were and are often portrayed in the media as “innocent 
victims of men’s betrayal.”303 This discourse tended to construct 
“proper”304 (white, gender-conforming) heterosexuality as an 
identity that is, or ought to be, protected against HIV.305 
The first high-profile media coverage of an alleged HIV 
transmitter occurred in 1987. A CDC report, publicized by a 
bestselling book, identified Gaëtan Dugas, a handsome and 
promiscuous Québécois flight attendant, as “Patient Zero”: the 
man who brought HIV to the United States in the early 
1980s.306 These claims were later debunked—the men whose in-
fection was blamed on Dugas were almost certainly infected 
long before they met him, and HIV was present in the United 
States before Dugas became active in the mid-1970s307—but, at 
the time, media coverage of the Patient Zero story was sensa-
tionalistic and intense.308 News reports emphasized that “Mr. 
 
L. REV. 1463, 1464–65 (2009) (criticizing media characterization of black men 
“on the ‘down low’” as “dangerous black men” whose deceit threatens “innocent 
wives and girlfriends”).  
 303. Persson & Newman, supra note 16, at 637. 
 304. Id. at 632. 
 305. WEAIT, supra note 16, at 142–43; Persson & Newman, supra note 16, 
at 634. 
 306. This claim was advanced in RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED 
ON 128–40 (1987), and discussed in many media outlets, including the New 
York Times and the New York Review of Books. See Christopher Lehmann-
Haupt, Books of the Times: And the Band Played On, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 
1987, at C20; Andrew Moss, Letter to the Editor, In Response to ‘AIDS Without 
End,’ from the August 18, 1988 Issue, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec. 8, 1988, available 
at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1988/dec/08. The “Patient Zero” 
story was based on a study by Darrow and Auerbach, but the study did not 
give this characterization of the results. See David M. Auerbach et al., Cluster 
of Cases of the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome: Patients Linked by 
Sexual Contact, 76 AM. J. MED. 487, 487–92 (1984). 
 307. See, e.g., M. Thomas P. Gilbert et al., The Emergence of HIV/AIDS in 
the Americas and Beyond, 104 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 18566, 18566–70 (2007) 
(documenting HIV in the United States between 1969 and 1981); Moss, supra 
note 306. See generally PEPIN, supra note 64 (tracing the origins of HIV from 
chimpanzee hunting and butchering in early twentieth-century Congo through 
unhygienic midcentury Western-sponsored vaccination campaigns throughout 
Africa to Haiti in the 1960s to the United States in the 1970s). For an accessi-
ble summary of this history, see Patient Zero, RADIOLAB (Nov. 15, 2011), 
http://www.radiolab.org/story/169879-patient-zero. 
 308. See supra note 306; see, e.g., Lehmann-Haupt, supra note 306 (claim-
ing to have “identified the man who first brought AIDS to the United States, 
one Gaëtan Dugas, a sexually voracious French-Canadian airline steward 
known to have frequented homosexual bathhouses across the country”); Randy 
Shilts, Patient Zero: Wherever Gaëtan Dugas Paused, Gay Men Began To Sick-
en and Die, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 1, 1987, at D1; Nicholas Wade, Editorial Note-
book: AIDS in Harsh Review, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1987, at A34 (discussing 
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Dugas used his good looks and French-Canadian accent to lure 
handsome American men, even after he was diagnosed with 
AIDS in 1980.”309 He was depicted as a callous man who did not 
care whether he transmitted HIV310 and was even alleged to 
have delighted in telling men he had AIDS after bathhouse 
sex.311 (The book’s editor has since acknowledged that the Pa-
tient Zero story was a salacious “literary device” designed to at-
tract readers to a book whose main objective was to challenge 
the Reagan Administration’s longstanding indifference to the 
deaths of thousands of gay men.312) Despite the misleading cov-
erage, Dugas’s sexual behavior was never described as “rape,” 
nor were his sexual partners depicted as “innocent.” In the 
1980s, widespread knowledge of the risk to gay men did not 
give rise to a wave of HIV criminalization. Rather, many con-
servatives called for quarantine (or, memorably, tattooing313) of 
people with HIV, and several states enacted quarantine laws.314   
In the United States as in every Anglo-American jurisdic-
tion, the first high-profile HIV prosecution accused a black man 
of infecting white women. In 1997, NuShawn Williams, a nine-
teen-year-old black drug dealer from Brooklyn, became the cen-
ter of a media firestorm. Williams slept with many young wom-
 
“the horrifying case of the late Gaëtan Dugas” and how the book, SHILTS, su-
pra note 306, “graphically describes the gay bathhouses, their extreme sexual 
practices, the cruel deaths of those wracked by AIDS, and gay leaders’ stub-
born opposition to closing the houses down”).  
 309. Canadian Said To Have Had Key Role in Spread of AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 7, 1987, at B7. 
 310. See SHILTS, supra note 306. After a physician told him to abstain from 
sex, Dugas is reported to have replied, “Nobody’s proven to me that you can 
spread cancer . . . . Somebody gave this thing to me[.] I’m not going to give up 
sex.” Id. 
 311. SHILTS, supra note 306, at 165 (“‘I’ve got gay cancer,’ he’d say. ‘I’m go-
ing to die and so are you.’”). 
 312. Don Sapatkin, AIDS ‘Patient Zero’ Was a Publicity Strategy, Scholar 
Writes, PHILA. INQUIRER (Apr. 23, 2013), http://articles.philly.com/2013-04 
-23/entertainment/38738614_1_aids-policy-flight-attendant-randy-shilts (cit-
ing Michael Denney). 
 313. William F. Buckley, Jr., Crucial Steps in Combating the Aids Epidem-
ic: Identify All the Carriers, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 1986), https://www 
.nytimes.com/books/00/07/16/specials/buckley-aids.html (calling for persons 
with HIV to be “tatooed [sic] in the upper forearm, to protect common-needle 
users, and on the buttocks, to prevent the victimization of other homosexu-
als”); William F. Buckley, Jr., Killers At Large, NAT’L REV., Feb. 19, 2005, at 
54 (reiterating this call). 
 314. Gostin, supra note 84, at 1019; Sullivan & Field, supra note 89, at 
144–45 (describing AIDS and HIV quarantine measures passed or proposed in 
1986–87).  
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en and teenage girls in Jamestown, New York, both before and 
after he received a diagnosis of HIV. Most of them were white. 
The county health commissioner disclosed Williams’ identity to 
the press, declaring that Williams had “damaged hundreds and 
hundreds of lives” at a time when “there were only nine posi-
tive individuals associated with [Williams] and perhaps half of 
those had been infected before he was told he was positive.”315 
Although the young women said the sex had been consensual, 
media reports characterized Williams as a “rapist” and “sexual 
predator” who “preyed on school girls,” a “monster” and “would-
be serial killer” who “purposely infected dozens of teens with 
HIV.”316 The county health commissioner declared, “He’s not a 
monster . . . . We have the devil here.”317  
Similar racialized media panics accompanied the first high-
profile HIV prosecutions in Canada, the United Kingdom, Aus-
tralia, and New Zealand. In each country, the first HIV prose-
cution involved an African immigrant man accused of infecting 
native-born white women.318 As Matthew Weait observes, media 
coverage of these prosecutions in the United Kingdom framed 
the men as “assassins and predators who, with their black 
counterparts in other (predominantly non-black) parts of the 
world figure as insatiable and archetypal threats to innocent, 
 
 315. JoAnn Wypijewski, The Secret Sharer: Sex, Race, and Denial in an 
American Small Town, HARPER’S, July 1, 1998, at 35, 49. In the end, it turned 
out that thirteen young women who had slept with him tested positive for 
HIV; tests cannot determine whether they had gotten HIV from him or from 
someone else, nor could they determine who infected whom. SHEVORY, supra 
note 301, at 14–15 (noting that “some of the infected women were drug users 
and had multiple partners, making it virtually impossible to point the finger 
at Williams with certainty”). 
 316. SHEVORY, supra note 301, at 16–21. Shevory points out that an argua-
bly more sensational 1996 case, in which thirty women who had slept with the 
accused tested positive for HIV, and one of them shot and killed him, received 
little attention in the media. Id. at 20. All his uninformed partners were black. 
Id.  
 317. Wypijewski, supra note 315, at 38; see also Markus, supra note 275, at 
847–49 (characterizing Williams’ sexual activity as “a killing spree” against 
“kids”). 
 318. See, e.g., WEAIT, supra note 16, at 27–29, 138–40; Cameron et al., su-
pra note 16, at 36 (noting that the first New Zealand prosecution involved Pe-
ter Mwai, a Kenyan man accused of infecting New Zealand women); Miller, 
supra note 278, at 31–50 (documenting the racialized moral panic over allega-
tions that Charles Ssenyonga, a Ugandan immigrant, had infected three white 
women); Persson & Newman, supra note 14, at 634–35 (noting that, although 
multiple HIV prosecutions occurred in Australia during 2000–2005, the only 
prosecution covered by The Sydney Morning Herald involved an African male 
immigrant who had had sex with a white woman). 
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white, and ‘native’ femininity.”319 Sociologists Asha Persson and 
Christy Newman, too, note overtones of black sexual threat to 
white women in Australian media coverage of HIV prosecutions 
in the 1990s and 2000s.320 James Miller notes a similar dynamic 
in Canada.321 
In the United States, criminalization of HIV has often fol-
lowed intensive media coverage of allegations of heterosexual 
transmission. Florida, the first state to pass HIV-specific crim-
inal legislation,322 did so in response to widely publicized allega-
tions that an HIV-positive woman had been working as a pros-
titute.323 Missouri, likewise, expanded its HIV law in response 
to statewide publicity of allegations that Darnell “Boss Man” 
McGee, a black St. Louis drug dealer, had infected many black 
women and teenage girls.324  
Unlike the “Patient Zero” allegations against Gaëtan 
Dugas, the intense nationwide coverage of the Nushawn Wil-
liams case was followed by a wave of criminalization. Between 
1997 and 1999, California, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Missouri, 
New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Washington all passed 
legislation to create new HIV crimes, or to make existing ones 
more punitive. Many state legislators invoked Williams as they 
introduced these bills.325 In New York, for example, Williams 
was mentioned in repeated (but unsuccessful) legislative at-
tempts to pass punitive HIV laws.326 In Florida, state legislators 
“cited Williams as they revised the Florida criminal code to 
make knowing transmission (or attempted transmission) of 
 
 319. WEAIT, supra note 16, at 140. 
 320. Persson & Newman, supra note 16, at 636. 
 321. Miller, supra note 278, at 31. 
 322. See J. Stan Lehman et al., Prevalence and Public Health Implications 
of State Laws That Criminalize Potential HIV Exposure in the United States, 
18 AIDS Behav. 997, 999, 1000 fig.1 (2014). 
 323. See Robert Craig Waters, Florida’s Omnibus AIDS Act of 1988, 16 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 441, 511 (1988). 
 324. See MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT 20–21 (2000); David P. 
Niemeier, The Criminal Transmission of AIDS: A Critical Examination of 
Missouri’s HIV-Specific Statute, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 667, 688–89 (2001); Ad-
am Nossiter, Man Knowingly Exposed 62 Women to AIDS Virus, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 19, 1997, at 7; HIV-Infected Man Preyed on Girls Before His Murder, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 12, 1997, available at ProQuest, Doc. No. 418332244. 
 325. Wolf & Vezina, supra note 275, at 844.  
 326. Wypijewski, supra note 315, 38–39. The New York legislature did not 
expressly criminalize nondisclosure, but only revised its health law to require 
notification of public health officials and sexual contacts when a person tests 
positive for HIV. SHEVORY, supra note 301, at 2. 
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HIV a class I felony punishable by up to thirty years in pris-
on.”327  
Although legislative history is not readily available for 
most states’ nondisclosure laws, the available evidence sug-
gests that, as the Global Commission has observed worldwide, 
the proponents of HIV criminalization hope that nondisclosure 
laws will “protect women, especially monogamous wives, from 
the risk of HIV infection by male sexual partners.”328 In Michi-
gan, for example, the House Republican Task Force recom-
mended the broad HIV nondisclosure law that passed in 
1998.329 The Task Force report expressed concern that some 
people with HIV might show the “wanton disregard for the 
safety of sexual partners” that had recently been attributed to 
Gaëtan Dugas.330 Although Dugas’s partners had all been men, 
the Task Force expressed particular concern that bisexual men 
might pass HIV to their trusting wives.331 “[M]any times at-risk 
individuals are unaware,” the Task Force observed, citing a 
study indicating that “80 percent of the wives of bisexual men 
(a high-risk group) were unaware of their spouses’ bisexuali-
ty.”332 Citing the case of a woman who gave birth to an HIV-
positive baby after being unknowingly infected by a husband 
who had hidden his drug use from her, the report asked, “How 
common is this woman’s plight? . . . If marital partners can fail 
to inform their spouses of their infection and continue to prac-
tice unprotected sex, how much more likely is this to occur 
when the sexual encounter takes place outside the confines of 
marriage?”333 In other states for which detailed legislative his-
tory can be obtained (California, Tennessee, and Georgia), leg-
islators also seemed to envision that the victims of HIV nondis-
closure would be female and the perpetrators male.334 Ohioan 
 
 327. SHEVORY, supra note 301, at 2. 
 328. GLOBAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 31, at 23. 
 329. HOUSE REPUBLICAN TASK FORCE ON AIDS, supra note 66, at 17. 
 330. Id. at 17. 
 331. Id. at 17. 
 332. Id. at 17 (parentheses in original). 
 333. Id. at 19. 
 334. During the California legislative debate over its nondisclosure statute, 
legislators discussed only examples of male-to-female transmission, invoking 
heterosexual male nondisclosers including Nushawn Williams, Hank Bishoff, 
William Lucas Barker, and Forrest Jones. The transcripts indicate no mention 
of male-to-male nondisclosure or transmission: 1998 chaptered law 1001 (S.B. 
705), creating H&S Code 120291 (on file with author); see also, e.g., HIV—
Criminal Exposure—Penalties: Hearing on H.B. 1686 Before the Tenn. Judici-
ary Comm., 1994 Leg., 99th Sess. 2–3 (Tenn. 1994) (statement of Peroulas-
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legislators seem to have been an exception: like other state leg-
islators, they invoked Nushawn Williams and Darnell McGee, 
but they also mentioned several cases of male-to-male nondis-
closure.335 
Similarly, in the Supreme Court of Canada’s 2012 Mabior 
decision, Chief Justice McLachlin’s majority opinion asked, 
rhetorically: “Should the trusting wife who does not ask a direct 
question as to HIV status of her partner be placed in a worse 
position than the casual date who does?”336 “Is there a good rea-
son for compelling disclosure to one’s wife but not to a casual 
date?”337 This gendered language suggests that lawmakers saw 
criminalization as a way to protect women who conform to con-
ventional norms of heterosexual passivity. Like the legislators 
of Michigan, California, Tennessee, and Georgia, the Supreme 
Court of Canada expressed no concern about HIV transmission 
or nondisclosure by women, or between men.  
Criminal nondisclosure laws enact an underexamined intu-
ition that (faithful) heterosexuals should not ordinarily have to 
worry about HIV. This assumption was also built into recent 
federal HIV policy: the Bush Administration’s 2005 Plan for 
Treatment and Prevention of HIV/AIDS Abroad (known by its 
acronym, PEPFAR), for example, required abstinence-
promotion programs that recommended condom use only to 
“high-risk populations,” defined as “prostitutes, sexually active 
discordant couples substance abusers, and others.”338 PEPFAR-
funded programs touted an “ABC” approach to HIV prevention 
that would promote Abstinence before marriage, Being faithful 
within marriage, and Condom use only for “those who are in-
 
Draper, Member, Tenn. H.R.) (on file with author) (stating that, since the only 
existing HIV criminal law targeted prostitutes, who were “classically . . . fe-
male,” the new nondisclosure bill would help “individuals who fall through the 
cracks” by “addressing this [new crime] to females” as victims). The official 
Georgia legislative history summarizes the legislative discussion of Georgia’s 
1988 omnibus AIDS bill. It uses gender-neutral language throughout, except 
when discussing perpetrators of the new crime of HIV nondisclosure, for which 
the perpetrators were invariably described as “he.” Selected 1988 Georgia Leg-
islation, 5 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 173, 408–10 (1988).  
 335. The legislators also invoked two cases involving male-to-male nondis-
closure: James Russel and Tony Valenzuela (on file with author). 
 336. R. v. Mabior, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 584, 610 (Can.).  
 337. Id. at 613. 
 338. OFFICE OF THE U.S. GLOBAL AIDS COORDINATOR, THE PRESIDENT’S 
EMERGENCY PLAN FOR AIDS RELIEF: U.S. FIVE-YEAR GLOBAL HIV/AIDS 
STRATEGY 27 (2004). 
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fected or who are unable to avoid high-risk behaviors.”339 This 
approach to prevention declared that non-sex-working, non-
drug-injecting heterosexuals need not use condoms unless they 
have been told that their partners are HIV-positive. While a re-
strictive approach to condom use may have been welcome to 
straight couples who did not want to use condoms, it is alleged 
to have derailed Uganda’s early success in suppressing HIV 
transmission.340 
Fortunately, the Obama Administration has abandoned 
the abstinence-based PEPFAR strategy.341 The stereotype that 
heterosexuals are, or should be, immune to HIV remains visi-
ble, though, in contemporary academic discourse about the risk 
posed to heterosexuals by men who have sex with both men and 
women (variously characterized as “bisexuals,” men “on the 
down low,” or, more neutrally, MSMW). Since the early days of 
the HIV crisis, Kenji Yoshino notes, “nonmonogamy associated 
with bisexuals has been connected to HIV infection, with bisex-
ual ‘promiscuity’ acting as a bridge (phantasmatically if not ac-
tually) between the ‘infected’ gay population and the ‘uninfect-
ed’ straight population.”342 As Russell Robinson has observed, 
sensationalistic media coverage of black men “on the down low” 
frames closeted black MSMW in particular as an infectious 
threat to their “innocent wives and girlfriends.”343 The stigmati-
zation of HIV-positive black MSMW as “bridges” might increase 
risky behaviors, as they may hesitate to suggest condoms or 
disclose their HIV status for fear their female partners will 
suspect they are gay.344 
 
 339. Id. at 29; accord Jonathan Cohen & Tony Tate, The Less They Know, 
the Better: Abstinence-Only HIV/AIDS Programs in Uganda, 14 REPROD. 
HEALTH MATTERS 174, 177 (2006). 
 340. Cohen & Tate, supra note 339, at 177–78; see also GLOBAL 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 31, at 45 (discussing a proposed “draconian 
Anti-Homosexuality Bill” as an impediment to Uganda’s HIV prevention 
measures). 
 341. See generally WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF NAT’L AIDS POL’Y, supra note 
14 (presenting a strategy that relies on a combination of different approaches, 
including condom use). 
 342. Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. 
L. REV. 353, 363 (2000). 
 343. Robinson, supra note 302, at 1465, 1471, 1474 n.41. 
 344. See, e.g., Nina T. Harawa et al., Perceptions Towards Condom Use, 
Sexual Activity, and HIV Disclosure Among HIV-Positive African American 
Men Who Have Sex with Men: Implications for Heterosexual Transmission, 83 
J. URB. HEALTH 682, 687–91 (2006); Matt G. Mutchler, Psychosocial Correlates 
of Unprotected Sex Without Disclosure of HIV-Positivity Among African-
BUCHANAN_4fmt 4/7/2015  4:27 PM 
2015] WHEN IS HIV A CRIME? 1303 
 
The CDC has expressed skepticism about “media attention 
[to] men on the down low and HIV/AIDS [that] has focused on 
the concept of a transmission bridge between bisexual men and 
heterosexual women,”345 questioning whether MSMW are in-
fected in higher proportions or put more people at risk than 
other groups might. Nonetheless, public health research con-
tinues to investigate the role of HIV-positive MSMW as “bridg-
es” or “vectors” who might transfer HIV from the high-
prevalence population of MSM to the lower-prevalence popula-
tion of heterosexual-identified women.346 Researchers address-
ing the HIV risks posed by the sexual activity of MSMW ex-
press urgent concern about the potential threat they may pose 
to heterosexual women347 (and, sometimes, the women’s other 
 
American, Latino, and White Men Who Have Sex with Men and Women, 37 
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 736, 743 (2008). 
 345. ‘Down Low’: What Is It?, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/sex 
-relationships/what-is-down-low (last modified Apr. 12, 2006); accord Myth: 
HIV/AIDS Rate Among Black Women Traced to ‘Down Low’ Black Men, NPR 
(Oct. 28, 2009, 12:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php? 
storyId=114237523 (interviewing Dr. Kevin Fenton, Director of the CDC Na-
tional Center for HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, and STD and TB Prevention, who 
attributed sexual transmission of HIV to black women largely to male part-
ners that inject drugs or have “multiple [hetero]sexual partners,” with bisexu-
al black men accounting for “a smaller proportion” than these other risk fac-
tors, and pointed out that only two percent of black men are estimated to be 
“bisexually active”).  
 346. See, e.g., Karolynn Siegel et al., Sexual Behaviors of Non-Gay Identi-
fied Non-Disclosing Men Who Have Sex with Men and Women, 37 ARCHIVES 
SEXUAL BEHAV. 720, 720–21, 732 (2008) (summarizing research on the role of 
MSMW as “bridges” or “vectors” of transmission). Moreover, popular and aca-
demic concern about non-gay identified, non-disclosing MSMW tends to focus 
disproportionately on black men and Latinos “on the down low.” Id. at 721 
(noting in that “the existing research on non-gay identified MSMW is limited 
by its exclusive focus on African American and Latino men” (citation omitted)). 
For a critique of this discourse, see Robinson, supra note 302, at 1469–500. 
 347. See, e.g., Susan Y. Chu et al., AIDS in Bisexual Men in the United 
States: Epidemiology and Transmission to Women, 82 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
220, 220, 223–24 (1992); Harawa et al., supra note 344, at 687–91; J. P. Mont-
gomery et al., The Extent of Bisexual Behaviour in HIV-Infected Men and Im-
plications for Transmission to Their Female Sex Partners, 15 AIDS CARE 829, 
829–30, 832–33 (2003); Robinson, supra note 302, at 1465, 1471; Amy Rock 
Wohl et al., HIV Risk Behaviors Among African American Men in Los Angeles 
County Who Self-Identify As Heterosexual, 31 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE 
DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 354, 355–56 (2002); cf. Gregorio Millett et al., Focus-
ing “Down Low”: Bisexual Black Men, HIV Risk and Heterosexual Transmis-
sion, 97 J. NAT’L MED. ASS’N 52S (2005) (investigating the risk of HIV infec-
tion that black MSMW might pose to black heterosexual women, finding 
lower-risk behaviors among closeted MSMW than among heterosexual black 
men, and calling for investigation of the contribution of exclusively heterosex-
ual black men to black women’s rate of infection). 
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male partners).348 They typically express little or no concern 
that HIV-positive MSMW might also infect their male part-
ners,349 even where they find that such men report more high-
risk behavior with men than they do with women.350  
Prosecution lends itself to the heterosexist but still influen-
tial logic of HIV “innocence” and guilt.351 This logic is also 
racialized. Popular speculation about the African origins of HIV 
reinforced existing stereotypes of Africans and black people as 
hypersexual and closer to subhuman apes, and thus sexually 
deviant even if heterosexual.352 In keeping with the sensational-
ized stories of black-on-white victimization that initiated public 
discourse about HIV criminalization, prosecutions in Anglo-
American jurisdictions tend overwhelmingly to involve hetero-
sexual, rather than same-sex, interactions; defendants are dis-
proportionately African immigrant men, and nondisclosure 
complainants are disproportionately white women.353 Some HIV 
advocates suspect that U.S. prosecutions may follow a similar 
 
 348. Id.; see also, e.g., SHEVORY, supra note 301, at 13–15.  
 349. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 318–320. 
 350. See, e.g., Mutchler et al., supra note 344, at 739, 740 tbl.1 (finding that 
black, white and Latino HIV-positive MSMW reported higher rates of unpro-
tected intercourse without disclosure to male partners than to female part-
ners: 47% reported unprotected anal sex without disclosure with a male part-
ner, while only 28% reported unprotected vaginal or anal sex without 
disclosure with a female partner). This finding was not discussed in the arti-
cle. Instead, the authors expressed concern that “African-American and Latina 
females may be particularly vulnerable to HIV infection because their 
. . . MSMW’s [male] partners are more likely to identify as heterosexual, which 
may contribute to less communication about sex with male partners.” Id. at 
745.  
 351. Grant, Boundaries, supra note 20, at 154 (“The desire for retribution 
overshadows the complexity of the relationships involved in these cases, por-
traying the accused as an evil predator and (usually) the complainant as the 
innocent prey.”). 
 352. SHEVORY, supra note 301, at 11–13; Miller, supra note 278, at 44–45; 
see also Phillip Atriba Goff et al., Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Histori-
cal Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 292, 292 (2008) (finding that the “Black-ape association” influ-
ences “judgments in criminal justice contexts”). 
 353. See, e.g., WEAIT, supra note 16, at 146 (United Kingdom); Cameron et 
al., supra note 16, at 15, 35–36 (Australia and New Zealand); Miller, supra 
note 278, at 32 (Canada); Mykhalovskiy & Betteridge, supra note 16, at 44–45 
(Canada); Persson & Newman, supra note 16, at 633 (Australia); see also 
GLOBAL NETWORK OF PEOPLE LIVING WITH HIV, THE GLOBAL 
CRIMINALISATION SCAN REPORT 2010, at 16–17 (2010), available at http:// 
www.hivpolicy.org/Library/HPP001825.pdf (noting that “in numerous coun-
tries,” including Denmark, Norway, the UK, Australia, and New Zealand, Af-
rican immigrants and “men of African descent” are overrepresented as the ac-
cused in HIV criminal prosecutions). 
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pattern.354 In Nashville and Michigan, African-American men 
and women are heavily represented as accused in prosecutions 
for heterosexual nondisclosure, although it is not clear that 
their representation is disproportionate.355 Black men are nota-
bly underrepresented as accused in same-sex nondisclosure 
prosecutions.356 The Nashville and Michigan studies provide no 
 
 354. See, e.g., Luke Baumgarten, The Sick and the Damned, INLANDER 
(Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.inlander.com/spokane/the-sick-and-the-damned/ 
Content?oid=2139357 (quoting David P. Lee, former chair of Washington 
state’s Advisory Panel on HIV/AIDS, as suggesting that racial disparities in 
HIV prosecutions “probably inflam[e] racial passions—black men having sex 
with white women,” and reporting Trevor Hoppe as finding that, in Michigan, 
white MSM “account for 40 percent of people with HIV, but only account for 15 
percent” of HIV accused, while straight black men comprise 14 percent of peo-
ple with HIV, but almost 41 percent of HIV arrests); Mark D. Fefer, HIV: 
Criminal Intent, SEATTLE WEEKLY NEWS (Oct. 9, 2006), http://www 
.seattleweekly.com/2004-12-01/news/hiv-criminal-intent (“According to Seattle 
Weekly research, about half the defendants in recent HIV prosecutions across 
the country were black men. (Locally, it’s two out of the three.)”); see also 
Strub, supra note 50, at 42 (stating that racism is “inextricably linked” with 
HIV criminalization). 
 355. In both Tennessee and Michigan, the CDC estimates that about 61–
62% of people diagnosed with HIV are black. The CDC estimates that, in Ten-
nessee in 2011, 921 adults and adolescents were diagnosed with HIV, of whom 
about 61% were black and 33% were white. OFFICE OF THE DIR., NAT’L CTR. 
FOR HIV/AIDS, VIRAL HEPATITIS, STD, & TB PREVENTION, CDC, CS2382532-
47, TENNESSEE: 2013 STATE PROFILE (2013), available at http://www 
.cdc.gov/nchhstp/stateprofiles/pdf/Tennessee_profile.pdf. In Michigan in 2011, 
the CDC estimates that 793 adults and adolescents were diagnosed with HIV, 
of whom about 62% were black and 29% were white. OFFICE OF THE DIR., 
NAT’L CTR. FOR HIV/AIDS, VIRAL HEPATITIS, STD, & TB PREVENTION, CDC, 
CS2382532-26, MICHIGAN: 2013 STATE PROFILE (2013), available at http:// 
www.cdc.gov/nchhstp/stateprofiles/pdf/Michigan_profile.pdf. Of twenty-six 
Michigan convictions for male-to-female nondisclosure, fifteen involved black 
accused. Hoppe, supra note 73, at 84 tbl.4, 85 tbl.5. In Nashville, six of eight 
male-to-female nondisclosure prosecutions involved black accused. Galletly & 
Lazzarini, supra note 9, at 2627 tbl.2. Some studies suggest that black or La-
tino men may be more likely to nondisclose than white men. Mutchler, supra 
note 344, at 739; Kathleen Sullivan, Male Self-Disclosure of HIV-Positive 
Serostatus to Sex Partners: A Review of the Literature, 16 J. ASS’N NURSES 
AIDS CARE 33 (2005). 
 356. Galletly & Lazzarini, supra note 9, at 2627 tbl.2 (reporting that all 
Nashville MSM prosecutions involved white accused); Hoppe, supra note 73, at 
85 tbl.5 (ten of fourteen MSM prosecutions involved white accused, while three 
accused were black and one was “other”); see also Mykhalovskiy & Betteridge, 
supra note 16, at 41–42 (finding a majority of white accused in male-male 
nondisclosure prosecutions in Canada). Although systematic evidence of com-
plainants’ race, life experience, and socioeconomic status is not available, it 
seems reasonable to expect that men who report same-sex nondisclosure to 
police might be unusually enfranchised: these are men who do not expect po-
lice to mistreat or humiliate them, are not afraid to come out, and who expect 
police to take their complaints seriously. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
BUCHANAN_4fmt 4/7/2015  4:27 PM 
1306 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:1231 
 
information about the race of complainants that might further 
illuminate the racial dynamics of nondisclosure prosecutions in 
the United States.  
As Kathleen Sullivan and Martha Field cautioned in 1988, 
the unpopularity of the groups most affected by HIV—gay men, 
intravenous drug users, and racial minorities—should raise 
suspicion that calls for quarantine and criminalization “may 
not be motivated solely by public safety concerns.”357 “Many in 
positions of power will not fear a law they think themselves 
and their kind immune to, nor will they empathize with those 
less powerful groups to whom the law will predictably apply. If 
AIDS primarily afflicted mainstream groups such as white het-
erosexuals,” Sullivan and Field predicted, “quarantine and 
criminalization would not be discussed so lightly.”358  
Sullivan and Field predicted that HIV crimes would be se-
lectively deployed to harass and persecute gay men.359 Hetero-
sexual prosecutions would merely be incidental.360 Part IV of 
this Article will show that the demographics of HIV criminali-
zation tend to support Sullivan and Field’s concern that sexual, 
racial, and criminal stigma might shape HIV criminalization—
but not in the way they foresaw.  
IV.  THE GENDER OF HIV PROSECUTION   
To the extent HIV nondisclosure implicates any legally de-
fensible interest in health, autonomy, or moral retribution, it 
should be protected equally for people of all genders, regardless 
 
some male complainants do fit this description. See, e.g., Marsha Melnichak, 
Plendl: I Want To Be Who I Want To Be, LE MARS DAILY SENTINEL (June 23, 
2004), http://www.lemarssentinel.com/story/1071117.html (Adam Plendl, the 
Nick Rhoades complainant, appears to be a handsome, blond, blue-eyed white 
man. He describes his experience of coming out in high school: his principal 
“was really great with dealing with me on harassment issues. I would take 
names and whatever and he would deal with the issues. It got a lot better than 
I thought it was going to at first.”); Thompson-Sarmiento, supra note 97 (de-
scribing a complainant who is a well-known star of a successful television se-
ries). 
 357. Sullivan & Field, supra note 89, at 150. 
 358. Id. 
 359. Id. at 189–91; see also Gostin, supra note 84, at 1045, 1055, 1058 (not-
ing the creation of sexual offenses invites intrusion into the private lives of gay 
men); WEAIT, supra note 16, at 141–45 (describing the relationship between 
gay men, HIV, and risk). 
 360. “To be sure, if AIDS transmission were criminalized, some enforce-
ment against heterosexual AIDS transmitters would likely take place, but that 
fact would not itself negate the point about discrimination against gay men.” 
Sullivan & Field, supra note 89, at 190.  
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of their sexual orientation. This Part will highlight disparities 
between the apparent demographics of HIV prosecutions and 
the presumptive demographics of HIV nondisclosure. While da-
ta on prosecutions are incomplete, they raise concern that the 
criminal law may respond to HIV as a crime that matters most 
when it affects expectations of non-drug-injecting heterosexuals 
to immunity from anxiety about HIV. The demographics of 
nondisclosure prosecutions suggest that gendered and homo-
phobic AIDS stigma may shape whether and when sexual part-
ners, police, prosecutors, and juries think that HIV nondisclo-
sure is a crime. 
Although complete prosecution data is unavailable for the 
United States, it seems that HIV prosecutions are not very 
common.361 Even in the countries with the highest per-capita 
rates of prosecution for HIV exposure or transmission, far less 
than one percent of people with HIV have been prosecuted.362 
The rarity of HIV prosecutions, though, does not counsel com-
placency about the meaning or effects of such laws. As the Su-
preme Court observed in Lawrence v. Texas, a criminal law that 
is rarely enforced may nonetheless stigmatize the people whose 
behavior is criminalized, serving as a governmental “invitation 
to discrimination . . . both in the public and in the private 
spheres.”363 Moreover, as Alexandra Natapoff has argued, when 
underenforcement of criminal laws tends to track race and 
class status, it may reflect governmental indifference or disdain 
toward “the poor, racial minorities, and the otherwise political-
ly vulnerable.”364 Such concerns are especially acute in HIV 
criminalization, where laws seem to be underenforced with re-
gard to low-status victims—gay men, sex workers, drug users, 
and racial minorities—even when they have been infected.365 At 
the same time, HIV crimes seem to be overenforced with regard 
 
 361. See GLOBAL NETWORK OF PEOPLE LIVING WITH HIV, supra note 353, 
at 12 (estimating more than 300 prosecutions, 0.25 per 1,000 HIV-positive 
people, in the United States). 
 362. See id. For example, in New Zealand, the most aggressive per-capita 
prosecutor of HIV in the Anglo-American legal world, there had been only six 
prosecutions as of 2010 (4.29 per 1,000 people with HIV). Id. In Canada, there 
had been sixty-three prosecutions (0.86 per 1,000). Id. In Sweden, the prosecu-
tion rate is 6.12 per 1,000. Id. 
 363. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003). 
 364. Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 
1719 (2006). 
 365. See supra Part I.B. 
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to higher-status victims such as heterosexuals, police officers, 
and johns who have not been harmed or even put at risk. 
This Part identifies the apparent gender disparities in HIV 
prosecutions, and considers several potential explanations for 
them. It seems likely that straight women may be more likely 
than MSM to report HIV nondisclosure to police. The apparent 
gender bias in reporting, though, does not alleviate concerns 
that discriminatory status hierarchies may influence criminal 
HIV laws and their enforcement. Any such reporting bias might 
be consistent with widespread gendered and homophobic intui-
tions that HIV nondisclosure is a crime when a man does it to a 
woman, but is relatively benign when the uninformed partner 
is an MSM.  
A. DEMOGRAPHICS OF NONDISCLOSURE PROSECUTIONS 
As discussed above, public health research on HIV nondis-
closure suggests that it is commonplace, regardless of gender or 
sexual orientation.366 While people with HIV tend overwhelm-
ingly to disclose their status to exclusive, primary, and long-
term partners,367 several researchers have suggested that non-
disclosure to casual partners may be the norm, whether the 
partners are of the same or different sex.368 Thus one might 
predict that the demographics of HIV prosecutions might 
roughly resemble the demographics of the HIV-positive popula-
tion. The available evidence suggests that they do not.  
Across the Western world, prosecutions for HIV exposure 
and transmission follow a distinctive gender pattern: in each 
country, prosecutions typically involve female complainants 
and male accused, even though MSM are the population most 
affected by HIV.369 For example, in Canada, where nearly half 
of people living with HIV are MSM,370 72% of prosecutions have 
 
 366. See supra notes 287–291 and accompanying text. 
 367. See supra note 288 and accompanying text. 
 368. Id. 
 369. In Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New 
Zealand, Europe, and Central Asia, cases of heterosexual transmission and 
exposure are over-represented in criminal prosecutions. GLOBAL NETWORK OF 
PEOPLE LIVING WITH HIV, supra note 330, at 16–17.  
 370. In Canada, 46.7% of people living with HIV are MSM. PUBLIC HEALTH 
AGENCY OF CANADA, SUMMARY: ESTIMATES OF HIV PREVALENCE AND 
INCIDENCE IN CANADA 1 (2011), available at http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/aids 
-sida/publication/survreport/estimat2011-eng.php. On the other hand, 32.5% of 
Canadians living with HIV were infected through heterosexual contact (14.9% 
from HIV-endemic countries, and 17.6% from non-endemic countries). Id. Of 
HIV diagnoses attributed to heterosexual sex, about 55.2% (n=170) were men 
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accused men of nondisclosing to women.371 In New Zealand, 
where MSM comprise 83% of people living with HIV, five of 
eight prosecutions involved female complainants and male ac-
cused.372 In England and Wales, where MSM comprise 43.5% of 
people living with HIV,373 sixteen HIV prosecutions involved 
female complainants and male accused, while only three in-
volved MSM.374 In Scotland, all four HIV prosecutions have in-
volved female complainants and male accused.375 In Australia, 
where 86% of people diagnosed with HIV are MSM,376 54% of 
prosecutions involved female complainants.377 
Large-scale, comprehensive nationwide studies of HIV 
prosecutions have yet to be conducted in the United States. 
American HIV advocates believe that most nondisclosure pros-
ecutions involve women who allege nondisclosure by male for-
mer partners.378 The only U.S. jurisdictions for which compre-
hensive prosecution data are available—Nashville and 
 
44.8% (n=138) were women. PUBLIC HEALTH AGENCY OF CANADA, HIV AND 
AIDS IN CANADA: SURVEILLANCE REPORT TO DECEMBER 31ST, 2011, at 19 
(2012), available at http://www.catie.ca/sites/default/files/PHAC_HIV-AIDS_ 
2011%20Report_Eng-Fr.pdf.  
 371. See Mykhalovskiy & Betteridge, supra note 16, at 40 (noting that 74 of 
103 prosecutions involved men accused of nondisclosure to women). 
 372. Cameron et al., supra note 16, at 36. 
 373. Of 73,400 people living with a HIV diagnosis in the United Kingdom, 
31,900 (43.5%) are MSM, while 51.1% were infected by heterosexual sex. 
HEALTH PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 45, at 6. Notably, 23,100 (31.5%) are 
women infected through heterosexual sex (15,900 African-born women and 
7,200 women not born in Africa) and 14,400 (19.6%) are men infected through 
heterosexual sex (7,600 African-born, and 6,800 non-African-born). Id. 
 374. NAT, CRIMINAL PROSECUTION CASE TABLE 1–2 (2013), available at 
http://www.nat.org.uk/media/Files/Policy/2013/Criminal%20prosecution% 
20case%20table%20-%20March2013.pdf.  
 375. Id. at 4. 
 376. THE KIRBY INSTITUTE, HIV, VIRAL HEPATITIS AND SEXUALLY 
TRANSMISSIBLE INFECTIONS IN AUSTRALIA: ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE REPORT 
11 (2012). 
 377. Guide to Australian HIV Laws and Policies for Healthcare Profession-
als: Criminal Law, AUSTRALASIAN SOC’Y HIV MED., http://www.ashm.org.au/ 
HIVLegal/Default.asp?publicationID=2&SectionID=342 (last updated Dec. 10, 
2013) (noting twenty of thirty-seven prosecutions involved female complain-
ants and male accused).  
 378. Interview with Catherine Hanssens, Executive Director, Center for 
HIV Law and Policy; see also Strub, supra note 50, at 39 (“Heterosexual men 
of color are the most likely to be prosecuted.”); Fefer, supra note 354 (quoting 
Lambda Legal attorney Jonathan Givner as saying “[t]he demographics of the 
prosecutions do not match the demographics of the epidemic,” and asserting 
that in Washington and nationwide, “HIV prosecutions are almost exclusively 
directed at men victimizing women and occur mainly outside the major cities 
where HIV is most concentrated”). 
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Michigan—tend to support their observations: while most peo-
ple with HIV are MSM, most prosecutions involve men accused 
of nondisclosure to women. 
Of the approximately 940,600 living Americans who have 
been diagnosed with HIV, the CDC estimates that about 18% 
are women infected through heterosexual sex.379 Nonetheless, 
in Nashville and Michigan, women alleging sexual nondisclo-
sure by men account for a majority of nondisclosure prosecu-
tions and convictions. In Nashville, eight of fifteen prosecu-
tions—about 53.3%—alleged male nondisclosure to women.380 
The Michigan study counted convictions rather than prosecu-
tions.381 It found a similar gender disparity. Most convictions—
twenty-six of fifty-one, or 51.0%—involved male nondisclosure 
to women.382  
In the United States, MSM comprise a majority of the HIV-
diagnosed population—about 57%.383 In Nashville and Michi-
gan, MSM accounted for less than 30% of prosecutions: three of 
fifteen prosecutions (20%) in Nashville,384 and fourteen of fifty-
one (27.5%) in Michigan.385  
The table below presents the gender disparity in graphic 
form. Because the number of prosecutions in each jurisdiction 
is small and the gender disparities are similar, I have combined 
the data about known prosecutions in both Nashville and Mich-
igan. However, the reader should be aware that the prosecution 
figures presented in this chart oversimplify the findings by add-
ing prosecutions in Nashville to convictions in Michigan (alt-
hough almost all known Michigan prosecutions resulted in con-
viction386).  
 
 379. CDC, HIV SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 286, at 22. The CDC 
estimates 207,100 women are in the transmission category “heterosexual con-
tact,” of which it estimates 36,400 are undiagnosed. Id. The 170,700 women 
who have been diagnosed with HIV comprise 18.1% of the HIV-diagnosed pop-
ulation. Id.  
 380. Galletly & Lazzarini, supra note 9, at 2627. 
 381. Prosecutions in Michigan overwhelmingly resulted in conviction, but 
the Michigan study did not analyze the prosecutions that did not. See Hoppe, 
supra note 73, at 79–80. 
 382. Id. at 82, 84. 
 383. See supra note 286.  
 384. Galletly & Lazzarini, supra note 9, at 2627. 
 385. Hoppe, supra note 73, at 82, 84.  
 386. Id. at 79–80.  
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Table 1.387 
 
 
If we use HIV incidence (recent transmissions of HIV), ra-
ther than prevalence, as a comparator,388 the gender disparity is 
similar, but starker. Men who have sex with men constitute a 
large and increasing majority of new HIV infections, while the 
proportion of women infected by men has decreased slightly 
since the early 2000s.389 In 2010, the most recent year for which 
incidence statistics are available, 66% of new diagnoses were 
attributed to sex between men;390 less than 17% were women 
 
 387. CDC, supra note 286, at 22; Galletly & Lazzarini, supra note 9, at 
2627; Hoppe, supra note 73, at 82, 84. 
 388. There is little reason to suppose that most, or even much, HIV trans-
mission actually involves nondisclosure. As noted supra note 52 and accompa-
nying text, the people most likely to transmit HIV are those who do not know 
they are infected and thus could not be guilty of nondisclosure. Transmission 
by a person who knows s/he has HIV does not necessarily indicate nondisclo-
sure: as noted supra note 54, it is not uncommon for people to knowingly have 
unprotected sex with an HIV-positive partner. 
 389. See CDC, supra note 67, at 4. 
 390. The CDC attributes 29,800 of 47,500 new HIV infections (about 62.7% 
of the total) to male-male sex. CDC, supra note 67, at 15. Another 1,600 new 
infections occurred in men who had used intravenous drugs and had sex with 
other men (a category it counts separately from non-IV-using MSM). Id. Thus 
66.1% of new HIV infections have occurred among men who have sex with 
men. 
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infected by sex with men;391 and less than 9% were men infected 
by sex with women.392  
In Canada, male-to-male prosecutions may be increasing: 
Eric Mykhalovskiy found a marked increase in male-male pros-
ecutions in Canada since 2009.393 It seems plausible that reduc-
tions in societal homophobia might benefit male nondisclosure 
complainants who have had sex with men.394 On the other 
hand, the United Kingdom has apparently seen no male-male 
prosecution since 2007.395  
Because the numbers are so small, it is difficult to discern 
whether men alleging nondisclosure by HIV-positive women 
are overrepresented in nondisclosure prosecutions. If they are, 
the disparity does not seem to be as glaring: men infected 
through sex with women comprise about 8% of persons diag-
nosed with HIV,396 but men alleging nondisclosure by women 
account for 22.7% of the prosecutions or convictions in Nash-
ville and Michigan combined.397 There are roughly seven times 
as many MSM diagnosed with HIV than there are heterosexual 
men infected by women,398 but in Nashville and Michigan, the 
number of prosecutions was almost equal. Of 66 prosecutions, 
fifteen (four in Nashville and eleven in Michigan) alleged fe-
male-to-male nondisclosure, compared to seventeen prosecu-
tions (three in Nashville and fourteen in Michigan) alleging 
nondisclosure between men. 
 
 391. Women whose infection is attributed to heterosexual sex represented 
8,000 of 47,500 new HIV infections in 2010. Id. 
 392. Of 47,500 new HIV infections in 2010, the CDC attributes 4,100 
(8.6%) to men’s sex with women. Id.  
 393. Mykhalovskiy & Betteridge, supra note 16, at 40–41 (“[C]ases may be 
increasing among . . . MSM”). But see NAT, supra note 374, at 1–2 (finding no 
male-male prosecutions in England and Wales since 2007). 
 394. Marc Spindelman argues that gay men’s low reporting rates for HIV 
transmission and other “sexual harm” reinforce societal devaluation of gay 
men as victims of sexual violence. Marc Spindelman, Sexuality’s Law, 24 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 87, 226 (2013). 
 395. See NAT, supra note 374, at 1–2. 
 396. The CDC estimates 100,600 men have been infected through “hetero-
sexual contact,” of which it estimates 24,500 are undiagnosed. CDC, HIV 
SURVEILLANCE REPORT supra note 286, at 22. The remaining 76,100 men 
comprise 8.1% of the HIV-diagnosed population. Id. 
 397. See Galletly & Lazzarini, supra note 9, at 2627 (noting four of fifteen 
nondisclosure prosecutions alleged female-to-male nondisclosure); Hoppe, su-
pra note 73, at 82, 84 (finding eleven of fifty-one nondisclosure convictions in-
volve female accused and male complainants). 
 398. See supra notes 286, 396. 
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Disparities found in Nashville and Michigan cannot in 
themselves establish conclusive evidence of a nationwide pat-
tern, but there is reason to take them seriously. Carol Galletly 
and Zita Lazzarini (in Nashville) and Trevor Hoppe (in Michi-
gan) obtained access to court records of every prosecution that 
had taken place in their respective jurisdictions since prosecu-
tions began, so the gender disparities found in those places are 
real. The disparities are substantial, they are consistent across 
jurisdictions, and advocates think they are typical. If male-
male nondisclosure prosecutions were more frequent, across the 
United States, than the Nashville and Michigan studies sug-
gest, we might expect that the HIV advocacy groups that track 
(and oppose) such prosecutions would hear about more of 
them.399 But the gender pattern of cases identified by the CHLP 
is similar to those found in Michigan and Nashville.400 It is pos-
sible (though it seems unlikely) that prosecutions in other U.S. 
jurisdictions might follow a gender pattern completely unlike 
that found in Nashville, Michigan, and all other Anglo-
American jurisdictions, but there is no evidence pointing in this 
direction. I am aware of no jurisdiction in which a majority or 
plurality of prosecutions for HIV nondisclosure involve men 
who had sex with men.401 
B. GENDERED PROSECUTION DISPARITIES: WHY? 
HIV can be a frightening illness: it can be life-threatening, 
and the stigma associated with it only makes it scarier. A per-
son who learns that he or she has had sex with someone who 
did not disclose his or her HIV infection might feel fear, out-
rage, betrayal, concern, compassion, or some combination of 
these feelings, depending on the circumstances and the rela-
tionship. The prospect of illness and the fear of death are likely 
to be as terrifying to a gay man (or a non-gay-identified MSM) 
as to a heterosexual. Thus, if HIV transmission or exposure en-
 
 399. See, e.g., CHLP, ENDING AND DEFENDING, supra note 2; Strub, supra 
note 50, at 39 (“Heterosexual men of color are the most likely to be prosecut-
ed.”).  
 400. CHLP, PROSECUTIONS, supra note 2 (noting that as of July 3, 2014, of 
ninety-one prosecutions for non-assaultive nondisclosure identified between 
2008 and 2014 for which the gender of nondiscloser and complainant was as-
certainable, sixty-five involved female complainants and male accused, nine 
involved male complainants and female accused, and in seventeen prosecu-
tions, both complainant and accused were male).  
 401. See, e.g., GLOBAL NETWORK OF PEOPLE LIVING WITH HIV, supra note 
353, at 13–20, 36–37; UNAIDS, GUIDANCE NOTE, supra note 31, at 7. 
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gages an interest in sexual autonomy, this interest would pre-
sumptively apply equally to gay and straight-identified com-
plainants.402 Why, then, would prosecutions so overwhelmingly 
involve male accused and female complainants, and why would 
so few of them involve men who had had same-sex sex?  
This gender disparity might result if HIV-positive men 
nearly always withheld their serostatus from women, and near-
ly always disclosed it to other men. Sally Cameron and her co-
investigators, for example, suggest that “men have manipulat-
ed particular heterosexist power dynamics and have been par-
ticularly deceitful and exploitative, particularly in cases involv-
ing long-term relationships and sex with young women and 
girls.”403 The available public health research, though, does not 
suggest that nondisclosure varies by gender in this way.404  
The fact that HIV is transmitted more easily from man to 
woman than the reverse cannot explain straight women’s 
overrepresentation as nondisclosure complainants. First, as 
mentioned above, prosecutions address disclosure, not trans-
mission. Moreover, men’s relatively lower risks of heterosexual 
transmission (compared to women) cannot explain why male-
to-male sexual transmission—by far the most common mode of 
HIV transmission405—would seldom be prosecuted. Moreover, 
although the abusive dynamics identified by Grant and others 
in heterosexual relationships406 are too often real, they are 
hardly universal, and they are not unique to heterosexual rela-
tionships. Abuse and exploitation can occur in same-sex as well 
as heterosexual relationships, and straight women can have 
unprotected or uninformed sex for reasons other than coercion 
by men. Straight women, like straight and gay men, often agree 
to, prefer, or insist upon condomless penetration without re-
quiring an STI test first.407  
 
 402. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 538 U.S. 558, 574 (“Persons in a homo-
sexual relationship may seek [sexual] autonomy . . . just as heterosexual per-
sons do.”). 
 403. Cameron et al., supra note 16, at 42. 
 404. See supra notes 287–291 and accompanying text. 
 405. See supra notes 390–392 and accompanying text. 
 406. See supra note 280 and accompanying text. 
 407. See D.C. Bell et al., The HIV Transmission Gradient: Relationship 
Patterns of Protection, 11 AIDS BEHAV. 789, 804–05 (2007); A. Michelle Cor-
bett et al., A Little Thing Called Love: Condom Use Among High-Risk Primary 
Heterosexual Couples, 41 PERSP. SEXUAL REPROD. HEALTH 218, 222–23 (2009) 
(heterosexual men and women preferred not to use condoms in loving sexual 
relationships; nonuse of condoms signals love, trust and intimacy); see also 
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The apparent overrepresentation of women as complain-
ants, and the apparent underrepresentation of MSM, does not 
necessarily indicate bias among hospital workers, police, or 
prosecutors, though. It seems that most nondisclosure prosecu-
tions originate with a criminal complaint by an uninformed 
partner.408 To the extent that nondisclosure prosecutions are 
driven by victim-initiated complaints, nonreporting by MSM 
probably accounts for much of their underrepresentation as vic-
tims (and accused) in such cases. A recent UNAIDS background 
paper estimated that “the vast majority of cases – in the US 
and all other high-income countries – originate from people 
(primarily heterosexual women) who turn to law enforcement 
after they have ended a relationship.”409 
Uninformed female partners may be more likely to report 
nondisclosure to police than uninformed men are. Some studies 
suggest that, when women test positive for HIV, they may be 
more likely than men to react by blaming their ex-partners.410 
To the extent that prosecutions associate nondisclosure with 
sexual assault, women may be more likely than men to “recog-
nize themselves as victims, to make complaints, and to have 
their complaints acted on by police investigators.”411 
Moreover, given the intense media coverage of high-profile 
prosecutions for male nondisclosure to women, it is hardly sur-
prising that a heterosexual woman who learns that a partner 
was infected might be more likely to “think of . . . [herself] as 
having been wronged and to turn to the criminal law for ‘jus-
tice’, or that the widespread reporting of one successful prose-
cution should lead to others being brought.”412 Correspondingly, 
 
MacFarlane, supra notes 265–266, at 693 (discussing STIs and partners found 
online).  
 408. See UNAIDS, supra note 16, at 26; Hoppe, supra note 73, at 89 (in 
Michigan, enforcement of the disclosure law is “largely through complainant 
reports”).  
 409. UNAIDS, supra note 16, at 26 (parentheses in original). 
 410. See, e.g., Pamina M. Gorbach et al., To Notify or Not To Notify: STD 
Patients’ Perspectives of Partner Notification in Seattle, 27 SEXUALLY 
TRANSMITTED DISEASES 193, 199 (2000); cf. Chacko, supra note 291, at 30 
(noting that thirty-one percent of the adolescent females who notified their 
partners that they had been diagnosed with a venereal disease did so in an 
accusatory manner).  
 411. Mykhalovskiy & Betteridge, supra note 16, at 44; see also CAMERON & 
RULE, supra note 16, at 42 (speculating that “heterosexual populations have 
failed to adopt the ‘mutual responsibility’ ethos embedded in safer sex messag-
es, because women may more readily identify as victims in heterosexual rela-
tions”); Grant, Time To Rethink Cuerrier, supra note 20, at 54. 
 412. WEAIT, supra note 16, at 146. 
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men who learn that a male sexual partner had HIV might be 
less likely than other uninformed partners either to feel that 
they are victims of a crime, or to report it to police.  
On the other hand, the perception that HIV nondisclosure 
harms women more grievously than it harms MSM is probably 
not limited to the complainants themselves. Evidence of the 
origin of such prosecutions is necessarily anecdotal, but many 
HIV prosecutions start when public health or social workers 
report HIV-positive patients to police when they believe that 
their patients are disregarding public health advice to use con-
doms and disclose their status before sex.413 Other prosecutions 
have originated when health workers urged patients who 
sought testing to call the police.414 Moreover, some HIV prosecu-
tions seem to have been initiated by police during routine traf-
fic stops or other law enforcement unrelated to HIV.415 To the 
extent that government actors urge or initiate prosecutions, 
they may be implicated in the gender disparity.   
 
 413. See, e.g., Trevor Hoppe, Controlling Sex in the Name of “Public 
Health”: Social Control and Michigan HIV Law, 60 SOC. PROBS. 27, 36–38, 42 
(2013) (documenting that Michigan public health authorities investigate 
anonymous allegations that patients are having sex without disclosure, re-
quire that they sign forms acknowledging that they have been told to disclose 
and use condoms and acknowledging that they may be prosecuted if they fail 
to obey, and refer intransigent patients to police); see also State v. Mahan, 971 
S.W.2d 307, 309–11 (Mo. 1998) (en banc) (describing public health interven-
tions similar to those described by Hoppe); UNAIDS, supra note 16, at 23 (cit-
ing “evidence from the United States that some public health departments . . . 
are using fear of prosecution (sometimes based on an inaccurate characterisa-
tion of the law) to prevent people with HIV from unprotected sex, even with 
the informed consent of partners”); SHEVORY, supra note 301, 1–2, 100–02 
(health authorities initiated Nushawn Williams’s prosecution); Hoppe, supra 
note 9, at 142 (describing how the prosecution of “Sandra” began after her 
guardian reported her to police for having undisclosed sex). 
 414. The Nick Rhoades prosecution began when his uninformed partner, 
Adam Plendl, sought prophylactic treatment. “According the police report . . . 
the hospital called police.” Young, supra note 28; see also, e.g., Thompson-
Sarmiento, supra note 97 (explaining that Lee Thompson pursued charges 
against his boyfriend only after receiving advice to do so).  
 415. See, e.g., Man Convicted on AIDS Case Arrested on Sex Charge, JOLIET 
HERALD NEWS (Apr. 21, 2011), http://heraldnews.suntimes.com/news/4941274 
-418/man-convicted-on-aidscase-arrested-on-sex-charge.html (explaining that 
police found HIV medication while searching a car and disclosed a man’s HIV 
infection to his partner, who was in the car); Todd Heywood, Police Officer Re-
leases HIV Status of Suspect to His Ex-girlfriend, BETWEEN LINES, Dec. 2, 
2010, at 10 (describing a traffic stop in which a man who was pulled over and 
arrested for driving with a suspended license told the state trooper he had 
HIV and needed access to his medications; the trooper told his ex-girlfriend, 
and she pressed nondisclosure charges). 
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Several commentators suggest that, because HIV preva-
lence is much higher within “gay communities” than among 
heterosexuals, MSM may be aware of a considerable risk that 
their partners may have HIV even if they do not disclose.416 
Mykhalovskiy and Betteridge contend that, because gay men 
are aware that their partners may be HIV-positive, and be-
cause safer sex is “common, if not normative” among gay men, 
“within gay communities, HIV disclosure is not routinely ex-
pected or demanded.”417 Other commentators claim that “much 
of the gay community holds that everyone is responsible to pro-
tect themselves because anyone could be infected, . . . [an] ethic 
[that] may not apply equally in heterosexual communities.”418 
Marc Spindelman goes further, arguing that gay men may have 
internalized a misguided “ideology of sexual freedom,” ground-
ed in queer theory, that valorizes sexual risk-taking and disre-
gards sexual injuries suffered by gay men.419 Men who see 
themselves and their community in any of these ways might be 
less likely than straight-identified women or men to feel that a 
crime has been committed if they learn that a sexual partner 
did not disclose HIV-positive status before sex. 
Gay cultural norms, though, are unlikely to fully account 
for the relative rarity of prosecutions for HIV nondisclosure be-
tween men. Firstly, not all gay-identified men agree that HIV 
disclosure should be optional: many of them believe that all 
people with HIV owe an obligation to disclose their serostatus 
before sex.420 Certainly, gay men who report their partners’ 
nondisclosure to police see themselves as victims of a sexual 
crime.  
 
 416. Ciccarone et al., supra note 108, at 952 (suggesting that “public health 
messages urging gay men to ‘act as if every partner is HIV positive’ may have 
contributed to norms that make disclosure optional”). 
 417. Mykhalovskiy & Betteridge, supra note 16, at 43–44. 
 418. Symington, supra note 20, at 660; see also Hoppe, supra note 73, at 
86–87 (noting that HIV prevention messages targeting the gay community en-
courage individuals to protect themselves). 
 419. Spindelman, supra note 394, at 98. 
 420. BARRY D. ADAM ET AL., ONTARIO HIV TREATMENT NETWORK, HOW 
CRIMINALIZATION IS AFFECTING PEOPLE LIVING WITH HIV IN ONTARIO 18 
(2012); Mykhalovskiy & Betteridge, supra note 16, 44 (noting that “[g]ay men 
are heterogeneous in their views on the legal and moral duty of HIV disclo-
sure”); see also Horvath et al., supra note 1, at 1224 (indicating that sixty-five 
percent of MSM respondents think HIV nondisclosure should be illegal before 
unprotected sex). 
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Secondly, most MSM are not gay: about two thirds of MSM 
are not gay-identified.421 Young, low-income black and Latino 
men, in particular, may not identify themselves or their part-
ners with “gay” identity and culture, which they and others 
may associate with affluent white gay men.422 Nonwhite MSM 
are also overrepresented among recent HIV infections.423 It is 
by no means clear that the (contested) cultural norm condoning 
nondisclosure that some commentators attribute to “gay com-
munities” is shared by non-gay-identified MSM.  
The reasons MSM might not report cannot be assumed to 
be idiosyncratic or benign. Even if a man thinks his male part-
ner’s HIV nondisclosure was a crime, he might hesitate to con-
tact police for fear of a homophobic or racist reception,424 or be-
cause he fears the consequences of revealing his same-sex 
sexual activity.425  
If, as seems likely, prosecution disparities are driven main-
ly by reporting bias rather than by official misconduct, they 
should still give us pause. Feminists and others concerned 
about justice should be concerned when the “law on the books” 
appears to be facially neutral, even as the “law in action” is 
targeted by gender or race.426 A facially neutral nondisclosure 
law is not necessarily benign if legislators, police, health work-
 
 421. Anjani Chandra et al., Sexual Behavior, Sexual Attraction, and Sexual 
Identity in the United States: Data from the 2006–2008 National Survey of 
Family Growth, 36 NAT’L HEALTH STAT. REP., No. 36, at 26 tbl.9, 27 tbl.10, 30 
tbl.13 (2011) (finding that 4.3% of men report same-sex sex during the past 
year, 5.2% report ever having had same-sex sex, but only 1.7% identify as 
“gay”); GARY J. GATES, HOW MANY PEOPLE ARE LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND 
TRANSGENDER? 5 (2011) (“[A]dults are two to three times more likely to say 
that they are attracted to individuals of the same-sex or have had same-sex 
sexual experiences than they are to self-identify as LBG [lesbian, gay man or 
bisexual].”). 
 422. See Robinson, supra note 302.  
 423. CDC, supra note 67, at 1, 8 (noting of new infections among MSM, fif-
ty-five percent were young black men age 13–24). 
 424. Hoppe, supra note 73, at 86; Mykhalovskiy & Betteridge, supra note 
16, at 44. In Australia, Cameron et al. found “anecdotal evidence of the police 
not taking complaints from gay men as seriously as from heterosexual wom-
en.” Cameron et al., supra note 16, 45–46 n.48. 
 425. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 302, at 1496 (citing structural con-
straints on ability of low-income minority men to come out as gay). 
 426. See generally ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW 
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No 
Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 
STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1129–46 (1997) (describing how the discriminatory pur-
pose doctrine permits facially neutral acts that reinforce gender and race hier-
archies). 
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ers, and most other people understand it to apply primarily to 
heterosexual women. Furthermore, to the extent that media 
reporting affects public perceptions of who a typical nondisclo-
sure complainant would be, the apparent gender disparity may 
be self-perpetuating even if it is entirely unintentional. 
The demographics of nondisclosure prosecutions are con-
sistent with an assumption—whether by law enforcement, the 
Florida courts,427 or by uninformed partners themselves—that 
it is mainly heterosexuals who are wronged when their part-
ners fail to disclose HIV-positive serostatus. Whether it is be-
cause of how others see them, how they see themselves and 
their partners, or how they expect the police to react to them, 
MSM seem to be grossly underrepresented in nondisclosure 
prosecutions, and intravenous drug users—in the few states 
that require needle-sharing disclosure—seem hardly to be rep-
resented at all.  
C. WHAT ABOUT HETEROSEXUAL MEN? 
The apparent overrepresentation of men who had sex with 
women as nondisclosure accused might seem curious, in light of 
early predictions that gay men would be targeted for prosecu-
tion.428 Enforcement of other nonviolent sex crimes, such as 
sodomy, prostitution, and public sex, does not typically target 
heterosexual men for arrest while sparing gay men.429 It seems 
unlikely that heterosexual men constitute a legally subordinat-
ed or disfavored group in the context of consensual sex.430  
Men who are prosecuted for nondisclosure to women, 
though, are not necessarily exclusively heterosexual. If they are 
heterosexual, others who know of their serostatus may not see 
them that way. The bare fact of HIV infection may give rise to 
suspicion that a straight-identified man has been having sex 
with men.431 Prosecutors sometimes suggest, whether in good 
 
 427. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 428. See supra notes 359–360 and accompanying text.   
 429. This generalization, obviously, does not apply to crimes of sexual coer-
cion that were long defined by male sexual victimization of (chaste) females, 
such as traditional rape law, statutory rape, and the crime of seduction. See, 
e.g., Buchanan, Engendering Rape, supra note 21, at 1640–41 (defining the 
prototypical sexual assault case to involve a man aggressor and female vic-
tim). 
 430. See Robert Wyrod, Masculinity and the Persistence of AIDS Stigma, 13 
CULTURE, HEALTH & SEXUALITY 443, 445 (2011). 
 431. See, e.g., Harawa et al., supra note 344, at 690–91 (the stigmatization 
of HIV-positive black MSMW as “bridges” may increase risk behaviors, as they 
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faith or for tactical reasons, that men who nondisclose to wom-
en may be bisexual.432  
Given the stereotypical characterization of bisexual men or 
men “on the down low” as deceitful “bridges” who spread HIV to 
heterosexual populations,433 and widespread denial that unpro-
tected heterosexual sex is high-risk,434 it is conceivable that 
complainants, public health workers, or criminal justice actors 
may suspect HIV-positive men of being bisexual “vectors” of in-
fection, regardless of their actual sexual history.435  
Meanwhile, though heterosexual nondisclosure seems to be 
prosecuted more vigorously than its same-sex counterpart, it 
does not seem that nondisclosure laws are enforced as aggres-
sively on behalf of male victims of women’s nondisclosure as for 
female victims of men’s nondisclosure.436 Prosecutions tend to 
construct HIV nondisclosure as a crime of sexual victimization; 
as I have shown in previous work, conventional understandings 
of sexual coercion tend to presume that perpetrators are male 
and victims are female, an expectation that can obscure sexual 
victimization that does not conform to this pattern.437 Hetero-
sexual men fit uneasily into the stereotypical role of sex-crime 
victim, and nondisclosure prosecutions do not tend to construct 
them that way.  
On the other hand, state laws also criminalize HIV-positive 
people for nonrisky behaviors—sex work438 and biting or spit-
 
hesitate to suggest condoms or disclose their HIV status for fear their female 
partners will suspect they are gay); Mutchler et al., supra note 344, at 743 
(same); see also Miller, supra note 278, at 42–43 (noting that a sensational 
Canadian bestseller suggested, with little evidence, that Charles Ssenyonga, a 
Ugandan-Canadian man alleged to have infected many white Canadian wom-
en without disclosing his HIV status, was actually gay).  
 432. One Michigan court, for example, upheld the behavior of a prosecutor 
in a man-woman nondisclosure case who “implied that [the accused] . . . was 
[a] homosexual,” pointing out that the accused had attended a physician visit 
with a man, and asking him “whether he made a comment to a third person 
about intending to infect every woman in Pontiac with HIV.” People v. Flynn, 
No. 199753, 1998 WL 1989782, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 1998). 
 433. See supra notes 346–349 and accompanying text. 
 434. See supra Part III. 
 435. See Robinson, supra note 302, at 1523; Yoshino, supra note 342, at 
423–26. 
 436. See supra notes 396–397. 
 437. Buchanan, Engendering Rape, supra note 21, at 1640–41; see also Bu-
chanan, Our Prisons, Ourselves, supra note 21, at 42–43 (arguing that in 
men’s jails and prisons, sexual victimization emasculates victims in the eyes of 
other men). 
 438. Although sex work may involve high-risk sexual behavior such as 
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ting—that could cause anxiety to men who are behaving as 
conventional gender expectations might predict. Since biting 
and spitting cannot transmit HIV,439 there is no reason to pun-
ish biting or spitting any more severely if the biter or spitter is 
HIV-positive.  Nonetheless, such prosecutions are common-
place.440 In Nashville, the number of HIV prosecutions for biting 
or spitting was comparable to the number of prosecutions for 
sexual nondisclosure.441 Of eleven “HIV exposure” prosecutions 
in Nashville for spitting, biting, or flinging blood, ten of the vic-
tims were police officers. While nine out of these ten cases oc-
curred before 2007,442 other evidence does not suggest a similar 
recent decline nationwide.443 Since such prosecutions serve no 
plausible interest in public health, the additional penalty im-
posed on biters and spitters who are HIV-positive appears to 
serve no purpose other than protection of a dignitary interest of 
law enforcement officers in not being made to worry about HIV. 
Prosecutions of HIV-positive sex workers are similarly un-
related to transmission risk: as mentioned above, many such 
prosecutions involve acts that cannot transmit HIV.444 Felony 
HIV-prostitution is a crime even if the sex worker discloses his 
or her status.445 HIV-positive sex workers have been prosecuted 
even though they were carrying condoms.446 As Galletly and 
Lazzarini point out, prosecutions for such commercial sexual 
 
condomless penetration, prosecutions of sex workers depend only on their HIV 
status. Condom use is not a defense to any HIV-prostitution crime, and many 
of the prosecutions involve no risk of transmission. See supra notes 76–78 and 
accompanying text. 
 439. See, e.g., HIV Transmission Risk, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/ 
policies/law/risk.html (last updated July 1, 2014) (characterizing risk from bit-
ing as “negligible”). Thirteen states have laws that specifically criminalize bit-
ing, spitting or throwing blood while HIV-positive: CHLP, supra note 69. 
 440. See, e.g., CHLP, PROSECUTIONS, supra note 2 (finding that of 130 HIV 
prosecutions identified by CHLP since May 2010, twenty-seven alleged biting 
or spitting). 
 441. Galletly & Lazzarini, supra note 9, at 2626–27 (finding eleven biting, 
spitting, scratching, and flinging blood prosecutions (of which ten victims were 
police officers) and eight male-to-female sexual nondisclosure prosecutions).  
 442. Note that the decline was not statistically significant. Id. at 2627.  
 443. See id. at 2634; see, e.g., State v. Schroeder, No. E2010–01210–CCA–
R3–CD, 2011 WL 208078, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 13, 2011) (prosecuting 
defendant for biting hospital employee). 
 444. See supra Part I.C. 
 445. See CHLP, ENDING AND DEFENDING, supra note 2, at 31. 
 446. See, e.g., People v. Hall, No. B190199, 2007 WL 2121912, at *1–2 (Cal. 
Ct. App. July 25, 2007). 
BUCHANAN_4fmt 4/7/2015  4:27 PM 
1322 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:1231 
 
activities “[do] not appear to be based on either actual risk or 
evidence of intent to harm.”447 
Furthermore, police in many U.S. jurisdictions reportedly 
treat possession of multiple condoms as evidence that a suspect 
is a prostitute, thereby discouraging sex workers from carrying 
and using them.448 To the extent that they are punished for car-
rying condoms, the vigorous prosecution of HIV-positive sex 
workers suggests that criminalization might in effect protect an 
interest of (presumptively male) clients in having condomless 
commercial sex without anxiety about HIV. This interest, like 
the interest in freedom from (unfounded) worry that saliva will 
transmit HIV, is not worthy of protection by the criminal law.  
D. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND PERCEIVED HIV RISK 
A final explanation for the gender disparity in HIV prose-
cutions might be that gay and straight sexual actors might as-
sess their HIV risk differently. Learning that a partner has 
HIV could come as a greater shock to a heterosexual than to a 
MSM. There is no doubt that, in North America, HIV preva-
lence is much higher among men who have sex with men than 
it is among most heterosexual men and women.449 A majority of 
 
 447. Galletly & Lazzarini, supra note 9, at 2632. 
 448. See, e.g., Jim Dwyer, Giving Away, Then Seizing, Condoms, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 25, 2012, at A18 (reporting that New York police confiscated and 
destroyed condoms from people they suspected of being sex workers); Megan 
McLemore, Distributing, Then Confiscating, Condoms N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 
2012, at A17 (reporting that many of the women she “interviewed told us they 
were afraid to carry the number of condoms they needed, and some — about 5 
percent — told us they had unprotected sex with clients as a result”); Sex 
Workers at Risk, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 19, 2012), available at http:// 
www.hrw.org/node/108771 (reporting on police and prosecutorial use of con-
doms as evidence of prostitution in New York City, Washington, D.C., Los An-
geles and San Francisco, and finding that “despite millions of dollars spent on 
promoting and distributing condoms as an effective method of HIV prevention, 
groups most at risk of infection—sex workers, transgender women, and lesbi-
an, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) youth—are afraid to carry them 
and therefore engage in sex without protection as a result of police harass-
ment”). Moreover, the HRW report found that it was disproportionately female 
and transgender sex workers who were harassed for carrying condoms; one 
outreach worker noted that he had “never had any young men afraid to take 
condoms.” Id. at 5. 
 449. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) does not estimate the preva-
lence among heterosexual as opposed to gay-identified communities, presuma-
bly because of the difficulty identifying them. Nonetheless, it declares that 
MSM are “the population most severely affected by HIV.” CDC FACT SHEET, 
HIV AMONG GAY, BISEXUAL AND OTHER MEN WHO HAVE SEX WITH MEN 1 
(Sept. 2013) [hereinafter CDC, HIV AMONG MEN], available at http://www 
.cdc.gov/hiv/pdf/risk_HIV_among_AA_Gay_other.pdf. In the United Kingdom, 
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people living with HIV are MSM, but this proportion is not 
overwhelming: the most recent CDC prevalence data indicate 
that 56.8% of the 1.15 million Americans living with HIV are 
men infected through same-sex sex.450 About 42.7% of the HIV-
positive population is non-MSM: about 18% are women infected 
through sex with men, about 8.7% are men infected through 
sex with women, and another 15.9% are men and women whose 
infection is attributed to injection drug use without any male-
male sexual contact.451  
Given the statistical and stereotypic association between 
HIV and gay identity, some heterosexuals might believe (sin-
cerely, albeit inaccurately) that it is safe to assume that poten-
tial partners do not have HIV unless they say so. Such a heter-
osexual might feel that an HIV-positive partner who fails to 
disclose has wronged him or her by exposing him or her to a 
much higher risk than he or she might have foreseen. By this 
reasoning, heterosexuals—and the health workers, police offic-
ers, and prosecutors who interact with them—might fairly be-
lieve they are wronged by HIV nondisclosure in a way that 
MSM are not. The heterosexual, unlike the gay man, was ex-
posed to risk that he or she did not subjectively foresee.  
The risk-perception argument, though superficially plausi-
ble, is misguided on a number of levels. If it relies on unbiased 
assessments about statistical prevalence, we might ask why the 
same intuition does not seem to extend to complainants who 
had sex with HIV-positive black or African partners. Infection 
rates among African-Americans are considerably higher than 
among other American racialized groups.452 One might argue, 
 
where heterosexual transmission is more common than in the United States, 
the public health agency estimates HIV prevalence to be 1.5 per 1,000 for the 
entire U.K. population (1 in 666); among MSM, 47 per 1,000; among hetero-
sexual African women, 1 in 51; among heterosexual African men, 1 in 26. 
ADAMMA AGHAIZU ET AL., HIV IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 2013 REPORT 4, 7 
(Pub. Health Eng., 2013).  
 450. Estimating about 1,148,200 Americans currently living with HIV, the 
CDC attributes the infection of about 592,100 people living with HIV or AIDS 
to male-male sex; another 60,200 people with HIV report both male-male sex 
and injection drug use. These two groups of men comprise about 56.8% of all 
people living with HIV. CDC, HIV SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 286, at 
22 tbl.5a. 
 451. The infections of 100,600 men (8.7% of the total) and 207,100 women 
(18.0% of the total) are attributed to “heterosexual contact”; 70,200 (6.1%) are 
women whose infection is attributed to “injection drug use”; and 113,200 
(9.8%) are men who report “injection drug use,” but no sex with men. Id. 
 452. African Americans comprise twelve percent of the U.S. population, but 
forty-four percent of new HIV diagnoses. Prevalence among black Americans 
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then, that the statistical and stereotypic association between 
HIV and black or African origin puts anyone, of any race, on 
notice of a higher risk that a black or African partner might 
have HIV. Yet white women who had sex with nondisclosing 
black men are the prototypical complainants in HIV nondisclo-
sure cases.453 If prosecution disparities reflect a judgment that 
nondisclosure is less wrongful among MSM and more wrongful 
when a black man does it to a white woman, that judgment is 
not the product of unbiased risk assessment based on group 
prevalence. It also cannot explain why sex workers would be 
punished for having HIV: it cannot be seriously argued that the 
clients of sex workers would be surprised to learn that a sex 
worker could have HIV (or any other STI).  
If prevalence-based risk perception were taken seriously as 
a justification for differential HIV prosecutions, it would imply 
that an HIV-positive man should be prosecuted for 
nondisclosing to a female partner, but not for nondisclosing to a 
man; an HIV-negative woman could file a complaint if a white 
man nondisclosed to her, but not if a black man did; an HIV-
positive john might be punished, but an HIV-positive sex work-
er could not be. While group-based risk assessment cannot ex-
plain our contradictory laws and practices with respect to HIV 
crime, they remain consistent with my status-based theory of 
HIV crime: an inchoate expectation that heterosexual (white) 
men and women are entitled to assume their partners are HIV-
negative in a way that MSM (of any race) are not. 
Group-based risk assessment is no more relevant to public 
health than it is to morality. The race or gender of the partici-
pants does not affect the risk of a particular sexual activity. 
Anal sex is riskier than vaginal sex, but they are both classified 
as high-risk. In any case, many heterosexuals engage in anal 
sex.454 Since HIV can be transmitted to and by men and women 
of any racial background, race or gender distinctions based on 
differential prevalence rates seem indeterminate (How large 
must a prevalence disparity be to put a partner on notice of el-
 
is eight times higher than among whites. CDC, HIV AMONG AFRICAN 
AMERICANS 1 (2014), available at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pdf/risk_HIV_ 
AfricanAmericans.pdf.  
 453. See supra notes 316–323. 
 454. See, e.g., Chandra, supra note 421, at 1 (providing that thirty-six per-
cent of women and forty-four percent of men say they have had anal sex with a 
heterosexual partner). 
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evated HIV risk? How are the relevant groups defined?), and, if 
explicit, might be unconstitutional.455 
The most important difficulty with the risk-perception ar-
gument for privileging heterosexual complainants is that, if a 
heterosexual believes that unprotected heterosex poses no risk 
of HIV transmission, that belief is unreasonable. HIV trans-
mission among non-drug-injecting heterosexuals is much less 
common than among non-drug-injecting MSM, but it is not 
vanishingly rare. More than 300,000 Americans currently liv-
ing with HIV (100,600 men and 207,100 women) were infected 
by heterosexual sex without any history of male-male sex or in-
jection drug use.456 While this group is a very small percentage 
of the adult population—roughly one out of every 770 American 
adults457—there are hundreds of thousands of heterosexuals 
who, under this assumption, might be imagined to face no ap-
preciable risk of encountering (or having) HIV. A presumption 
that heterosexuals need not take precautions against HIV 
would not have served such people, or their partners, well.  
Not only is there no way for a heterosexual (or anyone else) 
to know whether a prospective partner is infected, there is no 
way for him or her to know that the prospective partner is 
straight. A person may know that she or he is exclusively het-
erosexual and has never shared a needle, but cannot safely as-
 
 455. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (endorsing Justice 
O’Connor’s Equal Protection analysis as “tenable”). Governmental gender clas-
sifications are quasi-suspect, and can be justified only where the gender classi-
fication bears a “substantial” relationship to an “important” governmental ob-
jective. United States v. Virginia 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996); Craig v. Boren 429 
U.S. 190, 211 (1976). Although biological differences between men and women 
can justify gender classifications, see, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 53 
(2001), HIV can be transmitted both by and to men and women, so any rele-
vant “biological difference” is not obvious. A presumption that nondisclosure is 
more invidious based on HIV prevalence among heterosexuals as opposed to 
MSM might be based on overbroad statistical generalizations of the kind the 
Court has previously disapproved. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 516; Boren, 429 U.S. 
at 199. Even if this distinction is based on sexual orientation rather than gen-
der, it is almost certainly subject to a level of scrutiny more exacting than tra-
ditional rational basis review. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 
(2013); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 593 (O’Connor, concurring); Romer v. Evans, 517 
U.S. 620, 620 (1996).  
 456. See supra note 421 and accompanying text. 
 457. While CDC estimates HIV prevalence for the U.S. population aged 
thirteen and older, no equivalent age-based census data were available. The 
2010 U.S. Census estimated that the total U.S. population of persons age six-
teen or older was 243,275,505. LINDSAY M. HOWDEN & JULIE A. MEYER, AGE 
AND SEX COMPOSITION: 2010, at 2 tbl.2 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011), available 
at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-03.pdf.  
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sume the same of a prospective or current sexual partner. 
Many men who have sex with men do not tell all their women 
partners.458 Moreover, even if the heterosexual is right in guess-
ing that his or her prospective partner is also straight, and that 
he or she has never had male-male sex or shared a needle, 
there is no reason to assume that all his or her partners (and 
all their partners) share the same sexual and drug use history. 
There is no way to assess the HIV risk profile of a person by 
looking at (or talking to) them. If it were possible to distinguish 
people at risk of HIV from others, sexual transmission of HIV 
would seldom occur.  
Furthermore, whether dealing with an initial attraction or 
a long-term love, people tend to put their best foot forward, and 
to see potential romantic partners in an idealized light. “Few 
people know the whole truth about those with whom they have 
sex, at least at first.”459 Many of us might imagine that we 
would not be especially attracted to a person we thought was 
likely to have HIV; we also might not be especially attracted to 
a person we thought had a history of injection drug use, or—if 
we are heterosexual women—to a man we thought had had sex 
with men. If we are attracted to someone, we might not think 
them likely to engage in stigmatizing behaviors or likely to 
harbor stigmatized diseases. Heterosexuals, like gay men and 
everybody else, are simply unable to make confident assess-
ments of the likelihood that a partner might have HIV, wheth-
er based on population-level statistics or on our guesses at an 
individual’s history of risk behavior.  
If nondisclosure laws worked to increase disclosure, they 
would not necessarily help straight women (or anyone else) 
know whether their partners were infected. About 18% of peo-
ple living with HIV are unaware of their infection and therefore 
could not disclose it no matter what the law required.460 Hetero-
sexual-identified men are overrepresented among this group.461 
The likelihood that a non-drug-injecting heterosexual might 
 
 458. See supra note 288 (discussing MSMW); see also GATES, supra note 
421, at 5 tbl.4 (“[A]dults are two to three times more likely to say that they are 
attracted to individuals of the same sex or have had same-sex sexual experi-
ences than they are to self-identify as LGB.”). 
 459. Rubenfeld, supra note 189, at 1416.  
 460. CDC, HIV SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 286, at 22 tbl.5a (esti-
mating that about 207,600 Americans do not know they have HIV). 
 461. 11.8% of people living with undiagnosed HIV are men infected by sex 
with women, compared to 8.7% of those who know of their diagnosis. Id.  
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encounter an HIV-positive partner is lower than that of a gay-
identified man, but it cannot be assumed to be zero.  
While non-drug-using heterosexuals might prefer to believe 
that our sexual partners present no risk of HIV infection unless 
they say so, this assumption is not realistic. If enacted into law, 
this assumption might put heterosexuals at increased risk of 
infection by encouraging misguided complacency. Moreover, if 
many heterosexuals have this expectation, it is not based on an 
objective assessment of HIV prevalence but on inaccurate (albe-
it good-faith) stereotype-based assessments of sexual risk. The 
law should not punish people for violating an unreasonable ex-
pectation of heterosexual immunity, however sincerely it might 
be held.  
Fortunately, the heterosexual—or anyone else—who wish-
es to bring his or her HIV risk as close as possible to zero has a 
far more effective strategy than relying on partners to disclose 
infections they may not know they have: he or she can use a 
condom. In the unlikely event that the partner of unknown sta-
tus has HIV, use of a condom cuts the risk to negligible lev-
els.462 Yet heterosexuals—like other people—routinely have sex 
without using a condom, even with new partners, nonexclusive 
partners, and sex workers. This does not necessarily mean they 
are sanguine about the prospect of conceiving a child or con-
tracting an STI from these partners. Many people trade pleas-
ure in the moment against what they deem to be a small-
enough risk of an unwanted consequence. They choose to take a 
risk of pregnancy, STI, or HIV transmission, however likely or 
remote they may believe these outcomes to be.  
In most states, HIV nondisclosure statutes treat any un-
disclosed risk of HIV transmission, however remote, as legally 
intolerable. Unprotected heterosex also carries other notorious 
risks. Even if a heterosexual believes that HIV is a statistical 
impossibility among his or her pool of potential sexual partners 
(by assuming, unreasonably, that a potential partner’s HIV risk 
can be divined from his or her gender, appearance, and out-
ward behavior), he or she must realize that unprotected vaginal 
intercourse with a woman of reproductive age carries a risk of 
pregnancy, and that unprotected oral, vaginal, or anal sex can 
transmit other serious STIs, such as hepatitis and HPV, whose 
consequences, if untreated, can also be fatal. As discussed in 
 
 462. See supra note 33. 
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Part II, though, nondisclosure that affects these risks is gener-
ally not a crime. 
Most people, gay or straight, would probably want to know 
that a person has HIV before deciding about sex. But HIV non-
disclosure does not make the uninformed partner feel he or she 
has to have sex. The uninformed partner remains free to accept 
or refuse, albeit with imperfect information. Sexual autonomy 
does not require criminal punishment of one who betrays or 
disappoints a sexual partner. Sexual autonomy does not re-
quire that sexual activity be free from unwanted risks or con-
sequences. It does not require that people be punished for fail-
ing to conform to the unreasonably optimistic risk assessments 
of their partners. Rather, sexual risk-taking is an exercise of 
sexual autonomy.  
E. GENDER, INTIMACY AND SEXUAL DECEPTION 
We should be even more concerned about the selective 
criminalization of HIV when we consider that the criminal law 
of sexual deception is itself deeply gendered and 
heteronormative. Rape law’s caveat emptor approach to sexual 
deception condones a heterosexist expectation that men, as 
sexual initiators, will press reticent women for sex—and that 
the law should not punish men for using deception to get it. 
Criminal laws have been deliberately reformed to accommodate 
this cultural expectation: during the mid-twentieth century, 
almost every state abolished the crime of seduction—a man’s 
false promise of marriage to persuade a chaste woman to sub-
mit to sex—alongside the “heartbalm” torts (such as criminal 
conversation and alienation of affections). A large part of the 
stated rationale for such abolition was to protect unmarried, 
sexually active heterosexual men against extortion by unscru-
pulous female “gold-diggers” seeking money or marriage.463  
Several feminist and pro-feminist legal commentators have 
argued that women’s true sexual autonomy requires that all 
sex-by-deception should be treated as a crime.464 Like advocates 
 
 463. See generally Jane E. Larson, “Women Understand So Little, They Call 
My Good Nature ‘Deceit’”: A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. 
REV. 374, 446 (1993) (“Images of ‘gold diggers’ and other sexual schemers were 
a staple of the legislative campaigns in the 1930s to abolish the common law 
seduction tort.”); Murray, Marriage As Punishment, supra note 193, at 38 
(“[F]or many critics, it appeared that those most in need of law’s protection 
were men, who, because of civil and criminal seduction laws, could be tricked 
and duped by scheming women.”). 
 464. See, e.g., ESTRICH, REAL RAPE, supra note 268, at 102–03; 
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of HIV criminalization, these scholars generally proceed from 
the premise that criminalizing sex-by-deception would benefit 
(heterosexual) women at the expense of deceitful men.465 Noting 
that current laws permit “a man [to] do things to get a woman’s 
agreement to sex that would be illegal were he to take her 
money in the same way,”466 they argue that the minimal protec-
tions accorded to deceived sexual partners reflect the low value 
placed on women’s sexual autonomy when balanced against 
what Stephen Schulhofer calls a legally protected “interest that 
seems of overriding importance, especially to men: the freedom 
to seek sex with any potential partner who might be interested 
or even reluctant but persuadable, in one way or another.”467 
Several of these commentators adopt a view of sexual au-
tonomy by which women’s equality requires that sex take place 
in an emotionally intimate relationship.468 Martha Chamallas 
 
SCHULHOFER, supra note 189, at 154, 274, 276 (stating that, if a man’s prom-
ise of marriage was “fraudulent from the outset,” the woman’s sexual autono-
my is compromised since “the injury to the woman is not the loss of the eco-
nomic value of the marriage but the indignity of a sexual experience accepted 
under false pretenses”); Boyle, supra note 131, at 146; Martha Chamallas, 
Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 
777, 780 (1988) (“Detailed attention is given to recent feminist-inspired legal 
reforms in the law of rape and sexual harassment, and in tort law governing 
deception in sexual relationships.”); Decker & Baroni, supra note 186 at 1167–
68; Estrich, Rape, supra note 268, at 1120; Falk, supra note 188, at 141; Lar-
son, supra note 463, at 414; Mathen & Plaxton, supra note 20, at 478–84; 
Jacqueline Smyrnick, Challenging the Use of Fraud To Get Into Bed After 
Suliveres v. Commonwealth—A Call for Legislative Reform, 43 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 321, 322–23, 330–31 (2009); see also R. v. Cuerrier, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371, 
380–91 (Can.) (L’Heureux-Dubé J., concurring). 
 465. See, e.g., Cuerrier, 2 S.C.R. at 434 (L’Heureux-Dubé J., concurring); 
ESTRICH, REAL RAPE, supra note 268, at 103; SCHULHOFER, supra note 189, at 
152–59; Chamallas, supra note 464, at 813; Decker & Baroni, supra note 186, 
at 1168–69; Estrich, Rape, supra note 268, at 1120, 1182. 
 466. E.g., Larson, supra note 463, at 412. She argues, though, for creation 
of a tort, not a crime, to address this “dignitary” disparity. Id. at 404, 416; see 
also Cuerrier, 2 S.C.R. at 430; ESTRICH, REAL RAPE, supra note 268; 
SCHULHOFER, supra note 189, at 154–55; Decker & Baroni, supra note 186 at 
1167–68; Falk, supra note 188, at 141, 154–55; Mathen & Plaxton, supra note 
20, at 485 (advocating that the standard for criminal liability for sexual fraud 
should be lower than that for commercial fraud).  
 467. SCHULHOFER, supra note 189, at 276–77. 
 468. See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 464, at 783–84 (explaining that the 
“paramount goal” of a feminist, “egalitarian view” of sexual relationships 
would promote “noncoercive sexual relationships.” “Good sex,” which the law 
should foster, “ha[s] as [its] objective only sexual pleasure or emotional inti-
macy . . . [it] is noninstrumental conduct . . . . Sex used for more external pur-
poses, such as financial gain, prestige, or power, is . . . exploitive and immoral, 
regardless of whether the parties have engaged voluntarily in the encounter,” 
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argued that “it is only in the last few years women have been 
bold enough to assert that they have a legal right to expect 
honesty from men in sexual relationships.”469 Likewise, Decker 
and Baroni argue that criminalizing sex by deception would 
protect the “sexual integrity of women.”470 “Sexual activity,” 
they contend, “is one of the most intimate encounters people 
engage in . . . . [T]olerance [of sex by deception] promotes an 
unseemly status quo in our social fabric that denigrates the 
most intimate of relationships.”471 In Cuerrier, Justice Cory held 
that “a certain amount of trust and confidence exists in any in-
timate relationship . . . the act of intercourse is usually far 
more than the mere manifestation of the drive to reproduce. It 
can be the culminating demonstration of love, admiration and 
respect. It is the most intimate of physical relations.”472 To the 
extent that criminal law might be used to enforce these ideals, 
any casual or exploitative sexual encounter that does not in-
volve mutual love and respect could be punished as rape (possi-
bly mutual rape).473 
In contrast to their embrace of informed-consent rationales 
for HIV nondisclosure, courts and lawmakers have not been re-
 
and should be prohibited by law); see also ELAINE CRAIG, TROUBLING SEX 79 
(2012) (arguing that legal recognition of “sexual integrity” requires “a concern 
with how people treat each other sexually,” but questioning Cuerrier in light of 
“developments in knowledge regarding the rates of transmission and regard-
ing the treatment protocol for HIV”); Larson, supra note 463, at 438 (arguing 
creation of a tort of sexual fraud “would advance feminist ends [and] that cre-
ating and supporting expectations of fairness and honesty between sexual 
partners would increase the quality (and perhaps even the quantity) of sexual 
interaction”); Mathen & Plaxton, supra note 20, at 481 (arguing that the HIV 
nondiscloser’s crime is that he “has used the victim’s body for his own sexual 
pleasure. He has treated the victim simply as an object for his enjoyment, ra-
ther than as an autonomous being in her own right, with her own ends and 
feelings that deserve respect”). 
 469. Chamallas, supra note 464, at 813. 
 470. See, e.g., Decker & Baroni, supra note 186, at 1168–69. 
 471. Id. at 1168; see also, e.g., Smyrnick, supra note 464, at 334 (arguing 
that criminalizing sex-by-fraud would protect the “sexual integrity” of vic-
tims); see also Bradford Bigler, Comment, Sexually Provoked: Recognizing 
Sexual Misrepresentation As Adequate Provocation, 53 UCLA L. REV. 783, 803 
(2006) (“Consensual sex brings with it an element of reciprocity and trust.”).  
 472. R. v. Cuerrier, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371, 428, 430–31 (Can.) (quoting Kath-
leen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (Ct. App. 1984)). 
 473. Taking this argument to an extreme, Bradford Bigler argues that, be-
cause all sexual interactions involve “reciprocity and trust,” an uninformed 
sexual partner is like a married person who discovers a spouse’s infidelity: 
s/he should enjoy a defense of provocation if s/he kills a partner who failed to 
disclose HIV or another “less dangerous sexually transmitted disease, such as 
herpes.” Bigler, supra note 471, at 803.  
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ceptive to the argument that deception vitiates sexual consent 
more generally. The rape-by-deception argument fails in the 
face of an assumption—one apparently so commonsensical as 
not to require citation—that it is common, benign, and normal 
for men to lie to women to get sex. Because male-to-female ly-
ing is so normal, many courts and commentators assert, it must 
not be a crime.  
For example, the Cuerrier majority rejected the rape-by-
deception argument out of hand.474 Proceeding from the as-
sumption that “it will more often be the man who lies,”475 Jus-
tice Cory’s majority offered a number of examples of sexual de-
ception that self-evidently “lack[ed] the character of 
reprehensible criminal acts.”476 A man might lie to a woman 
about his age, or about “the position of responsibility held by 
him in a company; or the level of his salary; or the degree of his 
wealth; or that he would never look at or consider another sex-
ual partner; or as to the extent of his affection for the other 
party; or as to his sexual prowess.”477 To treat such lies as “seri-
ous criminal offence[s],” the Court asserted, would “trivialize” 
sexual assault.478 The Court declared that such lies should not 
be criminalized without explaining why: “The lies were immor-
al and reprehensible but should they result in a conviction for a 
serious criminal offence? I trust not.”479  
Defenders of the caveat emptor approach invoke a number 
of common-sense scenarios to demonstrate that sexual decep-
tion “does not betoken the same depravity and disregard of so-
cial norms” that commercial fraud does, and so should not be a 
crime.480 Almost all these scenarios involve men lying to get sex 
from women. For example, “a man promises a woman a fur coat 
 
 474. In a concurrence, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé advocated the criminaliza-
tion of sexual deception, if “the dishonest act in question induced [a partner] to 
consent to the ensuing physical act, whether or not that act was particularly 
risky and dangerous.” R. v. Cuerrier, 2 S.C.R. at 388.  
 475. Id. at 434 (holding that “its consequences would be the same if it were 
the woman”). 
 476. Id. at 433–34. 
 477. Id. at 434. 
 478. Id. at 434–35. 
 479. Id. at 434.  
 480. Bryden, supra note 187, at 462 n.505 (quoting Herbert Wechsler 
comment in MODEL PENAL CODE COMMENTARIES, PART II §§ 210.0-213.6, 393–
94 (1980)); see also Dan Subotnik, “Sue Me, Sue Me, What Can You Do to Me? I 
Love You” A Disquisition on Law, Sex, and Talk, 47 FLA. L. REV 311, 343 
(1995). 
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in exchange for sexual intercourse,” and fails to deliver;481 a 
man has sex with a prostitute and refuses to pay;482 “Ted” lies to 
“Sally” about his infidelity to her;483 “a married man . . . pre-
tends to be single and has sex with a single woman”;484 or a 
man promises love or marriage to get sex.485 These deceptions, 
they claim, are “the common misrepresentations of dating and 
courtship”486: “lies about love, commitment, marital status, and 
fidelity.”487 Because “[g]irls are taught by their parents to be 
suspicious of the blandishments of suitors,”488 Richard Posner 
argues, women should rely on “self-protection” rather than 
criminal remedies.489 
These commentators offer no evidence that such lies are ei-
ther as common or as harmless as they assume them to be. 
They simply appeal to what they assume is a shared sense of 
the way heterosexual relationships are, and should be. This as-
sumption forms a notorious part of the sexual double stand-
ard.490  
There are sound, gender-neutral reasons to defend caveat 
emptor as a general rule with respect to sexual deception491: 
these aren’t them. Defenders of the caveat emptor rule have 
rightly pointed out that people may not know how they really 
feel or what they want; that people’s feelings can change, in 
good faith; that people put their best foot forward toward new 
and ongoing partners, so that sexual deception might resemble 
“commercial puffery”; and that, before and during a relation-
 
 481. Cuerrier, 2 S.C.R. at 403, 410 (McLachlin, C.J. concurring). 
 482. Bryden, supra note 187, at 466–67. 
 483. Id. at 463; see also SCHULHOFER, supra note 189, at 156–57; Subotnik, 
supra note 480, at 356. 
 484. Bryden, supra note 187, at 464. 
 485. See, e.g., id. at 462 n.505. 
 486. RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON 393 (1992). 
 487. Bryden, supra note 187, at 468; see also SCHULHOFER, supra note 189, 
at 155. Dan Subotnik argues that deception is not only “pervasive,” but “social-
ly purposive.” Subotnik, supra note 480, at 348. “[A] healthy, livable human 
lifetime of relationships with others is . . . inconceivable without deception.” 
Id. at 343 (citing DAVID NYBERG, THE VARNISHED TRUTH 2 (1998)). 
 488. POSNER, supra note 486, at 393. 
 489. Id. at 393: see also Bryden, supra note 172, at 465. 
 490. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. 
PA. L. REV. 955, 960–61 n.19 (1984); Anna Stubblefield, Contraceptive Risk-
Taking and Norms of Chastity, 27 J. SOC. PHIL. 81 (1996); Keith Thomas, The 
Double Standard, 20 J. HIST. IDEAS 195 (1959). 
 491. For a less gendered defense of the legality of sex-by-deception, see 
Rubenfeld, supra note 189. 
BUCHANAN_4fmt 4/7/2015  4:27 PM 
2015] WHEN IS HIV A CRIME? 1333 
 
ship, partners tend to see each other in an idealized light.492 Be-
cause people routinely have sex with others they do not know 
very well, they inevitably fill in gaps in their knowledge of the 
partner with idealized speculation about what the partner is 
really like. This makes it particularly inadvisable to criminal-
ize nondisclosures alongside overt lies. Furthermore, after a 
bad breakup, a person may view the ex-partner and the rela-
tionship in a harsh light, so that any nondisclosure or previous-
ly undisclosed fact might look, in retrospect, like a malicious 
betrayal.493 These objections are sound, but do not fully capture 
the practical and normative difficulties with criminalizing all 
nondisclosures that might be material to sexual consent. 
Arguments in favor of criminalizing sex by deception gen-
erally start by analogy to commercial fraud: the criminal law 
tolerates lies to get sex that would be crimes if used to get mon-
ey.494 This analogy is misguided. Sexual consent is not like con-
sent in contract. Moreover, the presumptions about full infor-
mation and rational decisionmaking that underpin the law of 
contracts—whose empirical validity is questionable in many 
contractual contexts495—are inapposite to sexual 
decisionmaking. 
A is free to refuse sex with B for all kinds of reasons that 
might be invalid as reasons to refuse to enter a contract: be-
cause B is the wrong gender, or the wrong race, or the wrong 
religion; because B is annoying, too tall, too short, too fat, or too 
poor; because B doesn’t smell right, or is a terrible driver; be-
cause B is married, or single, or divorced; because B is a Repub-
lican (or a Democrat); because B has a foot fetish, which turns 
A off; because B is epileptic and A believes, wrongly, that epi-
lepsy is sexually transmissible. No matter how arbitrary, irra-
tional, mistaken, or discriminatory A’s beliefs are, the law 
rightly protects no right of B to require A to have sex with her.  
When it comes to sex, B cannot necessarily foresee what 
disclosures might be material to A. The law should not enforce 
private bias by punishing B as a criminal for failing to live up 
 
 492. See, e.g., Bryden, supra note 187; Rubenfeld, supra note 189; 
Subotnik, supra note 480. 
 493. Bryden, supra note 187.  
 494. See, e.g., SCHULHOFER, supra note 189; Chamallas, supra note 464; 
Estrich, Rape, supra note 268. 
 495. The field of behavioral economics explores the ways in which irration-
al psychological motivations affect economic behavior. See, e.g., DAN ARIELY, 
PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 
(2007). 
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to A’s unstated preferences (or her stated ones), which will, 
quite legitimately, be idiosyncratic, arbitrary, and discrimina-
tory. Perhaps the law could enumerate a list of deceptions that 
would count as presumptively material. It is not clear how 
lawmakers could come up with such a list, other than appealing 
to intuition and common sense (as the proponents and critics of 
sexual caveat emptor do). The list might create a presumption 
that deceptions with respect to, say, gender, fidelity, marital 
status and STIs would be material. (We might ask, then, why 
the law has been reformed to criminalize nondisclosures about 
gender and HIV, and to decriminalize misrepresentations about 
marriage.) But there are people who do not mind, or even pre-
fer, that a sexual partner be married to someone else. There are 
people for whom gender is not a dealbreaker in sexual attrac-
tion. There are “bug chasers” who prefer a partner with HIV, 
and there are people who engage in casual unprotected sex 
without inquiring about STI status.496  
If we take the strong version of sexual autonomy seriously, 
though, we cannot prescribe an objective list of omissions or de-
ceptions that presumptively vitiate consent: the essence of sex-
ual autonomy is that each person gets to decide, on his or her 
own terms, what matters to him or her in sexual 
decisionmaking. Each person can accept or refuse sex for his or 
her own reasons—no matter how trivial or misguided those 
reasons might seem to others.  
In any case, many deceptions that are material to sexual 
consent should not be crimes, an argument I expand on in two 
current works in progress.497 As this Section does not purport to 
offer a comprehensive analysis of sexual autonomy, I will offer 
a single example of sexual nondisclosure to raise questions 
about the normative desirability of criminalizing every sexual 
nondisclosure that might affect sexual consent. Like the schol-
ars who argue for and against sexual caveat emptor, I appeal 
here to the reader’s life experience and moral intuition. Unlike 
the heteronormative scripts imagined by defenders and critics 
of the caveat emptor rule, the scenario offered here is easy to 
imagine among people of any gender. To challenge conventional 
assumptions about sexual deception, though, I will describe the 
nondiscloser as a woman:  
 
 496. See DEAN, supra note 54. 
 497. Kim Shayo Buchanan, Rape by Fraud (under submission, on file with 
author); Kim Shayo Buchanan, Deception, Coercion, and Rape (manuscript, on 
file with author). 
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A and B are on their second date. A, who is 35 years old, was diag-
nosed with gonorrhea ten years ago. She took a course of antibiotics, 
and was completely cured. She does not mention this. After a very 
pleasant dinner, the two have sex for the first time. 
If A disclosed her prior STI to B on the second date, there’s 
a good chance there’d be no sex, and no third date. B might be 
turned off by the fact that A had had gonorrhea—or by the fact 
that it is socially inappropriate to discuss such matters on the 
second date.  
Imagine that A and B continue dating, and fall in love. Af-
ter four months, A discloses her secret, which is shameful to 
her. B might not feel betrayed that A had not revealed this ear-
lier—even though B might not have pursued the relationship 
had A disclosed it on the second date. B might understand that 
A doesn’t share sensitive, embarrassing truths with people she 
barely knows. B might feel honored that, by sharing this infor-
mation, A is signaling deep trust in B. B might be happy that 
their relationship has grown close enough that the two of them 
can share secrets that they would never disclose to a casual 
date. Now let’s suppose that, after a couple of years together, A 
and B break up. Did A rape B repeatedly during the early 
months of their relationship? What if, before that second-date 
sex, B had asked A whether she’d ever had an STI, and A had 
lied? Should her falsehood be a crime?  
Sex often entails emotional intimacy, but it doesn’t always. 
Sometimes sex comes before emotional intimacy. Sometimes 
sex builds emotional intimacy. Sometimes the intimacy never 
materializes, or was never intended. Sex may be casual, or 
commercial. Sometimes the partners don’t trust each other. A 
rule that mandates complete disclosure of every unflattering 
detail about oneself prior to first sexual intimacy would be im-
possible to administer or enforce. Moreover, as a normative 
matter, it wouldn’t be desirable. Criminal law cannot mandate 
emotional intimacy; where it exists, it builds over time. Couples 
build trust by taking emotional and sexual risks.498 Emotional 
intimacy entails sharing aspects of oneself—including aspects 
 
 498. People who think they are HIV-negative are much less likely to use 
condoms with primary or established partners than with partners who are 
new, casual, or secondary. “The duration of a relationship does not have to be 
lengthy before condom use decreases, sometimes only a month or less. At-
tempting to protect oneself from HIV infection during sex between committed 
partners can be viewed as a sign of mistrust or an accusation of infidelity.” 
Bell, supra note 407, at 801 (citations omitted); see also Corbett, supra note 
407. 
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of the self that might, if shared, lead to blame, shame, or rejec-
tion. Self-disclosure is never complete, even in the most inti-
mate of relationships. 
The caveat emptor approach leaves almost all sexual decep-
tion to be dealt with outside the courts, through social or public 
health sanctions. My support of this position may seem disso-
nant with well-established feminist criticisms of how tradition-
al public-private distinctions in criminal law maintained gen-
der hierarchies, leaving women largely unprotected against 
domestic and sexual violence.499 But this Article does not argue 
for complete privatization of HIV disclosure. Rather, 
governments should address HIV the way we do other com-
municable diseases—through public health interventions, ra-
ther than criminal prosecution. Like most sexual deception, 
HIV nondisclosure need not be criminalized: it is not a violent  
crime, and there is little reason (other than the evidence-free 
stereotypes advanced in academic debate over the caveat emp-
tor rule) to believe that lack of candor in sexual relationships 
systematically reinforces gender hierarchy the way sexual as-
sault and domestic violence do. It is likely that conventional 
gender expectations might shape the facts people choose to 
share, withhold, or lie about to potential partners (e.g., men 
might pretend to be more sexually experienced than they are, 
while women might pretend to be less so500). But the selective 
criminalization of sexual nondisclosure by HIV-positive people 
(and transgender men501) gives every reason to fear that a crim-
inal mandate of universal sexual candor would be designed and 
enforced in invidious and discriminatory ways. 
By enacting a presumption that all sex should entail the 
degree of intimacy, trust, and self-disclosure associated with 
the idealized marriage, HIV disclosure laws mandate such in-
timacy, making it a crime for an HIV-positive person to have 
sex when his or her relationship falls short of this standard. 
Where the relationship is intimate, people with HIV are very 
 
 499. See generally, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating As 
Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996); Estrich, Rape, supra note 
268, at 1177. 
 500. See, e.g., Terri Fisher, Gender Roles and Pressure To Be Truthful: The 
Bogus Pipeline Modifies Gender Differences in Sexual But Not Non-Sexual Be-
havior, 68 SEX ROLES 401, 411–12 (2013) (finding that when respondents 
thought their answers were being monitored by a lie detector female respond-
ents reported more sexual partners than males did). 
 501. See supra notes 206–209 and accompanying text. 
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likely to disclose their serostatus.502 But casual, exploitative, 
and abusive relationships are commonplace. Poverty, abuse, 
homophobia, and gender inequality structure the HIV vulnera-
bility of groups such as MSM, married poor African women, sex 
workers, poor people, and racial minorities.503 Such people are 
more likely to be stigmatized, closeted, isolated, or financially 
dependent on their partners, making it much more difficult for 
them to negotiate condom use or, if they are HIV-positive, to 
disclose their serostatus.504  
HIV disclosure mandates illustrate the danger of extending 
the supposedly sacred bonds of love—and its attendant obliga-
tions—to all consensual sexual activity. As Katherine Franke 
and Melissa Murray have cautioned, treating all sexual rela-
tionships as if they were loving and intimate leaves no legiti-
mate space for sex that does not fit the quasi-marital mold, and 
exposes nonconforming sexual actors to criminal scrutiny and 
punishment.505  
Even in relationships that are long-term and emotionally 
intimate, there are many ways in which a trusted spouse or 
sexual partner might betray us. Even a beloved spouse or part-
ner might fail to tell the whole truth about his or her fidelity, 
feelings, sexuality, or health. The most egregious of deceivers 
might misrepresent his or her identity.506 Our society deals with 
 
 502. See supra note 288. 
 503. See, e.g., HIV Among Women, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/HIV/risk/ 
gender/women/facts/index.html (last updated Mar. 6, 2014) (“Women who have 
been sexually abused may be more likely than women with no abuse history to 
engage in sexual behaviors like exchanging sex for drugs, having multiple 
partners, or having sex with a partner who is physically abusive when asked 
to use a condom.”); CDC, HIV AMONG MEN, supra note 449 (“Homophobia, 
stigma, and discrimination may place gay men at risk for multiple physical 
and mental health problems and affect whether they seek and are able to ob-
tain high-quality health services.”); see also GLOBAL COMMISSION REPORT, su-
pra note 31, at 21 (noting that HIV prosecutions exacerbate the vulnerability 
of populations such as HIV-positive women, MSM, transgender people, drug 
users, and sex workers). 
 504. See, e.g., GLOBAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 31, at 20–26; Jane 
K. Stoever, Stories Absent from the Courtroom: Responding to Domestic Vio-
lence in the Context of HIV and AIDS, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1157, 1172–77 (2009) 
(noting that HIV-positive women are subject to abuse, threats to expose their 
serostatus, and partners who often accuse them of infidelity and beat them if 
they suggest condom use).  
 505. See generally Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Law-
rence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (2004); Murray, supra note 193. 
 506. See, e.g., Abby Goodnough, Impersonator To Go on Trial for Kidnap-
ping, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/26/us/ 
26rockefeller.html (describing how a man impersonated a Rockefeller, married 
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such betrayals through social or public health sanctions. In 
general, they are not crimes. 
V.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS: RATCHET UP OR DOWN?   
Public health research offers no reason to expect that HIV 
criminalization would increase disclosure or reduce sexual 
risktaking. Criminalization of nondisclosure could plausibly be 
defended as a normative message that nondisclosure is wrong, 
or as a symbolic attempt to change our cultural norms toward 
greater transparency and self-disclosure in sexual interactions. 
Yet these justifications are not typically used to criminalize 
nondisclosure of other, equally dangerous diseases, or other, 
equally material sexual deceptions. The selection of HIV as a 
vehicle for these symbolic messages does not seem arbitrary. 
The moral salience of HIV in criminal law cannot be separated 
from the homophobia, racism, and gender stereotyping that 
shape exaggerated fears and moral judgments about AIDS and 
HIV in the broader society.  
One way to address the discriminatory HIV 
exceptionalism507 that characterizes our current criminal re-
gime might be to “ratchet up,”508 criminalizing all other poten-
tially deadly infections or material sexual nondisclosures. Fem-
inist-inspired reforms to the laws of sexual assault and 
statutory rape have rightly adopted a ratchet-up solution to 
rape law reform. For example, state legislatures have almost 
universally replaced gendered statutory rape laws with gender-
neutral rules, at least nominally protecting male and female 
youth against sexual exploitation by perpetrators of any gen-
der. Similarly, the intractable race and gender inequalities that 
pervade rape prosecutions do not counsel that sexual assault 
should be decriminalized. Instead, feminists argue that crimi-
nal justice actors should treat the sexual assault of low-status 
 
a businesswoman, and had a child with her). Impersonation is generally crim-
inalized only in specific circumstances, such as fraud or false identification to 
police. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 266, § 37E (2010) (impersonation crimi-
nalized only when “intent to defraud”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25 (2008) (im-
personation criminalized only with “intent to obtain a benefit or to injure or 
defraud”). Impersonation to get sex is not a crime. See supra Part II.C. 
 507. A useful definition of HIV “exceptionalism” is the notion that this vi-
rus “requires a response above and beyond ‘normal’ health interventions.” 
Julia H. Smith & Alan Whiteside, The History of AIDS Exceptionalism, 13 J. 
INT’L AIDS SOC’Y 47 (2010). 
 508. See Aya Gruber, Murder, Minority Victims, and Mercy, 85 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 129 (2014) (highlighting the choice between “ratcheting up” and “ratchet-
ing down” as a solution to inequality). 
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victims as the serious crime that it is.509 Unlike HIV nondisclo-
sure, though, sexual assault is coercive and is always morally 
blameworthy. Victims of sexual assault typically suffer serious 
physical, psychic, and dignitary harms. Sexual assault should 
be a crime regardless of whether enforcement is discriminatory 
or whether criminalization works as a deterrent.  
HIV nondisclosure, by contrast, falls into a gray area. 
While some nondisclosures warrant moral condemnation, pros-
ecutions seem to be quite common in the absence of risk, harm, 
or grievous wrongdoing. There is no evidence that otherwise-
consensual sex without HIV disclosure often causes the kind of 
physical, psychic, or dignitary harm associated with sexual as-
sault. Unlike rape, sex without disclosure is not categorically 
harmful (at least in any way that distinguishes HIV from other 
diseases or deceptions). In these circumstances, concerns about 
the discriminatory application of an ineffective law point to-
ward ratcheting down—decriminalization—rather than ratch-
eting up.  
Several commentators have suggested that HIV criminal 
laws should be adjusted to better fit their moral and public 
health objectives by, for example, restricting criminal liability 
to activities that pose a high risk of transmission, or are in-
tended to transmit HIV.510 HIV prosecutions for oral sex, digital 
manipulation, and biting and spitting could, and should, be 
stopped. HIV-positive sex workers could, and should, be held to 
the same disclosure standards as all other people with HIV. 
Criminal liability could, and should, be restricted to cases in 
which the nondiscloser had specific intent to infect the unin-
formed partner (not just intent to have unprotected sex).511 
While such changes would represent an improvement over the 
current status quo, no state has adopted all of them.512  
 
 509. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 62; Hernández-Truyol, supra note 62; 
Elizabeth Iglesias, Rape, Race and Representation: The Power of Discourse, 
Discourses of Power, and the Reconstruction of Heterosexuality, 49 VAND. L. 
REV. 869 (1996). 
 510. See, e.g., Pinkerton & Galletly, supra note 31 (recommending this ap-
proach); Kaplan, supra note 3 (same); GLOBAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra 
note 31 (same); Mykhalovskiy & Betteridge, supra note 16 (same); UNAIDS, 
GUIDANCE NOTE, supra note 31, at 2–4. 
 511. See UNAIDS, GUIDANCE NOTE, supra note 31, at 2–4.  
 512. California and Illinois have made many of these changes, see notes 6 
and 15, supra. But, like many other states, they subject sex workers to en-
hanced penalties even where they disclose their status or their activities pose 
no risk of transmission. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120291 (2012); 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 647F (2012); CHLP, ENDING AND DEFENDING, supra note 
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Furthermore, the experience of other Anglo-American ju-
risdictions suggests that such reforms would be unlikely to dis-
rupt the gender disparities of HIV prosecution. For example, in 
the United Kingdom, nondisclosers can be prosecuted only if 
they transmit HIV.513 Nonetheless, gender disparities there re-
semble those seen in the United States and Canada, which 
punish nondisclosure regardless of transmission.514  
Another reform might address HIV exceptionalism by ex-
panding criminal liability to other life-threatening sexually 
transmissible infections. Four U.S. states nominally criminalize 
nondisclosure of hepatitis, but these laws seem rarely, if ever, 
to be enforced.515 In Canada, likewise, nondisclosers can be 
prosecuted for any STI—or contraceptive deception516—that 
poses a “significant risk of serious bodily harm.”517 Between 
1989 and 2010, Canada saw at least 122 prosecutions for HIV 
nondisclosure; of these, seventy-eight percent resulted in con-
viction.518 In that time, there has been only one prosecution for 
nondisclosure of hepatitis.519 While the Supreme Court recently 
affirmed that an HIV transmission risk of 1 in 10,000520 was a 
“realistic possibility” of transmission that could support convic-
tion for aggravated sexual assault,521 the judge in the hepatitis 
 
2, at 60–68 (discussing Illinois prosecutions of sex workers in the absence of 
risky activity). 
 513. See generally WEAIT, supra note 16.  
 514. See supra notes 369–377 and accompanying text. 
 515. See supra notes 217–221 and accompanying text. 
 516. The Supreme Court of Canada recently held that condom sabotage 
that deceived a woman into unplanned pregnancy was a fraud that vitiated 
sexual consent, converting otherwise consensual sex into sexual assault. R. v. 
Hutchinson, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 346 (Can.). The majority held that deceiving a 
man into unplanned pregnancy would not vitiate sexual consent because it did 
not pose any risk of “significant bodily harm.” Id. at 76–77. Contraceptive 
fraud is not a crime if the deceived partner cannot become pregnant. 
 517. R. v. D.C., [2012] 2 S.C.R. 626 (Can.); R. v. Mabior, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 584 
(Can.); R. v. Cuerrier, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371 (Can.). 
 518. Mykhalovskiy & Betteridge, supra note 16, at 36, 46. The Global 
Criminalisation Scan reports 146 prosecutions in Canada as of September 
2014. Canada, GLOBAL CRIMINALISATION REPORT, http://criminalisation. 
gnpplus.net/country/canada (last updated Sept. 30, 2014).  
 519. R. v. Jones, [2002] NBQB 340 (Can.). 
 520. Grant, Over-Criminalization, supra note 20, at 63–64 (summarizing 
evidence before the Court in Mabior).  
 521. See Mabior, [2014] 2 S.C.R. at 621–23 (finding that undetectable viral 
load did not eliminate “realistic possibility” of transmission). The only evi-
dence it cited, Myron S. Cohen et al., Prevention of HIV-1 with Early An-
tiretroviral Therapy, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 494, 499 (2011), found that the 
risk of transmission with suppressed viral load was 0.1 per 100 person-years. 
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C prosecution acquitted because a transmission risk of “less 
than 1 percent” was not “significant.”522 Meanwhile, the gender 
dynamics of Canadian nondisclosure prosecutions resemble 
those seen in the United States and elsewhere.  
The consistency of gender disparities across a variety of 
criminal approaches to HIV exposure and transmission suggest 
that the discriminatory social meaning of such laws is not an 
unfortunate epiphenomenon, but the essence of HIV criminali-
zation. Reforms that tailor legal requirements to medical reali-
ties cannot transcend this difficulty. Law reforms that crimi-
nalize other STIs seem in practice to serve as window dressing. 
The criminalization of a broader swath of sexual deceptions 
might address the discriminatory social meaning of HIV crimi-
nalization, but the absence of political will to do so suggests, 
again, that HIV crimes enforce a particularized stigma. 
The available evidence gives little reason to hope that leg-
islative and law enforcement choices would be immune to HIV 
exceptionalism or the discriminatory intuitions by which com-
plainants, police, prosecutors, lawmakers, and triers of fact 
seem to understand HIV as most criminal when it poses a 
threat to heterosexual women. It is hard to imagine requiring a 
legislature to enact, or police and prosecutors to more vigorous-
ly enforce, laws requiring disclosure to drug users, sex workers, 
or MSM—especially when potential complainants may hesitate 
to come forward.   
Nondisclosure of HIV is not a sexual assault. The unin-
formed partner is not made to feel she or he has to have sex. 
We should not create status crimes that send people to prison, 
label them sex offenders, and undermine effective public health 
interventions to make a dubious moral point. HIV laws are de-
monstrably ineffective with respect to their public health goals. 
The denunciatory value of HIV prosecution is questionable, 
given that most victims suffer no physical harm, some are ex-
posed to no risk, and many accused do not deserve moral con-
demnation. Whether they punish nondisclosure, prostitution, 
biting, or spitting, HIV-targeted criminal laws are unnecessary, 
discriminatory, and harmful. They should be repealed. 
 
 522. Jones, [2002] N.B.Q.B. at 340 (acquittal for nondisclosure of hepatitis 
C on the basis that a transmission risk of “less than 1 percent” was not “signif-
icant”). 
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  CONCLUSION   
We should be very concerned about the selective criminali-
zation of sexual activity by stigmatized people when there is no 
distinctive moral, public health, or sexual autonomy reason to 
do it. There is every reason for concern that HIV criminaliza-
tion fits more closely with homophobic, racialized, and gen-
dered valuation of complainants than with any legitimate con-
cern about morality, sexual autonomy, or public health. HIV 
was not treated as rape when AIDS was understood to be a 
“gay plague” that might bypass heterosexuals. Widespread 
adoption of HIV criminal laws followed high-profile cases of 
transmission to white women by black men. Legislators said 
that their intention was to protect heterosexually partnered 
women against deceitful bisexual men. In law and in the me-
dia, male-to-female nondisclosure is often characterized as a 
form of rape—but sentences can be as long or longer than for 
forcible sexual assault, raising doubt that HIV laws have much 
to do with the physical integrity or sexual autonomy of victims.  
The design and implementation of HIV criminal laws is 
consistent with these troubling origins: nondisclosure to heter-
osexual women seems to elicit punitive responses from legisla-
tors, prosecutors, and complainants in a way that male-to-male 
nondisclosure does not. Nondisclosure to other stigmatized in-
dividuals, such as sex workers and needle sharers, is rarely a 
crime, and seems hardly ever to be prosecuted, even when 
transmission has occurred. Meanwhile, prosecutions continue 
to target HIV-positive sex workers and detainees who bite or 
spit on police officers, even when their actions pose no risk of 
transmission.  
In action, HIV criminalization seems to protect an inchoate 
expectation that heterosexuals should be immune to anxiety 
about HIV—even when they engage in casual, unprotected, or 
commercial sex. This is not an interest in sexual autonomy. It 
is not an interest that criminal law should protect, evenhand-
edly or at all. Far from promoting any legitimate interest in 
public health or sexual autonomy, nondisclosure prosecutions 
reinforce invidious gendered, sexual, and racial hierarchies in 
ways that we ought to reject.   
